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8“We want a strong and stable government, not a 
coalition of chaos, led by Jeremy Corbyn”. These 
words, uttered by Greg Knight - Conservative 
candidate for East Yorkshire - in the campaign’s 
most infamous campaign video, came to represent 
a microcosm of the 2017 UK General Election 
campaign. First, it put Theresa May front and 
centre of all Conservative campaign communi-
cations. Second, it contained the Conservative 
Party’s key election message - based on the belief 
that endlessly repeated slogans were the only 
way to cut through the increasingly chaotic and 
fragmented news cycle. And third, it was a terribly 
executed piece of political communication, which 
rather summed up the Tory campaign as a whole. 
By the end, ‘strong and stable’ was a thoroughly 
discredited slogan, as the Tories went on to develop 
their own ‘coalition of chaos’ with the Democratic 
Unionist Party. 
Things weren’t supposed to turn out like this. 
In early April 2017, the Conservatives were at least 
20 points up in most polls, and the Prime Minis-
ter’s personal ratings soared above those of Jeremy 
Corbyn by at least 40 points. These were unprec-
edented numbers, and so with her opponents 
looking ripe for the taking, Theresa May took 
the opportunity to crush the Labour Party for a 
generation and secure her own mandate. With the 
might of the Conservative campaigning machine at 
her disposal and the partisan press firmly behind 
her, she was widely expected to deliver a landslide 
majority for her party. 
But we live in unconventional times, where the 
rules of the game are being perpetually rewritten. 
Even in the context of the election of Trump the 
Brexit vote, the General Election of 2017 will go 
down as one of most extraordinary campaigns of 
recent times. 
This was also an election campaign that was 
twice suspended: firstly, after the Manchester Arena 
bombing on 22nd May that killed 23 and injured 
119 people; and secondly, after the London terrorist 
attack 3rd June that left 8 dead and 48 wounded. 
Both events had a dramatic impact on the ‘mood of 
the nation’, and of course influenced the agenda of 
the campaign with regards to security and policing.
This unique election has raised countless 
questions and talking points, which pollsters, jour-
nalists, academics, commentators and politicians 
alike are all busy analysing. This project, and report 
that follows, is our contribution to our shared 
purpose of making sense of the 2017 election. To 
do this, we have again turned to leading academics 
in the UK and beyond – a mix of world-leading 
experts and early career researchers – to offer their 
reflections, analysis and early research findings on 
the election campaign.
After Section 1 outlines the context in which 
this election was called, we begin to unpack 
voting patterns in Section 2 and their possible 
explanations. After over a decade of rising mul-
ti-party politics, 2017 saw the return of two-party 
dominance, with the Conservatives and Labour 
gaining 82% of vote share and 89% of seats. The 
real story of voters in 2017 was turnout (at nearly 
69% the highest since 1997) despite an electorate 
seemingly jaded from repeated votes, and the 
mass mobilization and engagement of younger 
voters (particularly by the Labour Party). Here, the 
unprecedented generational divide between young 
and old is one of the key stories to emerge. 
In both the 2015 General Election and 2016 
EU referendum campaigns, the (mostly right-wing) 
British press was credited with a crucial influence 
on the outcomes, and in 2017 they again followed 
their usual script. Abuse was continually directed 
at the Labour party and its supposedly shambolic 
leader, amid a constant diet of misinformation 
and spin. But this time – no matter how bluntly 
partisan – the press had limited effect. Section 
3 examines this phenomenon in detail, pointing 
towards the counter-balancing role of social media 
(Section 5), which for the first time, might have 
played a decisive role in a UK election campaign. 
The power of television also endures. As Jeremy 
Corbyn relished being in the spotlight, Theresa 
May performed badly when unscripted and dodged 
debating with opponents. Section 4 thus examines 
the party and campaign dynamics that might 
explain this most unexpected of results exploring 
the reasons for the Tory campaign faltering from 
the start and for Labour to be resurgent. 
With an increasing dis-United Kingdom under 
the shadow of Brexit we also examine the dynamics 
across the nations of Britain. There are two 
important stories that emerged from the nations 
in 2017 which are examined in Section 6. The 
first is the erosion of the SNP share of seats (from 
the historic high in 2015), and the second is in 
Northern Ireland, where the DUP not only gained 
seats but became kingmakers in a hung parlia-
ment. Section 7 then moves to focus on Brexit, the 
pretext for the election that largely became a non-
issue, hence it is important to gauge perspectives of 
the contest from key European countries. 
Finally, in Section 8 we capture perhaps one of 
the most interesting dynamics of the election. The 
interplay between politics and popular culture and 
the role personality played in the outcome.
Published within ten days of the result, these 
contributions are short and accessible. Authors 
provide authoritative analysis of the campaign, 
including research findings or new theoretical 
insights; to bring readers original ways of under-
standing the campaign. Contributions also bring a 
rich range of disciplinary influences, from political 
science to cultural studies, journalism studies to 
psychology. We hope this makes for a vibrant, 
informative and engaging read.
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Amidst a mixed overall picture, two key features of the 
2017 election campaign stand out as systemically signif-
icant for the role of communication in British politics. 
Should they be sustained in the future, the prospects for 
democratic citizenship look brighter.
The confrontation between two different models 
Since the election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader in 
mid-2015, academics, journalists, and the UK citizenry 
at large have been simultaneously exposed to two 
radically different approaches, the driving forces, actor 
relationships, rules of the game and values of which 
stand in sharp contrast to each other. On one side, there 
has been a political consultancy-led model, while on the 
other, there has been a movement-led one. Questions 
then arise over the staying power of the hitherto quite 
firmly entrenched notion of the 'campaign communi-
cation game’ and whether and how it may co-exist with 
the alternative. 
Pressures for similarity stem from the uncertainty 
and unpredictability of the modern election campaign, 
which often demands immediate responses by all 
involved to intrusive events and rivals’ ploys. Neverthe-
less, distinct and sharp contrasts marked the conduct of 
the major parties in 2017. In particular:
- preferred style of political discourse: sound-bitten 
slogans vs. extended speech, repeated Tory emphases 
on 'strong and stable leadership’ (later, the dangers of 
a 'coalition of chaos’) vs. Corbyn’s sustained critiques 
of austerity and inequality allied to visions of a social 
and political order that would serve the interests  of 'the 
many not the few’.
- policy detail: a light Conservative offer presented 
in a short and undetailed manifesto vs. Labour’s 
policy-abundant one, dealing with nationalization, 
economic investment, public finances, the NHS, social 
care, school funding,  housing, tuition fees, pensions, the 
creative arts, etc., etc.!
- assumptions about the role of human nature in 
politics: Lynton Crosbyites’ decidedly limited view 
of the desire and ability of the average person to take 
in political information as against Jeremy Corbynites’ 
belief in an appetite of citizens to learn what politicians 
intend to do if given power.
- news publicity tactics:  the Conservatives catering 
to conventional news values (novelty, drama, conflict, 
sensation) in order to dominate headlines in contrast 
to Labour’s  releasing of discrete policy proposals in 
the hope they would be reported and discussed by 
broadcast journalists.
- message discipline: reflected in Mrs. May’s refusal 
to take part in debates, limited acceptance of interview 
requests, tendency not to respond directly to questions 
posed in interviews, appearances in stage-managed 
events, attempts to control journalists’ access.
- presidentialization: a Conservative campaign built 
heavily round Theresa May personally, relegating the 
party to second place.
- campaign communication ethics: the continual 
denigration of Jeremy Corby and occasional mis-rep-
resentation of his political positions, in contrast to 
Corbyn’s refusal to  make or even respond to personal 
attacks, which, in his words, 'would devalue yourself 
and the process’.
The rejuvenation of public service journalism 
Writing after the 2010 campaign, I noted 'some diminu-
tion and decline of the civic mission of British broad-
casters’ as one of three main trends that had 'formatively 
shaped election television’ since 2001. Writing after the 
Brexit result, I maintained 'the broadcasters were jointly  
responsible [with politicians] for the poverty of the 
referendum campaign’, instancing four main shortcom-
ings of their coverage. In contrast, in 2017, the BBC had 
demonstrably pulled up its public service socks:
2016: failure to broaden the campaign issue lens
2017: commitment to cover a broad range of issues 
from a broad range of angles in Today and extended 10 
p.m. bulletins, such as the NHS, the cost of living, the 
state of the economy, social care and Brexit options
2016: impartiality carried to an extreme
2017: fewer attempts at a strict balancing of rival parties’ 
claims within reports
2016: shortage of information provision
2017: deployment of specialist correspondents to 
provide 'reality checks’ on contested issues
2016: prominent attention paid to misleading/false 
statements (e.g. a £350 million windfall for the NHS by 
leaving the EU)
2017: occasional inclusion of 'fact checks’ within news 
bulletins (not just online)
The BBC also made a noticeably hard-hitting commit-
ment to 'journalistic interventionism’. In Question Time 
specials, for example, moderators frequently challenged  
dubious or vague assertions by politicians. In interviews, 
politicians were forthrightly condemned at times for 
their 'half-baked policies’, 'terrible record’, 'pretty damning 
figures’ of failure, contradictory positions , etc. Esser and 
Humbricht (2014) distinguish between 'desirable’ jour-
nalistic interventionism that scrutinizes policy positions 
and a 'less desirable’ form that aims at game-related 
aspects and distracts from the real issues. That distinc-
tion probably needs refinement. Policy interrogation can 
be overly aggressive (e.g. Paxman to Corbyn and May), 
breach the impartiality norm, or unduly pare a politi-
cian’s stance down to its more vulnerable aspects.
Some conclusions
In UK 2017, the consultancy-led model was wounded, 
whether fatally remains to be seen. But in an 'age of 
authenticity’ it may repel more voters than it attracts.
Political agency matters. Politicians with convictions 
may not need to 'self-mediatize’.
The existence of a principled, well-resourced public 
service broadcaster matters.
Exposure to Jeremy Corbyn’s ideas and personal-
ity via broadcast media probably explains much of 
his party’s remarkable surge as well as the equally 
remarkable transformation of his public image.
The 'crisis of public communication’, which Michael 
Gurevitch and I deplored, may have eased a bit. In 
communication as in politics, hope may stand a chance 
of beating fear!
Looking on the bright side for a change
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The performance of the electoral system
The House of Commons is elected by the First 
Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system.  Whatever 
its imperfections, FPTP is supposed to have one 
crucial advantage over its proportional rivals: it 
generally produces single-party majorities, which, 
its supporters say, help deliver (to coin a phrase) 
strong and stable leadership.
Clearly, that did not happen this time. Indeed, 
this was the second election in three that failed 
to perform as FPTP’s backers expect. The decline 
of the UK’s traditional two-party system since 
the 1970s has made such outcomes more likely. 
Multipartism weakened in this election but did not 
disappear: the minor parties still hold more seats 
than at any post-war election before 1997.  Unless 
things change dramatically, results such as this may 
become fairly normal.
Does that mean that this election result 
has strengthened the case for electoral reform?  
Perhaps, but we should not be too hasty.
FPTP’s biggest flaw is generally seen as its 
failure to translate votes for different parties pro-
portionally into seats. In 2015, for example, UKIP 
famously secured just one seat despite receiving 
more than an eighth of all votes. By the standard 
measure (the so-called Gallagher index), however, 
the 2017 election was the least disproportional 
since 1955 and by far the least disproportional 
since 1974. The reduction mostly reflects the shift 
back towards two-party politics: FPTP is much 
more likely to distribute seats in rough proportion 
to votes if those votes are overwhelmingly cast for 
only two parties.
At the same time, this proportionality may 
have been achieved at a cost: at least some voters 
clearly felt forced by FPTP into backing one of the 
two main parties to avoid ‘wasting’ their votes. 
Such tactical imperatives limit voters’ ability to 
express their true preferences. But it is too early 
to say confidently whether levels of tactical voting 
were unusually high or low this time.
Another concern about FPTP is that it can 
give majority power to a party with only minority 
support among voters. In 2005, Labour won a clear 
majority on only 35.2 per cent of the votes cast (or, 
given low turnout, just 21.5 percent of the eligible 
electorate). This time, however, the Conservatives 
won 42.4 of the vote and 29.1 of the eligible elec-
torate. In both cases, these are the highest figures 
for one party this century. 
Supporters of FPTP praise it for holding MPs 
accountable to local voters. FPTP’s detractors, by 
contrast, point out that this often fails to work in 
practice: in safe seats, the candidate of the majority 
party will almost inevitably win. The proportion 
of marginal seats has tended to fall somewhat over 
time, favouring the anti-FPTP side of this debate. 
This time, however, numbers of marginals rose: 
14.9 per cent of seats now have margins below 5 
per cent – the highest figure since October 1974 
– and 26.0 per cent have margins below 10 per 
cent.  There are, of course, still some extremely safe 
seats: thirty-five have margins above 50 percentage 
points. But the problem has shrunk.
FPTPs’ critics also point towards its poor 
record in promoting representation of society in 
all its diversity. Each party has only one candidate 
in each constituency and will therefore seek the 
candidate who it believes will appeal to most 
voters. Given stereotypes and expectations, that is 
most likely, on the traditional view, to be a white 
male. Assessing the system’s 2017 performance on 
this criterion requires some nuance. The number 
of women MPs – 208 out of 650 – is the highest 
ever, and, at 32 per cent, the proportion is ahead 
of the European average. But we remain behind 
most of the long-standing democracies of north 
west Europe that should be our comparators. The 
House of Commons also still lags the Scottish 
Parliament, Welsh Assembly, and UK delegation 
to the European Parliament, all of which use more 
proportional systems, though it is marginally 
ahead of the Northern Ireland Assembly. There 
are, meanwhile, 52 BME MPs and, according 
to Andrew Reynolds of the University of North 
Carolina, 45 out LGBT MPs – a world record share. 
Whether FPTP is still holding back social rep-
resentation in the UK therefore looks unclear.
Where does this leave us? The problems 
generally associated with FPTP have in fact been 
relatively mild in this election: disproportionality 
is unusually low, the government’s popular support 
base is larger than in other recent elections, society 
is better represented, and fewer MPs have safe 
seats.  This election has not strengthened the case 
against FPTP.  
But the result does weaken the positive case for 
FPTP. That case is based largely on the claim to 
foster single-party majority government, which 
the system has again failed to deliver. If FPTP 
continues to produce minority governments, it will 
become less obvious why its disadvantages ought 
to be tolerated.
What the UK electoral map would look like with Proportional 
Representation, courtesy of indy100 
(https://www.indy100.com/article/uk-election-map-proportional-representation-system-2017-conservative-labour-7784956)
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Fixed-term parliaments and the electoral cycle
The 2017 general election was an attempt by 
Theresa May to overturn the imposition of a 
regular electoral cycle on UK politics. The Fixed 
Term Parliaments Act 2011 was meant to prevent 
prime ministers exploiting a favourable political 
conjunction in order to extend their mandate and 
increase their majority. May was happy to say ‘I 
called the election…’ in her stump speech though 
she did require a Commons motion backed by 
two-thirds of the total membership.  And she 
planned never to be troubled about it again. The 
Conservative manifesto said (p43) ‘we will repeal 
the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act’, feeling no need 
to give any justification or explanation for this 
constitutional change. Any repeal cannot in fact be 
totally simple as the statutory basis for a maximum 
five-year term now rests on the 2011 Act. There 
would be political, and possibly legal, controversy 
about replacing a parliamentary framework for 
early dissolution with a reversion to the previous 
exercise of royal prerogative under ministerial 
advice. The Conservatives may now need the 
lifeline of the 2011 Act to sustain their fragile hold 
on the newly elected House of Commons.   
May took a risk in assuming – correctly - 
that a politician’s natural response to the whiff of 
grapeshot would bring most MPs on board. Labour 
did have a blocking one-third of members but 
declined to use it (and did suffer a minor rebellion 
the other way). The 2011 two-thirds mechanism 
is actually derived from the Scottish Parliament, 
with the difference that there the extraordinary 
election does not replace the normally-scheduled 
election unless it is within six months of it. With 
the 2011 Westminster act, the five-year clock 
starts again after an election, a further temptation 
to premature dissolution.
May had challenged the early 21st century 
trend to codify and structure the UK constitution 
and its electoral arrangements. Devolution law was 
one example of this. In terms of a second Scottish 
independence referendum, legislation is precise 
on granting additional powers to the Scottish 
Parliament (as was done in 2013 to remove tem-
porarily any doubt about its ability to pass a legal 
referendum act) and managing any UK override of 
potentially illegal devolved action (by a referral to 
the Supreme Court within four weeks of passage). 
The Conservative manifesto declined to take a 
position on either of these, taking refuge in the for-
mulation ‘in order for a referendum to be fair, legal 
and decisive, it cannot take place until the Brexit 
process has played out and should not take place 
unless there is public consent for it to happen’ 
(p32). This could mean almost anything.
In Scotland, the early election was a par-
ticular disruption to the electoral cycle. The SNP 
was looking for five years of benefit from its 2015 
near-sweep in Scotland (56 out of 59 seats and 
a tantalizing 49.97% of the popular vote) and a 
near-majority in Holyrood in 2016 (63 seats out of 
129, with six pro-independence Green members 
available). These mandates were on the line 
politically and have now been attenuated. In the 
campaign the SNP had to face premature scrutiny 
of their ten-year record in devolved government, 
and were forced into a yet higher level of caution 
on a second independence referendum. Their 
manifesto text was ‘at the end of the Brexit process, 
when the final terms of the deal are known, it is 
right that Scotland should have a real choice about 
our future’ (p29). The date of that choice now 
seems set to be postponed indefinitely.  
The Conservative manifesto also promised to 
bring in first-past-the-post voting for mayoral and 
police commissioner elections and put on hold 
any further House of Lords reform. May tried to 
reinstate a nostalgic, pragmatic UK tradition in 
which sovereignty and flexibility are prized, there 
is no fixed electoral cycle, and the ruling UK party 
takes strong control.  The shock election outcome 
traps May as both winner and loser, and constrains 
her scope for significant action on the constitution 
and everything else. 
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Institutions and nation building: there is such a 
thing as society
For much of 2010-2015, I ran a participatory project 
involving community co-researchers from Ashington, 
Northumberland. The project traced the ways the 
dissolution of institutions through neoliberalism was 
inflicting on once functioning communities avoidable 
harm, despite valiant efforts  of community members. 
Nationalized industry had provided subsistence and 
purpose had been dissolved; community institu-
tions, Unions and social clubs had provided formal 
welfare and community cohesion, were demeaned 
and devalued. The consequences were appalling: 
successive generations gradually becoming more 
dysfunctional as institutions disappeared. The key 
finding was clear: people need specific institutions 
and neoliberalism cannot provide them. This election 
supported that finding in important ways. 
For much of the election campaign, supposedly 
informed left-leaning commentators have, in equal 
measure, dreaded the forthcoming Tory landslide 
and seemed to regard it as, in many ways, prefera-
ble to the incompetence of Corbyn’s Labour. May’s 
Red Toryism and patriotic rhetoric was seen as the 
perfect means of appealing to English nationalism in 
a way that captured the mood of Brexit – the logical 
extension of Labour ‘moderates’ who argued that 
recent electoral woe reflected Labour’s inability to 
understand the nation.
In large part, this perception was due to the 
contempt in which voters were held. Regarded, 
almost uniformly, to be incapable of recognizing their 
interests, there was a post-feudal sense that voters 
were unable to engage seriously with key debates, 
absorbing uncritically authoritarian soundbites espe-
cially where those soundbites served to damage col-
lective interests. There was evidence to support such 
belief in my community on the banks of the Tyne. 
Here, I encountered views that rendered cognitive 
dissonance a community pursuit. One skilled 
working class voter in his 70s outlined his quandary 
thus: “The grandkid is paying £9 grand a year for a 
two-bit degree and now we might not be able to give 
him the house because my missus might lose her 
marbles”. Obviously a Labour vote secured, then? 
Not quite: “I’ve never voted Tory, but that Corbyn’s a 
bloody clown. May’ll sort it”. 
Yet, as the campaign wore on, it became apparent 
older voters were not immune to reason. First, the 
Social Care reforms indicated the self-interest of older 
voters was threatened by a Conservative Govern-
ment. Then, a series of campaigns, often independ-
ent of party affiliation, highlighted the crumbling 
condition of national institutions and public services. 
The consequences of cuts to those institutions became 
tragically clear in the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks in Manchester and London. Most important-
ly, the Conservative Manifesto and the narrative of 
Conservative politicians made clear to many that the 
notion of ‘austerity’ had been misleading – a means of 
smuggling permanent small government into politics 
under the guise of ‘belt tightening’.  
At the same time, young people, shocked at 
being dragged out of the EU, starting to think of 
themselves as a constituency with shared interests, 
were motivated by the message of hope promoted by 
Corbyn. They were attracted to the Manifesto pledges 
targeted explicitly at them and sought through social 
media to make voting Labour socially acceptable, 
breaking a ‘spiral of silence’ among other groups. 
Just as in the Irish referendum on Gay Marriage, 
the young actively engaged to counter understand-
ings derived from the tabloid press. Gone was the 
apathy of my generation in our 30s, grounded in 
belief that elections served merely to elect the least 
worst administrators of neoliberalism. In its place, a 
substantive discussion about how our society ought 
to be organized.
This was apparent at Corbyn’s rallies. In 
Gateshead, some 10,000 people of all ages, stood in 
heavy rain to endorse Labour’s plans to nationalize 
transport, energy and industry and to create new 
national education, care and investment institutions. 
This was nation building.  
As the campaign reached the last few days, 
Labour were cast in direct contrast to the empty 
nationalism offered by May’s Red Toryism – proud 
to be British, but unwilling to invest in Britain’s 
future. Indeed, as May refused to take seriously a 
nurse’s plea for an end to wage cuts in real terms or 
leading police officers’ pleas for investment in police 
numbers, it became apparent any future Conserv-
ative Government was committed to making very 
easy choices – giveaways for wealthy actors who 
did not need (and, in the case of Corporation Tax 
cuts, had not asked for) extra resources, and cuts for 
those she claimed to serve. 
My first inkling that any of it had had any effect 
was on my way to commentate on the election for 
BBC Radio Cumbria. My taxi driver in Gateshead 
began by condemning the two party system and 
indicating that he would have preferred to vote 
UKIP. However, he stated that he just could not bring 
himself to vote Tory. They had, after all, ravaged the 
region and spent decades failing to invest in our lives. 
He and his colleagues abandoned UKIP and voted 
for a lentil eating hippy from Islington. So, it turned 
out, did the older voter concerned about student debt 
and the dementia tax. His grandchildren – who, like 
many other young people, actually voted – swayed his 
thinking in the days before the ballot. In an unusual 
example of the ‘Bradley Effect’ out-group bias, 
confronted with a box bearing the name of a party 
tribally associated with another group, he had found 
himself unable to act – he was a ‘Shy Labour’ voter.
This election confirmed what many of us have 
long argued: institutions matter. It seems that one 
institution supposedly cherished by May’s Govern-
ment played a central role in Labour’s rise: the family. 
Young people opened the gateway to their elders. 
Society is fashionable again. 
Dr Matthew Johnson
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Global questions, parochial answers
The election results created suspense, confusion 
and uncertainty. They raised more questions than 
they provided answers. Yet, one thing became 
clear: Britain’s electoral and political system is 
unable to generate debate, solutions and rep-
resentation for the really important issues currently 
facing the country. These issues are not local; they 
are not even primarily national, although they have 
both local and national consequences. Britain – 
along with many other countries around the world 
– is facing a set of pressing, complex and inter-
connected global challenges. Yet, the narratives
afforded by the first past the post system (FPTP),
and by the current leaders of the main political
parties, were almost parochial.
What, precisely, is the Government’s (or, 
indeed, the opposition’s) plan for Brexit? In fact, 
what is the plan for Britain’s role outside the 
European Union, and in the world at large? Can 
Britain count on its ‘special relationship’ with 
a United States led by an embattled, distracted 
President Trump? How will the British economy 
remain competitive against Germany or China? 
What is the future of NATO and of collective 
security in Europe at a time when Putin’s Russia is 
staging a concerted campaign of cyber attacks and 
intervention in the domestic politics of Western 
countries, triggering a New Cold War? What are 
Britain’s humanitarian and legal responsibilities, as 
a global advocate of human rights and a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council, vis-à-vis the 
millions of refugees and migrants from the Middle 
East and North Africa? 
These are not abstract, fuzzy, questions. They 
affect communities and the lives of citizens across 
the UK: Islamist terrorism is not a purely national 
phenomenon; it is a global phenomenon with local 
and national implications. While there are certain 
things that central and local government can do 
to tackle this challenge, there are many others 
that require cross-national collaboration. Framing 
each new terrorist attack as a “barbaric atrocity” 
by “cowards” against “innocent civilians”, and ex-
hausting rhetoric and media coverage on symbolic 
gestures of remembrance and solidarity deters 
serious debate and does not help address the root 
causes of the problem.
Climate change will be felt across Britain. It 
will lead to further coastal erosion, floods, drought 
and extreme weather phenomena, to say nothing of 
the humanitarian and migratory consequences on 
other parts of the world. 
Dependence on fossil fuels cannot be 
overcome through national means alone. Making 
sustainable forms of energy economically viable 
requires substantial investment in research and 
development that can only come from broad inter-
national collaborations. 
Tackling cybercrime, intellectual property 
theft, or the ethical, economic and practical 
implications of nanotechnology, biotechnology, 
artificial intelligence and driverless cars, all require 
transnational action.
Ignoring this ongoing reality – this layer of 
complex, globalised questions – the UK’s electoral 
and political system produced local, almost pro-
vincial, responses: first past the post encourages 
localism and the politics of the micro-community. 
DUP – which can only be described as a fringe 
party, geographically and ideologically – found 
itself controlling the future of the country. The 
swing from the SNP to the Conservatives in 
Scotland appears to have been driven by opposi-
tion to a second independence referendum. The 
Conservatives increased their vote share because 
they absorbed UKIP’s support, especially in the 
North. Labour performed well – especially across 
university towns – partly because students want a 
payback on their tuition fees. The Conservatives’ 
campaign was derailed by the so-called ‘death tax’ 
– the social care provisions in the Tory manifesto.
Neither party’s manifesto included a clear plan for
the Brexit negotiations.  The Remain camp was not
even represented as a coherent cause.
While Jeremy Corbyn succeeded in mobi-
lising young people, and while millions of voters 
are concerned about inequality, Labour provided 
conventional answers – such as borrowing, 
taxation and nationalisation – without considering 
the structural context within which the British 
economy will operate outside of the European 
Union. Possible trade isolation and cut-throat 
competition would require Britain to become the 
ultimate tax haven and cheap labour employer in 
order to survive. The global, structural root causes 
of inequality – deregulated governance, wide-
spread tax avoidance and tax evasion through 
remote havens and complex schemes – were not 
touched upon. 
Practical solutions, such as the Tobin tax 
(targeting speculative currency exchange trans-
actions), require a different mode of governance 
– global governance – and a different mode of
global citizenship and globally-conscious political
debate and representation.  Over and above all the
subject-specific issues facing us right now, we are
suffering from a serious democratic deficit and a
real need for global awareness. While one cannot
expect a single national election to begin to solve
these issues, the narratives and personalities of the
2017 election are a sad and stark reminder of the
disconnect between the local and the global.
Dr Roman Gerodimos
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The future of illusions
If proof were still needed, in the age of the Trump 
presidency, that democratic politics does not 
proceed in a rational way, then our 2017 General 
Election has thrown up some telling illustrations of 
the churning affect, and the illusions to which it is 
attached, that can shape electoral outcomes.
What do we make of the surge of idealistic 
engagement amongst the young set off by Corbyn’s 
campaign? It isn’t clear how young the ‘young’ 
were, nor how many seats they directly won, but 
preliminary analysis of the results points to the 
likely importance in the vote of this surprising 
mobilisation. Most importantly, we don’t know 
what will happen to that idealism now the election 
is over, nor is it fully clear what issues are most 
important to it. Much will depend on the direction 
offered to it by Corbyn himself, especially given the 
lack of charisma and appeal elsewhere in his front 
bench team.
Yet television coverage was repeatedly showing 
us the depth of public cynicism about politics. It 
was conveyed in the default cliché rehearsed in 
many vox pops: ‘They’re all in it for themselves’. 
Anyone these days asked by a journalist if they 
trust politicians would be afraid of looking foolish 
if they said anything but ‘No’. 
Of course the behavior of some politicians of 
all stripes has fed this conventional wisdom, but 
the cynicism is mis-directed. It is not their own 
individual self-interests which most politicians 
seem to be pursuing but the interests of their 
parties. Those collective interests (like those of ‘the 
country’) may at times be easily confused by poli-
ticians with their personal ambitions, as perhaps in 
May’s opportunistic call for an election. But much of 
the deception and pretension in political discourse 
is a product of our dysfunctional party system, and 
is in order to protect or advance the party. 
The House of Cards illusion of Westmin-
ster as populated entirely by self-serving crooks 
has become an enduring feature of our political 
culture. Fortunately it does not prevent people 
from voting – the turnout of 69% was an encour-
aging feature of the 2017 election. But it comes 
and goes in the public mind, a recurrent hissing 
at hopeful politics. Does the fresh enthusiasm for 
Corbyn (when disentangled from re-treads of Far 
Left fervour) signal a weakening of this illusion, 
induced by television and social media images of 
an unpolished and unaffected person? 
Other illusions are more transient, products of 
particular conjunctures. A prominent one during 
this campaign was that it was the ‘Brexit election’, 
to determine whether we would have a ‘hard’ or 
‘soft’ Brexit. Since control over immigration was 
(according to the Ashcroft Poll) the second most 
popular reason for voting Leave in the referendum, 
we may assume that for many people ‘hard Brexit’ 
meant, positively and simply, a hard border. Yet 
the only party claiming to offer this was UKIP, 
obliterated by the electorate, and anyway the whole 
issue of Brexit was obscured by the Corbyn surge 
at the centre of which were the issues of inequality, 
redistribution and public services.
Cue here for another illusion to make its 
claim on our understanding: that politics is always 
fundamentally about the economy and material 
interests. This most long-standing notion can take 
several forms: individual self-interest, sectional 
interest, or general concern for the ‘economy’ can 
all be seen as key drivers of electoral choice. While 
for some people any of these calculations might be 
crucial, few of us (none of us?) are in a position to 
make them without recourse to ideas and assump-
tions borrowed or taken on trust from elsewhere 
– which means that even the most dispassionate
calculations depend on affect-laden illusions about
what is going on in the world. And for others,
perhaps a majority, the calculative element is at
most secondary, as shown clearly by the many
referendum Leave votes cast in search of a sense of
control and independence, and those Remain votes
based on an attachment to a cosmopolitan identity.
The Remain campaign’s mistake, of course, was to
treat the issue as an exclusively economic one.
Labour’s new voters in 2017 were seemingly 
values-driven rather than identity-expressing, but 
they certainly were not calculators. They want a 
more fair society, with more public ownership and 
social provision. Idealism by definition comes with 
illusions, in this case likely to include some ideali-
sation of Corbyn and possibly others around him. 
Impressive though the campaign has been, and 
laudable in its call for social justice, the question 
now is whether the idealism it evoked will be 
channeled into the sterile illusions of our self-ide-
alising political parties and factions, or will be a 
force for the longer-term changes in our political 
culture and electoral system needed to realize the 
vision of a better society.
Voters, Polls 
and Results
2
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A glorious defeat: anti-politics and the funnelling 
of frustration
It’s not easy being a Professor of Politics. Everyone 
expects me to know what’s going on and what’s 
likely to happen. But I’m just as bamboozled as 
everyone else by the outcome of the UK’s recent 
general election. And yet ‘bamboozlement’ is 
becoming something of a byword for modern 
democratic events - think Brexit, think Trump, and 
now think ‘Corbyn the conqueror’ - the unlikely 
cult hero leading an ‘old’ political party re-desig-
nated as a grassroots social movement. 
And yet to some extent recent events in the 
UK are symptomatic of a broader international 
trend that is often (but incorrectly) labelled in 
terms of anti-political sentiment. Incorrectly 
labelled because the undoubted existence of high 
levels of social frustration and political disengage-
ment amongst large sections of the public actually 
veils a desire for a ‘different’ politics – not the 
denial or rejection of the need for democratic 
politics itself. It is this that explains the growth of 
populist nationalism - with variants on both the 
right and left - in Europe and the United States.  
It also helps explain the recent election result in 
the UK.
The success of Jeremy Corbyn and his 
‘New-Old’ Labour was that it managed to tap into 
and funnel the large reservoir of social frustration 
with politics that has been identified by political 
scientists for some years. Corbyn offered a very 
‘different’ type of politics in terms of content (i.e. a 
clear shift to the left built around higher taxes and 
nationalisation) and form (against the clean-cut 
on-message image of ‘professional politicians’). 
Corbyn’s rather chaotic and almost amateurish 
approach came across as refreshingly honest; never 
before have a scruffy beard and an un-tucked shirt 
become such electoral assets. 
If you are anti-political (in terms of how 
politics was ‘done’ in the past), if you are anti-
politician (in terms of politicians who all look 
and behave the same) and if you are anti-estab-
lishment (in terms of believing in the existence 
of a largely untouchable political elite) then the 
Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn positioned 
itself like a political lightning-rod to channel 
those frustrations. This is a key point that many 
of his opponents failed to understand. The more 
the media attacked and mocked him, the more 
Theresa May refused to engage, the more Boris 
Johnson described the Labour leader as a ‘benign 
herbivore’ and a ‘mutton-headed mugwump’ the 
more this seemed to energise and build Corbyn’s 
support base. It simply confirmed in the minds 
of the disaffected just how brash and arrogant the 
political elite (including the media and commen-
tariat had become).
Funnelling frustration and offering a 
positive message formed the magic formula for 
the Labour Party’s glorious defeat. It tuned into 
the populist signal.
The critical element, however, which offers a 
key to understanding contemporary democracy 
more broadly was the manner in which the Labour 
Party secured the support of at least three very 
different segments of the previously disillusioned 
or disengaged. 
The first segment was the traditionally 
anti-political youth vote (aged 18-24) that were 
dismissed for much of the election as ‘snowflake 
voters’ who would melt away before getting to the 
polling booth. The pollsters were wrong as around 
72 per cent of younger voters placed their cross 
on the ballot paper (up from just 44 per cent in 
2015). Many young people remained angry about 
the EU referendum vote and therefore overlapped 
with a second section of the public who were, put 
simply, ‘anti-hard Brexit’. This included remainers 
and soft-Brexiteers but the common denominator 
was deep-seated concern about the increasingly 
belligerent, nationalist and aggressive tone of the 
Conservative Party. Which, in turn, flows into a 
third and final group – the white working classes 
or ‘Left Behind’ that had rejected mainstream 
politics and progressive values and led ‘the revolt 
on the right’ seen in the emergence of UKIP. The 
simple fact seems to be that a large proportion 
of the ‘left behind’ went back to the left and the 
Labour Party as they prioritised an anti-austerity 
agenda and investment in public services above the 
anti-immigrant anti-Europe stance offered by the 
Conservatives. 
The lessons for understanding democracy 
around the world? 
Firstly, the public are not anti-political: they 
are ‘pro-political’ but ‘pro-a-different-way-of-
doing-politics’. They crave the existence of real 
policy choices and a positive vision for the future. 
Secondly, the concept of democracy is in flux and 
is arguably more fragile than at any point in the last 
fifty years. Politicians need to be popular but this 
is very different to falling into the trap of populism 
(the very opposite of democratic politics). Finally, 
the rules of the political game have changed 
but nobody seems to know quite what they are 
anymore. We need a new language of politics in 
order to fully grasp what kind of democracy this is 
(let alone where it might be going). 
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Younger voters politically energised, but the 
generational divide deepens
Over the past 20 years, we have witnessed a 
sharp decline in youth participation in general 
elections. 60% of 18-24 year olds voted in the 1992, 
compared to an average of 40% over the last four 
polls. As the graph below shows, the gap between 
youth and overall turnout has increased signifi-
cantly during this period.
However, there is overwhelming evidence to 
show that young people are interested in ‘politics’ 
(more broadly defined) and engage in a whole 
multitude of civic and political activities: from 
demonstrations against university tuition fees, 
to the boycotting of products that damage the envi-
ronment, to campaigns against the closing of parks 
or youth clubs in local communities. So, young 
people are often interested in, and engaged in, key 
issues, but have for many years been put off by 
politicians and political parties.
This was illustrated by the 2016 referendum 
on British membership of the European Union, 
when an estimated 60% of 18-24 year olds turned 
out to vote on this issue of concern. But most 
young people were disappointed by the result. 
Around three quarters of this age group (and 82% 
of university students) voted for the UK to remain 
in the EU.
It is nevertheless clear that the gap between 
youth attitudes and those of older voters has 
grown: from the Iraq War, to student tuition fees, 
to immigration, to Brexit. Indeed, the Labour Party 
under Ed Miliband managed to increase its share 
of the vote amongst 18-24 year olds in 2015, while 
losing ground amongst older cohorts.
One of the main surprises in 2017 general 
election was the strength of turnout amongst 
younger voters. A YouGov survey released on 13 
June, estimated that 57% of 18-19 year olds and 
59% of 20-24 year olds took part in the poll. Con-
stituency results also show that the swing to the 
Labour Party was significantly higher in areas with 
relatively young populations. 
Data from a Populus survey, which I helped 
to design (commissioned by Bite the Ballot and 
Freud), showed that young people were engaged. 
18-24 year olds were more likely to vote in the 
2017 general election than they were at a similar 
stage before the 2015 poll: 57% stated that they 
were certain to vote (a month before the election) 
compared to 46% two years ago. 18-24 year olds 
were actually as likely to vote as 25-34 year olds and 
35-44 year olds (though still well behind the over 
45s – of whom around 80% were certain to vote).
The same survey suggested that young people 
were energised by Brexit, Jeremy Corbyn, and the 
clear ideological divisions between the Labour 
and the Conservative Party.  81% of 18-24 year 
olds claimed that they were following the general 
election closely, compared to an average of 80% 
for all age groups (only topped by the interest of 
the over 65 age group). Furthermore, 88% of 18-24 
year olds stated that they were following Brexit ne-
gotiations closely – more than any other age group!
Younger voters were following the general 
election and Brexit negotiations much more closely 
than the most popular entertainment programmes: 
34% for Game of Thrones and 32% for Britain’s 
Got Talent. These figures illustrate that the popular 
claims – that younger citizens are apathetic about 
and uninterested in politics – yet immersed in 
their own leisure pursuits – are plain wrong.
Although we cannot say for certain that the 
EU referendum encouraged young people to 
engage more actively in the general election, we 
can say that those who supported Remain in last 
year’s poll had a very similar demographic profile 
to those who voted for Corbyn: young, highly 
educated, and supportive of cultural diversity in 
Britain. According to ICM, 75% of 18-24 year olds 
who voted Remain, voted for the Labour Party.
Young people were clearly attracted to 
Corbyn’s perceived authenticity and policy 
program, but this was a two-way street. In 2017, 
the Labour Party appealed directly to this demo-
graphic through proposed investment in education 
(including, the abolition of university tuition fees) 
and housing, and guaranteeing workers’ rights. 
By contrast, there was little for young people in 
the Conservative Party manifesto beyond vague 
references to intergenerational justice.
These differences in emphasis on age cohorts 
in party manifestos, was reflected by unprecedent-
ed differences in support for the two main political 
parties amongst younger and older citizens. 
According to Lord Ashcroft Polling on 8 June, 66% 
of 18-24 year olds (who expressed support for a 
political party) intended to vote Labour, compared 
to 38% nationally and only 23% of over 65s! On the 
other hand, just 18% of 18-24 year olds supported 
the Conservative Party, compared to 58% of over 
65s. The Figure below illustrates how the gap 
between youth support for Conservatives and 
Labour has widened dramatically since 2010 to a 
level unseen in recent political history. 
In 2017, younger voters were politically 
energised by Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party. In an 
echo of the 1960s, young people expressed them-
selves as (in Inglehart and Norris’ terms) left-of-
centre cosmopolitans, reacting both to austerity 
politics and the cultural conservatism found in older 
generations and embodied by the Leave campaign 
in the EU referendum. The Conservative Party will 
need to take note of these developments if they are 
to building a majority in future parliaments.
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Why the younger generation of Corbynistas?
One of the most remarkable developments in 
recent elections has been the propensity for 
younger citizens to vote, and support older 
socialist leaders advocating policies last fashion-
able during the 1970s. 
The British Labour party was pleasantly 
surprised to find young people flocked to Jeremy 
Corbyn’s rallies, a 68-year stalwart who never 
held office since entering parliament in 1983. A 
lifetime protestor,  pacifist and antiwar campaign-
er, his Labour manifesto promised to nationalize 
key industries, scrap tuition fees, boost workers’ 
rights, raise taxes on the wealthy and negotiate a 
soft EU exit. 
The British Election Study (BES) shows 
1970-2010 Conservatives consistently held a 
modest advantage among pensioners. But the age 
gap recently expanded and the June 2016 Brexit 
referendum saw a generational chasm. Younger 
people were significantly less likely to vote but 
when they did, around two-thirds voted Remain, 
by contrast 57% of pensioners voted Leave. 
Similar divisions persisted in 2017 , according to 
the Ashcroft General Election day poll, Labour 
received the votes of 23% of pensioners but 67% 
of 18-24 year olds. By contrast,  59% of pensioners 
voted Conservative, but only 18% of 18-24 year 
olds. According to Sky News,  turnout among 18-
24-year-olds was 66.4%, up 43 per cent from 2015, 
especially in seats with many aged 18-29,  possibly 
due to the high levels of the college educated pop-
ulations in these constituencies.  Class cleavages 
are negligible, although education was important; 
even controlling for age,  the higher the share of 
college-educated, the larger the Con>Lab swing of 
the vote. 
Similar patterns, for a similar candidate to 
Corbyn, were witnessed during the 2016-7 US 
Democrat primaries. Bernie Sanders’  substantial 
lead over Clinton among younger voters was one 
of the hall marks of the contest (Figure 2).The gen-
eration gap was also evident in the Clinton-Trump 
vote (Figure 3); the 2016 American National 
Election Study showed if those under 55 had voted, 
Hillary Clinton would be president. Youth were 
least likely to vote, though education was signifi-
cant, occupational class inequalities, the underly-
ing issue of both Sanders and Corbyn’s campaigns,  
failed to predict voting in either contest. 
So what explains these substantial age gaps? 
One explanation is that younger people are more 
idealistic and left-wing, attracted by the radical 
egalitarian economic message of both leaders; 
plausible if younger generations feel they face more 
limited economic opportunities than their parents 
and grandparents. Yet the evidence remains mixed. 
One study reported those who came of age under 
Thatcher were more rightwing towards wealth 
redistribution and the welfare state for example.
Alternatively, youth voters may be attracted 
more by social liberalism (such as gender equality, 
globalization, and climate change) and antipathetic 
towards the authoritarian values associated with 
nationalism and immigration underpinning the 
campaigns of Theresa May and Donald Trump. In 
this view, Left-Right divisions may have made way 
for cultural cleavages around values of transaction-
al national interests versus global cosmopolitan 
cooperation There is considerable evidence for this 
claim, for example, a Pew study noted growing ide-
ological and partisan generational gaps,,American 
youth are more tolerant, engaged and supportive of 
social justice. Equally a World Values Survey shows 
persistent generation gaps along authoritarian and 
libertarian perspectives.
An election day poll of 14,384 respondents, 
with CATI and online fieldwork 6-9th June does 
not show distinctive generational experiences (i.e. 
Boomers vs Millennials), life cycle effects (where 
attitudes change with age), or period effects (arising 
from specific events, like the financial crash).
Figure 4 shows UK youth are far more liberal 
than their parents and grandparents who are 
more socially conservative on  the Internet, the 
green movement, feminism, multiculturalism, 
globalization and immigration. The age gaps are 
substantial, for example a 30-point age gap between 
the youngest and oldest in approval of the green 
movement reflecting broader comparative evidence 
about the growth of libertarian and post-materialist 
values in many post-industrial societies.
Comparing public opinion on economic issues 
shows similar age gaps (Figure 5); with young 
people exhibiting more leftwing attitudes suggest-
ing they were more likely to be attracted towards 
Labour’s platform.
Yet austerity seems to have minimal impact. 
Figure 6 shows less consistent age gaps on expec-
tations of life chances in 30 years, whether social 
change was for the better or worse, and opportuni-
ties for advancement and social mobility.
The striking age gap similarities evident in 
recent US and UK elections, and the closure of 
occupational class cleavages, raise important 
questions about the changing nature of party com-
petition. If these represent generational shifts, and 
if young people can be mobilized to vote, then this 
could transform the policy agenda, future of party 
competition, and offer prospects for long-term 
electoral change.
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Figure 1: 
% Vote for the Labour and Conservative parties by age 
group, UK 2017 general election
Source: N. 14384 F/w 6-9 June 2017 http://
lordashcroftpolls.com/2017/06/result-happen-post-vote-
survey/
Figure 2:
% Vote for Sanders and Clinton by age group, US 2016 
Democratic primaries
Source: American National Election Study, time-series dataset http://
www.electionstudies.org/
Figure 4: 
Young are more socially liberal, and also more anti-
capitalist, UK 2017 General ElectionFigure 3: 
 % Vote for Clinton and Trump by age group, US 2016  
presidential election
Source: American National Election Study, time-series dataset http://
www.electionstudies.org/
Figure 5: 
Young are more left-wing towards social and economic 
policy issues, UK 2017 General Election
Figure 6: 
Young and old are similar in attitudes towards social and 
economic change,, UK 2017 General Election
Clinton
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Young people and propaganda in the wake of 
the 2017 election
The normative role of mainstream media in democ-
racies is to serve the public interest by representing 
the voices of citizens and holding those in power to 
account. Often, it appears, the British media choose 
to do neither. “The kind of bullying I’ve seen by The 
Sun, Daily Mail and even The Guardian and BBC of 
Jeremy Corbyn and us young people that supports 
him, would’ve destroyed some people. Even my 
uncle’s showed me the front pages and been like 
‘What you supporting this loser for, mate?’ But I 
just told him: ‘don’t always believe what you read’.” 
Ongoing media analysis and youth focus groups for 
EU Horizon 2020 Project CATCH-EyoU and for the 
All Party Parliamentary Group on A Better Brexit 
for Young People by Sam Mejias and myself suggests 
many young people view Corbyn as the opposite 
of an irresponsible politician and their skepticism 
about the values and views of mainstream media are 
more than justified. 
In the run-up to the announcement of 
the election, even the so-called ‘liberal’ media 
published material demonstrably more hostile to 
Corbyn than that published about previous Labour 
contenders. The stories were so vicious and con-
temptuous that young people interviewed about 
citizenship and democracy, commented that they 
felt the mainstream media were “bullying” Corbyn, 
“disgustingly unfair”, “totally biased”, “liars” 
and “belonged to the Rich”. Nevertheless, they 
continued to read these media, and few relied on 
alternative or online sources. Only one considered 
starting his own alternative blog. They were thus, 
de facto, responsible, and critical citizens. 
Reports based on content analysis of media 
coverage of Corbyn concluded mainstream media 
were biased, and that much of the UK print media 
deliberately undermined the Labour leader’s 
public image. They did this by 1) ignoring, 2) 
under-representing or 3) misrepresenting his own 
statements and those of his Labour party allies, 4) 
taking statements out of context, 5) sensationaliz-
ing past relationships, and 6) giving airtime/print 
space to critics on the of the Labour right and in 
government. The photograph of Jeremy Corbyn 
walking beside a world war veteran, cropped to 
make it look as if Corbyn was dancing insultingly 
on Remembrance Sunday, is only one case of such 
deliberate misrepresentation.
Representations of Corbyn and front bench 
colleagues as terrorist sympathizers, and of him 
as a coward who’d refuse to press the nuclear 
button screamed from billboards and circulated 
on Twitter. Loughborough University reports 
during the campaign the British media dispropor-
tionately attacked Corbyn and Labour. The work 
of delegitimizing Labour’s policies and personal 
records continued unabated in the first week of 
June, with The Daily Mail, The Express and The 
Sun leading the attack. Younger citizens and those 
with longterm leftwing sympathies Tweeted and 
Facebooked their discomfort and anger, sometimes 
getting thousands of shares. Young people par-
ticipating in our research repeatedly commented 
Corbyn is a hugely experienced MP with decades 
of constituency work, and a record of considered, 
ethical voting in parliamentary decisions on war, 
social benefits, civil and human rights. Several 
spoke of arguments with family members over the 
Brexit referendum and Jeremy Corbyn’s leader-
ship. In Huddersfield, Portsmouth and London 
young people also pointed out repeated attempts 
by British media to sensationalize, personalize and 
vilify have left little space for the public at large – or 
in their case, their older relatives – to get to know 
Corbyn’s positive qualities. The  May 29 TV appear-
ances finally gave Corbyn and May equal airtime. 
The context of media bias is, of course, 
significant. Corbyn and his shadow chancellor 
John McDonnell are exceptionally principled 
leftwing MPs, with no intention of changing their 
policies to satisfy big corporations. Much of the 
UK mainstream media expresses the ideological 
bias of their owners, with links to big business 
and conservative elites. Since the Leveson Inquiry 
links between Conservative government members 
and News International are no longer secret, and 
Twitter reports that Rupert Murdoch’s reaction to 
the exit polls was to storm out of the room. In this 
context, uncritical trust in media is tantamount to 
an abandonment of democracy. 
In this fraught context, the stunning success 
of Labour, and Corbyn’s personal authority, has to 
be an incredible, momentous, political achieve-
ment: a triumph of critical citizenship and the 
young. My project observed networks of Labour 
activists and volunteers from Momentum, local 
Labour members, and alternative media producers 
working tirelessly in the past two months to get 
the “message” about social democratic policies 
and Corbyn’s integrity out to the public: a message 
that should have been given a fair and equal billing 
in mainstream media. Offline and online work 
– such as Momentum’s ‘Bernie Sanders Training 
Events’ and My nearest Marginal allowed inexpe-
rienced citizens across generations to get involved 
in supporting the campaign, and to express their 
solidarity outside the mainstream media bubble. 
The election result is a resounding confirmation 
that young voters, socialist values, alternative 
leftwing media and grassroots work on doorsteps 
can challenge mainstream media. But, mainstream 
media is still incredibly powerful, and those who 
trust it, particularly in the middle and older age 
groups, risk allowing themselves to be misled. 
Surely, as citizens and scholars, we should not be 
satisfied with always being the underdog – surely 
we need to point out, and fight to undermine the 
political power, propaganda, and everyday biases 
of mainstream media.  
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The generation election: youth electoral 
mobilisation at the 2017 General Election
Now the dust has settled, how should we account 
for the surge in youth turnout at the 2017 UK 
General Election with estimates that as many as 72 
per cent of those aged 18-24 cast a vote - represent-
ing a significant increase on the last election and 
a departure from recent patterns of youth absten-
tion?  When Theresa May unexpectedly called a 
snap election on 18th April 2017, such an outcome 
seemed virtually unthinkable. The Conservative 
lead over Labour in the pre-election polls appeared 
unassailable, and the 50-day campaign period 
loomed long, flat and predictable.  For many 
young people, another vote, soon after what they 
considered a deeply disappointing 2016 referen-
dum outcome to leave the EU, heralded little more 
than the prospect of another 5 years in which their 
concerns would remain ignored by the political 
elite. The likelihood that Britain’s youth would 
flock to the polls seemed somewhat remote.
Certainly since 1997, election turnouts have 
been very generational affairs, characterised by 
strong voting by older citizens and abstention by 
the nation’s youth. At the 2015 General Election, 
only 43 per cent of registered 18-24 year olds 
voted, over 20 per cent below the average turnout 
and 35 per cent below those aged 65 and over.  
However, recent voting events suggested a possible 
change in the electoral wind, that youth could be 
attracted to the polls in 2017.  In particular, over 
two-thirds (68 per cent) of those aged 16-24 voted 
at the 2014 Scottish Independence referendum and 
60 per cent of 18-24 year olds voted at the 2016 
European Union referendum, suggesting British 
youth will vote when motivated by the political 
issues at stake or feel that they can influence the 
result. 
One early indication that we might see those 
2014 and 2016 referenda youth turnout rates 
repeated in 2017 was revealed in Hansard’s Audit 
of Political Engagement shortly before Theresa 
May’s announcement.  This suggested that 39 per 
cent of young people said they were certain to vote 
- a large increase on the 16 per cent who said they 
were certain to vote at a similar point in 2015. 
There were other clues pointing to a possible 
upsurge in youth mobilisation. Nearly one million 
(919,691) under 25s signed-up to vote in the 
month before the 2017 registration deadline; 
this surpassed registration rates in the build up 
to the 2016 EU referendum (709,076) and 2015 
General Election (657,570). Furthermore, young 
people’s certainty to vote soared to 63 per cent in 
polls before the election. Jeremy Corbyn seemed 
certainly to be a factor behind this surge and his 
openness to more direct forms of democracy 
appealed to young people who prefer politics 
created from below.  Labour were leading the 
Conservatives by 57 points in the 18-24 cohort 
according to one poll shortly before the 2017 
election, whereas only 16 per cent more of 18-24 
year olds preferred Labour to the Conservatives at 
the 2015 election. 
So why did Britain’s youth feel motivated to 
vote in 2017? One critical factor was their direct 
experience of recent government austerity policies. 
According to the Resolution Foundation and the 
Institute for Public Policy Research, young people 
have faced an unprecedented attack on their 
socioeconomic conditions in recent years; state 
support has been withdrawn from them (and often 
transferred to older age groups), their employment 
positions are increasingly precarious, access to 
homeownership is decreasing and wages are below 
those of previous youth generations. 
Moreover, at the 2017 General Election, a 
number of youth-centred policies were promoted 
by the parties. All bar the Conservatives and UKIP 
backed extending voting rights to those aged 
16 and 17.  Labour’s manifesto promised large 
increases in the minimum wage for under 25s, the 
abolition of university tuition fees, restoring the 
Education Maintenance Allowance and greater 
employment security. The Liberal Democrats 
produced a youth manifesto written in consulta-
tion with young people, although the Conserv-
ative’s manifesto commitments were somewhat 
limited in scope. 
Another potential factor was youth disap-
pointment following the vote for “Brexit” at the EU 
referendum. The fact that three quarters of 18-24 
year olds voted to “remain” may have motivated 
them to vote in 2017 to contest older generations’ 
preferences, which are often at odds with their 
political desires.  Furthermore, young people may 
have also been more inclined to vote in 2017 as 
they believed they could influence the result. The 
Conservative Party were defending a working 
majority of 17 seats and research from the BBC 
before the election suggested young people could 
influence the result in up to 10 seats.  While Henn 
and Foard (2014) suggest that contemporary youth 
doubt their influence in politics, their importance 
to the result of the 2017 election may have made 
them reconsider the impact they could have.  
The 2017 General Election will be remem-
bered for many things.  The unprecedented wave 
of terror attacks that formed the backdrop to the 
election. The stark ideological choice on offer 
between a very traditional Conservative party 
and a resurgent Labour party led by a long-term 
socialist that ultimately only narrowly failed in 
defeating the incumbent Conservatives by a 2.4 
percentage share of the national vote. The election 
will also be recalled as the event that captured the 
imagination of a new generation of young people 
who announced their return to the electoral stage 
in a way not seen in decades.
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As I have argued elsewhere, today politics in the 
United Kingdom and in much of Europe more 
generally is more complicated than a simple 
struggle between left and right. While issues of 
redistribution of wealth and private or public 
ownership of essential services have been critical 
issues in this month’s general election, the election 
took place in the shadow of last year’s vote to 
leave the European Union. While Brexit did not 
dominate the election as some commentators 
thought it would – and some politicians hoped 
it would – the UK’s future relationship with the 
EU is one element of a broad set of issues that 
have created a deep division within society. This 
division is essentially about the significance of 
“the other”, whether that be a power beyond our 
borders such as the EU, or a minority within, such 
as immigrants or Muslims. It is a divide between 
those whom David Goodhart describes as “from 
anywhere” and those “from somewhere”, between 
cosmopolitan “citizens of the world” and those 
who feel neglected and left behind by globalisa-
tion and feel that government is more interested 
in pleasing “outsiders” than its own people. Thus 
politics is not only shaped by (economic) left 
versus right, but also by a cultural dimension 
sometimes referred to as “open against closed”.
This election has been marked above all by 
a polarisation of the political parties. In line with 
Theresa May’s comment at last year’s Conserva-
tive Party Conference that “if you believe you’re a 
citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of nowhere”, 
since the vote to leave the EU and May’s victory 
in last year’s leadership contest, the Conservatives 
have positioned themselves near the “closed” end 
of the cultural dimension, drawing in former UKIP 
supporters, but at the same time have downplayed 
their position on the economic right by promising 
to increase the living wage and statutory rights 
for family care and training. This was a delib-
erate appeal to Labour’s former working class 
heartlands. At the same time, Labour took a very 
clear position near the left pole of the economic 
dimension by pledging to bring essential services 
back into public hands and increasing public 
expenditure through higher taxes on the wealthy. 
Finally, the Liberal Democrats and Greens both 
positioned themselves at the “open” end of the 
cultural dimension by calling for a second EU ref-
erendum. In Scotland, a rather different dynamic 
played out, with the critical divide being between 
those who favour independence and those who 
prefer the Union with the SNP located at one pole 
and the UK-wide parties at the other.
According to evidence obtained from data 
from English users of an online Voting Advice Ap-
plication called WhoGetsMyVoteUK that ran from 
24 May until 8 June and attracted some 100,000 
users, a major rift has opened up between support-
ers of the Labour Party, the Greens and the Liberal 
Democrats on the one hand, and Conservative 
and UKIP supporters on the other. Supporters of 
the former three parties tend to be economically 
left-wing and “open”, while the supporters of the 
latter two are generally “closed” in the cultural 
sense, with quite a significant gap between the 
“open” and “closed” ends of the spectrum that is a 
kind of no-mans-land for party supporters. This 
is illustrated by the diagram below that shows the 
positions of users who claim to support these five 
parties on policy issues that correspond to each 
of the above-mentioned dimensions. For more 
details on how the positions of party supporters 
were calculated, as well as a comparison with their 
positions in 2015, please refer to a recent article I 
wrote for LSE blogs.
In the end, despite their acceptance of Brexit, 
Labour managed to gain the support of young, 
cosmopolitan, “open” voters, eclipsing the Liberal 
Democrats and Greens, who hoped they could 
draw on the support of this group, although in 
those few constituencies in which the Liberal 
Democrats posed a greater threat to the Con-
servatives (such as Oxford West and Abingdon, 
Twickenham and Bath), these voters proved ready 
to vote tactically to oust a Tory incumbent. At the 
same time, the Conservatives picked up the older, 
more culturally “closed” vote and even made some 
headway against Labour in some more working 
class Northern constituencies. In total, the more 
“open” parties, i.e. Labour, the Liberal Democrats, 
Greens, SNP and Plaid Cymru garnered 52.5% of 
the vote, while the “closed” parties of the Conserv-
atives and UKIP won 44.3%.
On April 18, when she announced the general 
election, Theresa May claimed that “The country is 
coming together, but Westminster is not”. Evidence 
would suggest that both Westminster and the 
country remain deeply divided.
The 2017 General Election: How Votes were split 
between “open and closed”
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Figure: Mapping the UK's ideological divide
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Data and statistics play a central role in election 
analyses. While politicians, spin doctors and com-
mentators quickly aim to interpret the outcome 
according to their views, it is a much more 
complex task to provide a more thorough analysis 
of the underlying geographical patterns, demo-
graphics and other factors that have contributed to 
a specific election outcome.
From a geographical perspective maps are 
important in evaluating the spatial voting patterns 
in an election. Maps give an immediate under-
standing of the emerging political landscapes in 
a quickly accessible and more intuitive way than 
numbers or ordinary charts. They also allow for 
a visual exploration as well as revealing spatial 
correlations, which is particularly valuable when 
the actual outcome is as unexpected and surprising 
as in 2017.
The contribution of cartographic research has 
led to an increasing diversity of electoral maps 
in recent years. Along with the digital turn in 
cartography that has shifted map production to 
computers over the past 40 years more advanced 
methods of geographic data analysis and its 
visualisation were developed that contribute to 
different types of electoral maps that have become 
more common in recent years, especially in the 
United Kingdom.
This cartographic analysis of this June’s 
election results provides different insights into the 
underlying spatial patterns by using three types 
of maps. Apart from a geographic perspective 
using a conventional land area map, two so-called 
cartograms allow for the results to be seen from 
very unique angles. Cartograms are maps that are 
transformed on a ‘scale other than a true scale’. 
This means that statistics other than land area 
determine the shape of a map, while still retaining 
basic geographical references.
The unusual shape and still widespread use 
of cartograms can make them hard to read and 
understand for the untrained eye. When accus-
tomed to the map display, they can reveal unique 
and novel insights into the underlying data that 
conventional maps fail in conveying. Two types of 
cartograms are used in this feature to provide such 
additional insights: The hexagon shaped cartogram 
is a representation of the parliamentary constit-
uencies, each constituency being represented by 
a hexagon (some changes in constituencies over 
the past decades are reflected in split and merged 
hexagons). The other cartogram is a so-called 
gridded cartogram which works like an equal-pop-
ulation projection in which each person gets an 
equal amount of space by resizing grid cells of 
equal area according to their total population. Less 
populated areas become smaller, while densely 
populated areas are increased in size.
The gridded population cartogram magnifies 
the most populated parts of the country, so 
election results in cities hardly visible in a normal 
map become visible in the cartogram. This is also 
the most accurate depiction of how people voted 
relation to each political party. Though true to how 
people are represented, this equal-population pro-
jection does not fully reflect the share of seats each 
party holds in parliament due to the first-past-the-
post principle. The size of the electorate in each 
constituency varies quite significantly, reaching 
from slightly below 22,000 (Na h-Eileanan an Iar in 
Scotland) to almost 109,000 (Isle of Wight in South 
East England). The actual political implications are 
therefore best shown using the hexagon map which 
displays geographically the share of seats each 
party holds.
Here are some of the patterns that become visible:
The overall results of the winning party reflect 
a typical geographic pattern of voting where rural 
constituencies are more likely to vote Conserv-
ative while urban areas largely vote Labour. The 
population cartogram highlights this particularly 
well, as it reduces the dominance of rural areas due 
to lower population densities. This fairly consistent 
pattern is again manifested at this election with 
London now dominated by Labour constituencies. 
The Urban/Rural divide becomes much clearer in 
the population cartogram.
An urban-rural, but also a North-South divide 
in England become even more apparent in the 
cartograms. These divisions are hard to identify 
in a conventional map, since they correlate closely 
with the population and constituency distribution. 
Labour’s strongest vote shares are in the urban 
centres, even in some constituencies where Labour 
did not win an outright majority. The Conservative 
strongholds, in contrast, are largely in the East, 
South East and South West of England as well as in 
the suburban fringes in the North. Similar patterns 
are repeated in Scotland and – to a smaller extent 
– in Wales.
A final look at the voter turnout reveals 
turnout was comparably high at 68.7 per cent and 
with a turnout below 60 per cent found in the old 
industrial North of England and parts of Scotland, 
largely  areas of stronger Labour support. More 
striking, however, is the change in turnout in 
Scotland compared to the 2015 general election. 
While turnout was relatively high in most parts 
of Scotland, it has reduced almost everywhere, in 
some parts by more than 5 percent. Having been 
called to the polling booth for the fourth time in 
three years might have led the Scottish electorate to 
experience voter fatigue.
To fully understand the new political land-
scapes of the United Kingdom, only a combination 
of different perspectives as shown here can help to 
gain a more complete picture. Geography matters 
not only in its physical dimension, but just as much 
in its social and political spaces that are depicted in 
these maps.
Cartographic perspectives of the general election
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UKIP was a major player in the 2015 general 
election and the 2016 referendum. It was expected 
to be important in 2017 too – not by winning 
substantial votes, but by the choices its former sup-
porters made, Brexit having been achieved. They 
were expected to help Theresa May achieve the 
goal set out in calling a snap election: to enhance 
her mandate in forthcoming Brexit negotiations. 
To gain a larger majority than Cameron in 2015 
she needed support from those who favoured 
Brexit but had voted for other parties in 2015 –
UKIP being the key target.
Having been prominent in pressuring for an 
in-out referendum and playing a major part in the 
campaign that produced a narrow majority for 
Leave, UKIP’s raison d’être was eroded. To remain 
relevant it needed a new purpose and leader – Paul 
Nuttall – identified two main roles: to ensure a 
‘hard Brexit’; and to retain the support of individ-
uals who had previously voted Labour, but from 
which they felt increasingly alienated. UKIP could 
become the voice of the precariat.
Opinion polls initially suggested a wide 
Conservative lead over Labour with UKIP’s 
support – compared to 2015 – probably reduced 
by two-thirds. Many former UKIP voters were 
expected to switch to the Conservatives, as the 
party delivering Brexit, rather than  Labour, seen 
as ‘lukewarm’. UKIP decided to promote that shift 
by not fielding candidates in many Labour-held 
marginals, in most of which UKIP’s 2015 vote 
share s exceeded Labour’s majority, to assist Con-
servative campaigns in those target seats.
Labour won 42 seats with a majority over the 
Conservatives of less than 10 percentage points in 
2015. UKIP fielded a candidate in only seventeen – 
and in just three where it won less than 10 per cent. 
A number received campaign visits from Theresa 
May, expecting major gains.
Those expectations were dashed. Only five 
seats were won by the Conservatives (two in 
constituencies with no UKIP candidate). Indeed, 
Labour retained all fourteen of the most marginal 
four won in 2015 with majorities of less than one 
percentage point.
Why? In most of them Labour’s vote share 
increased by more than the Conservatives’, suggest-
ing that more former UKIP voters switched to 
Labour. Many, especially northern constituencies 
such as Dewsbury and Halifax, had voted Labour 
before 2015; but were expected to vote Conserva-
tive in 2017 because of their views on Brexit. But 
they didn’t. Brexit had been agreed and they didn’t 
need to vote Conservative to ensure it happened. 
Instead, they were attracted by Labour’s anti-austeri-
ty policies and put off by some Conservative policies 
– notably on social care, pensions and schooling.
Although the Conservative-Labour polling 
gap closed over the campaign it was still generally 
believed the Conservatives would increase their 
majority and few, if any, of their 2015 marginal 
seats would be lost. UKIP fielded 27 candidates 
in the 44 seats won in 2015 by the Conservatives 
by less than ten percentage points. In twenty the 
Conservative MP had voted Remain in 2016 and 
would probably be re-elected but a good UKIP 
performance would ensure they were aware of the 
strength of pro-Brexit local opinion. Only four 
Conservative MPs in marginal seats who had voted 
Remain did not face a UKIP opponent, compared 
to 13 of the 17 who voted Leave.
That strategy largely failed too. The UKIP 
vote collapsed across virtually all 44 seats, Labour 
being the major beneficiary. It won twenty-one 
of the constituencies, ten where UKIP didn’t field 
a candidate and eleven where it did. As in La-
bour-held marginals, more former UKIP sup-
porters switched to Labour; there also, it seems, 
Labour’s policies were more attractive and Brexit 
was relatively unimportant – nine of the twenty 
Conservative MPs who voted Leave in 2016 lost 
their seats, as did twelve of the twenty-four who 
voted Remain.
UKIP won 12.6 per cent of the votes in 2015: 
in 2017 it was 1.8 per cent (back to 2001 levels), 
although polls suggested it would do about 
twice as well. (Many who said they would vote 
UKIP were maybe unaware there was no UKIP 
candidate in their constituency.) A majority of 
those who deserted UKIP were widely expected 
to vote Conservative, helping the party protect its 
marginal seats and win its targets from Labour. 
But they didn’t. Brexit was happening, and with 
the Conservatives expected to win the election a 
‘hard Brexit’ was very likely. Voting UKIP, where 
it fielded a candidate, or Conservative to stress 
Brexit’s continued importance was seen unneces-
sary – especially among former Labour supporters 
for whom voting Conservative was anathema. 
Labour offered more attractive policies to those 
‘just about managing’, and there was no reason not 
to return to their former loyalties.
The Conservatives, many pollsters and 
commentators – and perhaps many in Labour 
too – seriously misread how 2015 UKIP and 2016 
Brexit voters would vote in 2017. UKIP alone did 
not block the Conservatives search for a larger 
majority or aid Labour’s unexpected advance. 
Labour’s policies attracted and mobilised many 
young voters –probably impeding advances by 
Liberal Democrats or Greens. Anti-SNP tactical 
voting also probably aided Conservatives’ Scottish 
victories, without which their lead over Labour 
could have been much smaller and their chances of 
forming a government significantly reduced. But 
in the big story of the 2017 election, the behaviour 
of UKIP and its former supporters played a (the?) 
major role – just not the expected role.
UKIP’s former supporters were crucial to the 
outcome – but not as generally expected
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The decision of Britain to leave the European 
Union (EU) has shaped British politics. Prime 
Minister Theresa May called an early election for 
June 2017 specifically asking the British electorate 
to decide who is the most capable of negotiating 
the Brexit process. 
In this context, the  Liberal Democrats 
attempted to project itself as the most pro-EU 
political force in order to benefit from the an-
ti-Brexit (Bremain) vote. Lib Dems pledged to 
prevent Conservatives from seeking a ‘hard’ Brexit 
as well as to call a second referendum once the 
negotiation process has finalized.
However, it seems that the Liberal Democrats 
failed to benefit from the pro-EU part of the 
electorate. Although it gained five more seats 
than in the 2015 parliamentary elections, they 
saw their vote share fall to 7.4 per cent of the vote 
down from 7.9 per cent they had won previously. 
In parallel, Labour seemed to benefit from the 
anti-Brexit vote more than the Lib Dems.
As a result, the question that naturally emerges 
is why? Two main factors may explain the poor 
electoral performance: weak demand and weaker 
supply. 
On the demand side, it seems that in the 
course of the election campaign the issue priorities 
of the British electorate changed to some extent. 
According to a post-election survey, almost one 
in three voters (28 per cent) considered Brexit as 
the most important issue facing the country. In 
parallel, the number of those who had backed the 
Remain side in the 2016 referendum appeared to 
have diminished. As a Yougov poll has indicated, 
around half of those who had voted in favour of 
Britain staying in the EU now share the view that 
the government has a duty to implement the Brexit 
process, while another half of them still want to 
reverse the referendum result. In other words, the 
rise of the so called ‘Re-Leavers’ weakened the 
anti-Brexit vote.
Against this backdrop, on the supply side, it 
is evident that Lib Dems failed to address credibly 
the concerns of their targeted voters. The campaign 
strategy of the party to stress the need for a ‘soft’ 
Brexit as well as to pledge a second referendum on 
whether the British people must accept the Brexit 
deal or to remain in the EU probably alienated 
both the hard Remainers and the Re-Leavers, gen-
erating more confusion rather than offering clarity. 
In particular, the promise of a second referendum 
probably estranged those ‘Re-Leavers’ who ac-
knowledged the result of the referendum prefer-
ring a ‘soft’ Brexit, while the goal of a ‘soft’ Brexit 
made it difficult to attract ‘hard’ Remainers who 
wanted to overturn the referendum. It is indicative 
that one of the main reasons for which those who 
had voted for the Lib Dems in 2015 stated that they 
would not vote for them in 2017, was that they did 
not approve their policies.
In parallel, the position of Lib Dems had 
already been undermined by their record as part 
of the 2010-5 coalition government and particu-
larly by their collaboration with the Conservatives. 
According to a pre-election YouGov survey, almost 
four in ten of those who had voted for the Lib 
Dems in 2010 and abandoned them in 2015 stated 
that they had no intention to vote for the party in 
2017 due to their ‘broken promises’ during their 
governing period.
 Certainly, the party had renewed its leader-
ship, while it remained in opposition for two years. 
However, it seems that this did not suffice in order 
for the Lib Dems to cover up for their leadership 
deficit in the eyes of the public. It is indicative 
that Tim Farron’s favourable opinions did not 
exceed the 20 per cent mark compared to Theresa 
May and Jeremy Corbyn, who enjoyed higher 
popularity ratings.
However, it can be argued that the electoral 
result could produce opportunities for the pro-EU 
forces and particularly for the Lib Dems. It is rea-
sonable to assume that the failure of the Conserva-
tive party to win an absolute majority is a rejection 
of the prospect of the ‘hard’ Brexit. In parallel, the 
political uncertainty that the election outcome 
generated might soon lead to fresh elections. So, 
the anti-Brexit parties might have an opportunity 
to shape the future of the country by turning the 
future of British politics to a pro-EU direction. 
However for the Liberal Democrats it would seem 
to be a challenge to regain their pre-2010 standing. 
Having been pushed to third place as Britain 
returns to two-party politics, and with a dimin-
ishing vote share, they may seem an even greater 
irrelevance by the time of the next election
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Meeting the public: the perils and pitfalls of 
‘walkabout’ questions to Theresa May in GE2017
One of the more notable themes of the GE2017 
campaign was Theresa May’s reluctance to 
engage in spontaneous public exchanges. Imme-
diately after the General Election was called she 
announced that she would not take part in any 
‘head-to head’ election debates and her subse-
quent public appearances were reportedly strictly 
managed to ensure that she was surrounded by 
Conservative Party supporters and not exposed to 
spontaneous questions. 
Here I use a discourse analytic approach to 
investigate one particular event where the guard 
slipped: an encounter with Kathy Mohan, a 
member of the electorate who questioned Theresa 
May in Abingdon market about the loss of her 
Disability Living Allowance (DLA). I identify 
the particular interactional difficulties that these 
events presented for Theresa May and show how 
all politicians should be cautious of these events as 
they are susceptible to contested representations in 
the media.
The first and most obvious characteristic of 
spontaneous public events is exactly that – poli-
ticians cannot prepare for them in advance and 
so the topic, tone, and detail of the question 
can take them by surprise. Theresa May appears 
to be more reliant on pre-planning than other 
political leaders. Her Prime Minister’s Question 
Time (PMQs) performances show a hyper-con-
trolled style and her responses seem prepared in 
advance. Although she cannot predict Corbyn’s 
weekly questions in PMQs, she can prepare her 
stock rhetorical tricolons or ‘sets of three’ and 
adversarial, ad hominem ‘soundbites’, that have 
become characteristic of these exchanges (such 
as: ‘He can lead a protest, I’m leading a country’). 
In contrast, it is impossible to predict any aspect 
of the spontaneous ‘walkabout’ public exchanges, 
and these prepared catch-phrases are unsuitable 
for such interpersonal conversations.
Kathy Mohan starts the conversation with 
the direct question ‘Are you going to help people 
with learning disabilities?’, followed by ‘I want you 
to do something for us’ (see Example 1, line 8).  
May’s initial response (‘We’ve got a lot of plans…’) 
evades the demand and attempts to provide a 
general response, aligning to her manifesto. 
However, Mohan interrupts May to correct her 
(line 10) in a way that shows no regard for May’s 
status as PM. This pattern is repeated throughout 
the conversation and Mohan interrupts May nine 
times during the exchange (see Example 2 lines 
21, 25, and 28). May is confronted by a self-con-
fessed ‘angry’ voter who directly contradicts her 
and underlines the personal impact of the loss of 
the DLA (see Example 2 lines 33-37). May attends 
to Mohan’s questions, does not directly interrupt 
her and gives appropriate ‘minimal responses’ 
which indicate attentive listening (for example 
the ‘yes’ and ‘right’ in Example 1, line 14), but she 
does not directly engage with Mohan’s demands 
or her personal circumstances. 
Responding to the public voice of the voter 
rather than an opposing politician in a more 
formal forum is therefore complex: May needs to 
manage affect and politely attune to the individual 
‘face’ or politeness needs of the questioner while at 
the same time attending to the impressions of the 
immediate and overhearing media audiences. This 
is more difficult than responding to questions from 
political opponents in political or media events 
(such as televised election debates or interviews), 
because politicians can completely disregard the 
face needs of their interlocuters and only attend to 
the immediate and ‘overhearing audience’ of the 
broadcast or social media. 
Interestingly, in the political campaigns of 
GE2017 that were rife with political insults, slurs 
and fake news from different directions, one of the 
media ‘takeaway’ messages from this interaction 
was that Theresa May ‘did not know the difference 
between ‘learning disabilities’ and ‘mental health’’. 
Example one suggests that May assumes Mohan 
has ‘mental health’ issues (line 9), and that Mohan 
corrects her (line 10). However, this transcript is 
taken from heavily edited versions of the conver-
sation (for example from The Guardian and BBC 
news websites). A longer version is represented in 
Example 3 (the added information is highlighted 
in red and it is taken from the Mirror and Sky 
News websites). In the second, longer version of 
the conversation it is clear that Mohan uses the 
phrase ‘learning difficulties and mental health’ more 
than once to describe the situation, which possibly 
explains why May uses this phrase herself. May 
also defends her use of the term ‘mental health’ 
in this conversation when she appears on BBC 
Question Time later in the election campaign. 
Whether May does or does not conflate these two 
terms is debatable but the differences between the 
two versions of the video are startling.  Certainly, 
the record of these spontaneous public events is 
highly unreliable given that there is no recourse 
to a definitive version of the ‘real’ conversation.  
Therefore, it seems that politicians have every 
reason to be wary of this type of political interac-
tion as it is particularly susceptible to alternative 
media representations.
Example 1: Kathy Mohan Questions Theresa May (Abingdon market, 15th May 2017)
KM:  I want you to do something for us=
TM:  =we’ve got a lot of plans for people with mental health [particularly]
KM:                  [AND] learning dis[abilities]
TM:                                [and learning]
         disabilities=
KM: =because I’ve got mild learning disabilities (.) and I haven’t got a carer at the moment
TM:                yes                  right
KM: and I’m angry 
Example 2: Kathy Mohan interrupts Theresa May
NB:                                                                                                     Kathy we’ve     
          done a lot to help haven’t [we]
KM:                                                   [no] I’m talking  about everybody not just me I’m talking about for
        everybody who’s got mental health and anybody who’s got learning disabilities (.) I want them     
        not to have their money taken away from them and being crippled=
TM: =we are going to do a number [of]
KM                                                        [the] fat cats keep the money and us lot get [nothing]
TM:                     [Kathy] we are going   
        to do a number of things let me just tell you one thing [which isn’t about money]
KM:             [well put the put the] do you know what I
        want (.) I want my my (.) um disability living allowance to come
TM:           mm
KM: back not have PIPS and get nothing I can’t live on a hundred pound a month (.) they took it all
        away from me=
Example 3: Kathy Mohan Questions Theresa May (longer version of example 1)
KM: Theresa (.) are you going to help people with learning disabilities and mental health
TM:           yes
KM:  because I stick up for mental health (.) and for learning disabilities and I’ve been (unclear) by 
TM:                                                                   yes
KM: them because cos they chucked me out the (unclear) cos I got a borderline and not I’m being
        serious (.) 
TM: Yes
KM:  I want you to do something for us=
TM:  =we’ve got a lot of plans for people with mental health [particularly]
KM:                 [AND] learning dis[abilities]
TM:                               [and learning]
         disabilities=
KM: =because I’ve got mild learning disabilities (.) and I haven’t got a carer at the moment
TM:                yes                  right
KM: and I’m angry and I’ve got no one to help me write a letter to Nicola I would like somebody to
        help me cos I can’t (.) I can’t do everything that I want to do
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Transcription Key
KM = Kathy Mohan (member of the public)
TM = Theresa May
NB = Nicola Blackwood (Conservative candidate for the Abingdon constituency)
[   ]= overlapping utterance with the line above/below
(.)  = pause of under a second
Underline = particular emphasis on word or syllable
CAPS = increased volume
‘=’ = Equals sign shows ‘latched’ utterances that run straight on from one speaker to
         another without a pause.
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The term most associated with political engage-
ment and participation is apathy. People do not 
see the point in voting, nothing changes when 
they do, a vote does not matter and they do not 
feel represented. Despite this somewhat negative 
picture voting is not in decline. The decline from 
71% in 1997 to 59% in 2001 was indeed dramatic, 
but the context of that election was particular (the 
outcome was indisputable). Since then turnout has 
steadily increased to 66% in 2010. More important-
ly the 72% turnout in the 2016 referendum on the 
UK’s membership of the EU demonstrates when 
every vote counts voters head to the ballot box. 
While the youth vote remains problematic, the 64% 
turnout by 18-24s for the referendum is equally 
positive. While voting is perhaps the most crucial 
act in terms of determining a nation’s government, 
it is not the only form of participation. We report 
the findings of a survey of a representative sample 
of 1,525 UK citizens to discover how many partic-
ipate in other forms of political activism and what 
mobilises them in order to shed some light on what 
factors might determine voter turnout.
It appears there is increased interest in 
politics as a result of the EU referendum. 72% 
say they are fairly or very interested in politics, 
even factoring socially acceptable answers this is 
higher than one might expect. The referendum 
may also have been empowering, 48% suggest 
that people can influence government. Yet despite 
the interest and empowerment, still 59% display 
indications of apathy, suggesting voting makes 
little difference. These factors suggest other forms 
of participation may be sought by empowered and 
interested citizens.
However the evidence for this is not as strong 
as one might expect. While signing petitions is 
quite high, the ease in which this can now be done 
perhaps makes the 52% fairly low. Buying or boy-
cotting products for political reasons is high, but 
this fundamentally does not go beyond the daily 
routine of shopping. Promoting a campaign, online 
or offline, is engaged in by 26% or 15%, few finan-
cially support campaigns, less take to the streets to 
demonstrate the online environment is a far more 
active participatory space. With numbers joining 
political parties or campaign organisations even 
lower, it would seem democratic processes beyond 
elections do not reflect interest levels.
But what factors mobilise citizens into partici-
patory action? It is quite natural that the two most 
important factors are when an issue is of personally 
high importance and if a particular act is seen 
as part of the duty of a citizen of a democracy. 
These factors are personal, referred to as intrinsic 
motivations and drive those wishing to be heard on 
an issue that concerns them and, in doing so, feel 
empowered and good about themselves.
Peers and the parasocial effect of ‘people like 
us’ are also important. Social media allows citizens 
to advertise their activities, ‘telling your friends’ 
has a powerful mobilising effect. Research also 
indicates that the larger the numbers of previous 
signatories (for example) the higher the likelihood 
that further people will sign a petition. Of course 
friends and family also mobilise one another face 
to face, but due to peer to peer networks there are 
numerous options for mobilisation to occur and 
that is important for driving political participation.
Campaign and political organisations also 
have a powerful effect in terms of mobilising 
citizens. Campaign organisations, as opposed to 
political organisations including political parties, 
have the edge. Again, social media acts as a crucial 
conduit for persuasive campaign communication, 
utilised by organisations to reach citizens, gain 
their support and then mobilise them.
What do these data tell us about voting 
behaviour? Firstly people must feel voting and its 
consequences are important, and that voting is 
likely to have an impact, and there must be a sense 
of duty. But networks can instil a sense of duty and 
importance, reinforce the importance of voting and 
can have an impact on voting intentions. Those 
citizens in a network of voters are more likely to 
vote and vice versa, so if people do encourage one 
another more might vote. This mechanism could 
be crucial particularly among the young. But 
campaign organisations, even political parties, have 
a role in mobilising citizens. The modern com-
munication environment can increase or decrease 
political participation and the turnout in 2017 was 
a factor of that environment.
Note: The data was collected within Innovation and 
stability project founded by Audencia Foundation 
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Moments of accidental connection with the ‘Great 
British Public’: because Brenda et al know best! 
Snap, crackle, pop! The lady changes her mind and 
there was to be another General Election after all. 
Paradoxically and bizarrely it was framed as ‘the 
Brexit election’ by the very same politician who 
told us to ‘move on’ and accept the result. Initially 
the public appeared to accept the label. But then, 
like humans tend to do, we appropriated it to suit 
our own agenda.
And so, we were able to enjoy or endure seven 
weeks of prime-time television coverage of the 
‘Great British Public’ (potential voters) as co-crea-
tors of our election news. In a world where every-
body’s opinion is equally valid the media generated 
instant commentary from the ‘person in the street’ 
and then sought to make news from it – even 
headlines at times regardless of how unsubstanti-
ated or contradictory much public discourse was. 
Ouch; these are real people, this is the electorate 
being referring to, the nub of democracy. Indeed, 
but if enlightened debate is required for there to be 
any sense of flourishing in this sphere then mere 
projection of existing biases and prejudices, voicing 
of barely thought-through ideas, and verbally 
haranguing those standing for office, is really not a 
useful substitute. 
What am I talking about? 
Brenda from Bristol. Whose instant reaction 
kick-started the campaign with “Oh my God, 
your joking, not another one!”. I’ve watched her 
14 second contribution over thirty times now and 
still I can’t quite locate its value in the context of 
division, growing inequality, world uncertainty and 
the rise of nationalism! 
‘Women in sunglasses’ who disturbed not only 
Theresa May’s lunch (take away chips) but also the 
dogma of ‘strong and stable’ surrounding her early 
weeks in this election campaign. In the process of 
trying to have a conversation about several issues 
with the Prime Minister it became apparent, this 
lady was not for engaging. 
Malcolm from Oxfordshire, who’d just turned 
65 and liked the sound of his own voice when 
‘confronting’ Tim Farron, accusing him of a variety 
of things (fake or not it didn’t seem to matter) 
from running the country down to labelling Leave 
supporters as ignorant. This member of the public 
was apparently “absolutely sure” what he’d voted 
for in the EU membership referendum. In his sub-
sequent two minutes of fame, being interviewed 
for national television, the viewer might have had 
their doubts.  
There must be something in the Oxfordshire 
water, the next awkward yet revelatory moment, 
was also in the county. This time Cathy gave the 
Prime Minister some home truths about life ‘on the 
PIP’ (Personal independent payment) a genuine 
struggle for Cathy. Most poignant in this encounter 
was the profound sense of different worlds briefly 
colliding; May appeared to both literally stagger 
and be staggered that such people exist so close 
to leafy southern suburbia …. and had no ability 
to engage with Cathy, instead responding with 
monotone platitudes as if taken from her now 
infamous party manifesto. 
Such was the centralised control of the main 
party campaigns that these moments of connection 
were rare.  The authentic qualities of these occa-
sional encounters had ‘news value’ writ large and 
so were amplified on and offline; echoing for 24 
hours or so after they occurred. Yet overall during 
this election ordinary voters’ un-staged interac-
tions with politicians - usually whilst they were 
out shopping – did not significantly break into the 
election mind-set, did not set the agenda and, I 
suggest, were only defining in the sense of reifying 
the protective status of the ‘general public’s’ 
opinions, regardless of how informed or not they 
might have been. Striking was the complete lack of 
challenge to these public utterances … the notion 
of empowerment taken too far.   
Drawing on these cultural observations, I 
argue that contemporary democracy, premised as 
it is on the atomized individual as the legitimate 
focus point, is being undermined. Disruption is 
due in part to a shift in our conception of ‘self ’ 
where narcissistic tendencies are more pro-
nounced and acceptable. This serves to corrode 
what it is to be civil and alters the nature of the 
public’s engagement with democratic forms 
of politics. Such politics has to be rooted in 
discourse ethics where we recognise the value of 
the other perspectives and are willing and able to 
be self-questioning. When the ‘public’ are extolled 
as sovereign beyond scrutiny by the mainstream 
media, most notably the national broadcasters, 
we should, as (whisper this quietly) experts, be 
concerned, very concerned.  
What’s to be done? 
The main parties clearly need new strategic 
responses in resisting this fetishisation of the 
public. Jeremy Corbyn’s driver had an unconven-
tional approach; run them over! However, it turned 
out that the poor guy hit was a BBC reporter 
who simply held the camera whilst members of 
the public ranted and raved, and, in other ways, 
demonstrated just how parochial they can be. 
Plus, the solution can’t be acts of violence (inad-
vertent or not). Whilst Theresa May’s approach 
was to avoid the general public whenever possible, 
which rather neatly turned out to be a reasonably 
reciprocal arrangement. Tim Farron, ever demon-
strating his reasonableness, foolishly saw it as an 
opportunity to have an actual conversation. The 
result: being shouted down … wagging pointed 
finger and all.   
The outcome of this cacophony of reified 
noise? Brenda had better get herself prepared as 
she will no doubt be ‘door-stopped’ by journal-
ists when the next General Election is called… 
probably sometime later this year. 
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To understand power you must first appreciate 
what powerlessness feels like. To make sense of this 
General Election we must first turn to the Brexit 
referendum. Brexit spoke to those who felt cast 
aside by globalization and forgotten by ruling elites 
all too willing to stand by and watch communities 
decimated and social infrastructures weakened. 
The tag line for the Leave campaign offered the 
promise of a different future – ‘Let’s Take Back 
Control’. It spoke to a disaffection that democracy 
doesn’t work for the majority of its members. That 
the Conservative Party thought they could win 
an enhanced majority simply by repeating ‘Brexit 
means Brexit’ reveals they never fully understood 
what people had hoped Brexit could give them: the 
dignity of making their own history. They did not 
understand powerlessness.
To begin to appreciate powerlessness requires 
an understanding of inequality - the fault line that 
exposes disaffection from a certain type of politics. 
As inequality has increased so social mobility has 
fallen. As the poor have got poorer so they have 
had less and less influence over policies and politi-
cians and been ever more cut adrift.
Global capitalism and democracy vie for 
opposite conclusions – one creates massive ine-
quality and the other is premised upon political 
equality. When referendum pledges are shown to 
be disingenuous, then democracy flounders. When 
elite interests prevail and the political system no 
longer works for the mass of ordinary people, then 
democracy is weakened further. When people 
feel that they are dispensable and don’t need to 
be listened to, then democracy has failed. The 
Conservative party weren’t just not listening, they 
blatantly refused to engage in virtually any debate 
at all. The face of ‘Caring Conservatism’ that the 
vicar’s daughter tried to wear on becoming Prime 
Minister was quickly exposed as a poor disguise 
during the election campaign.
The Labour Party, simultaneously weakened 
internally felt emboldened externally to present 
a Manifesto package that stopped pandering to 
Conservative values in a desperate bid to win over 
middle England and spoke directly to the felt expe-
rience of social need on the ground – investment 
in people and communities, working rights, better 
wages, a functioning NHS, free education. They 
had nothing to lose and everything to gain. And so 
for the first time since the financial crash there was 
an attempt to break with the neo-liberal force-field 
and an acknowledgement that to do this would 
require a redistribution of wealth via a more pro-
gressive income tax. Only an anti-elite candidate 
like Corbyn could do this.
Some have claimed that the outcome of a hung 
parliament was so unexpected and so contrary to 
the majority of mainstream media coverage that 
it shows the end of their influence. Simultaneous-
ly, it is said to confirm the power of the internet 
to transform politics. But we should be wary of 
drawing such hasty conclusions. We should seek 
to appreciate what powerlessness feels like as we 
struggle to understand where power lies.
Political shifts do not happen as a consequence 
of mainstream media coverage (although they 
may help to set the agenda) or even from online 
networks (although they may help civil society to 
mobilise). It is not down to Facebook advertis-
ing or clever memes that go viral. Shifts emerge 
from particular histories and the contradictions 
between how we are told the world works and our 
experiences of it. We have been told by politi-
cians and media alike that the only way out of an 
economic crisis is through a politics of austerity, 
despite the fact that the analysis on which a politics 
of austerity is based is largely discredited by the 
vast majority of economists. The more austerity 
we have had the less economic growth we expe-
rience and so the mismatch grows between what 
the politicians (and often the mainstream media 
news outlets) tell us and what our experiences 
show us. The Labour Manifesto spoke to the felt 
experience of inequality as powerlessness and then 
dared to proffer that austerity measures will make 
no difference to the many in the long term; that 
privatization is decimating long standing institu-
tions of social democracy leaving the vulnerable 
unprotected and unrepresented; and crucially, that 
an alternative politics is possible.
Brexit forewarned us of a crisis of the relations 
of political representation and political parties, 
what Gramsci called a crisis of authority. But 
Gramsci also pointed to the ‘trenches and fortifi-
cations’ of civil society as sites where democracy 
could kick back and power be reclaimed. What 
made the difference in this election was not 
mainstream media or social media but people on 
the ground coming together, walking and talking 
on the streets, knocking on doors to inform and 
persuade people as equals in a shared society that 
their voice counted, that the prospect of democracy 
may yet be realised. And that’s powerful stuff.
News and 
Journalism
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It was billed as the Brexit election, but events 
have influenced a campaign – and result – few 
predicted. I have been monitoring election 
coverage with a research team at Cardiff University, 
comparing TV news across the main UK evening 
bulletins. The opening part of the campaign began 
fairly predictably, with the Conservatives tightly 
controlling their rallies and walkabouts by limiting 
access to journalists. Brexit negotiations overshad-
owed the first week of our monitoring, with the 
Conservatives dominating coverage, particularly 
on the BBC.
However, the second week coverage become 
more balanced between Conservatives and Labour, 
with Corbyn often pictured in front of large crowds 
of people – notably students – cheering him on in 
rallies and walkabouts. But in focussing so much 
on May and Corbyn, the other UK parties received 
limited attention. Labour and Conservative, at this 
point in the campaign, made up 81.8% of airtime 
granted to all parties, yet in the 2015 election they 
only received 67.3% share of votes. 
Broadcasters, of course, may argue they 
were reflecting public opinion. But in narrowly 
focussing on the horse race between Labour and 
Conservative, they gave little airtime to other 
parties. Indeed, the DUP – who gained 10 seats 
and propped up the Conservative’s minority gov-
ernment immediately after the election – made just 
one or two appearances on each bulletin over the 
six week campaign. 
Post-election pundits have called for greater 
media scrutiny of Northern Irish politics, but the 
lesson should be that all devolved nations that 
make up UK politics should be better reflected 
in network coverage. We found the devolved 
relevance of polices was not always clearly commu-
nicated by broadcasters, including the Conserva-
tives’ proposal to reform social care, which affected 
people living in England, not Scotland, Wales or 
Northern Ireland. 
In the opening two weeks of campaign we 
found a relatively light policy agenda. Most 
election news had little policy information, with 
few ‘explainers’ unpacking the issues between 
parties. Experts were not used to explore the 
parties’ policies, as broadcasters choose instead to 
air – between a fifth and almost half of all sources – 
citizens’ views in vox pops. These were often short 
in length and substance, with the public mostly 
asked to respond to questions about the horse race, 
leaders’ personalities and, to a far lesser extent, the 
parties’ policies.
Once the parties’ manifestos were published 
– a week later – policy was pushed up the agenda.
Close to 8 in ten items were primarily about
policy issues, whereas the previous weeks of the
campaign issues made less than half of coverage.
The Conservative’s social care reforms became
the dominant issue as many voters and experts
voiced their opposition to the policy. This forced 
a Conservative U-turn and led to a visibly shaken 
up PM battling it out with journalists claiming 
“nothing has changed”. Clearly it had, but the focus 
of attention was short-lived. The terrorist attacks in 
Manchester halted campaigning and the govern-
ment’s response became the focus of attention. 
Once the spotlight turned to law and order, 
many pundits believed Conservatives were on safer 
territory. It legitimated broadcasters asking the 
Labour leader about his response to terrorism and 
led to prominent newspaper headlines – including 
on election day – about Corbyn being a terrorist 
sympathiser. 
When asked about domestic policy in areas 
such as health and education, polls showed many 
voters supported Labour’s policies. Yet the focus 
was often on party leaders – May’s ‘strong and 
stable leadership’ - rather than policy detail. 
Towards the end of the campaign, horse race 
reporting increased as some opinion polls showed 
Labour were not far behind the Conservatives. 
When interpreting these polls, however, a Tory 
majority was still perceived as the likely outcome.
The conventional wisdom was that, despite the 
popularity of their issues, Labour would perform 
badly because of Corbyn’s leadership qualities. In 
live two-ways – which made up nearly a quarter of 
all TV news items – often political correspondents 
would cast doubt on Corbyn’s ability to appeal to 
ordinary voters. And, in vox pops, where party 
political balance was constructed, Labour support 
was represented but Corbyn’s credibility was often 
undermined. “I still believe in Labour [but not] 
plonker Corbyn”, as one Channel 4 vox pop put it.
The day after the election, Channel 4’s anchor, 
Jon Snow, opened the programme by acknowledg-
ing: “I know nothing, we the media, the pundits 
and experts, know nothing”. He was speaking for 
many journalists who had followed conventional 
wisdom about Corybn’s electoral appeal. 
In rethinking election reporting, broadcasters 
may want to spend less time asking Westminster 
correspondents for their judgements and more 
time understanding the issues that made many 
people vote for one party over another. 
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The battle for control of the media agenda is 
a defining characteristic of modern election 
campaigns to the extent that some argue they 
can have a pivotal influence in determining 
their eventual outcome. Conscious of this factor 
Labour’s John McDonnell has claimed his party 
‘reinvented word-of-mouth as a form of political 
communication’ to counter its many critics, par-
ticularly in the press, during the 2017 campaign. 
And although social media platforms have been 
invaluable in disseminating information, espe-
cially to younger audiences, print and TV still 
provide millions of voters with their main source 
of election news. 
As such, it is important to provide a critical 
assessment of the performance of these outlets in 
order to understand the nature of the campaign 
coverage available to citizens in the run-up to 
polling day. Can such analysis help account for 
the extraordinary result the country woke up to 
on 9th June?
The Centre for Research in Communica-
tion and Culture conducted an audit of election 
news from 5th May to 7th June. We analysed the 
main weekday output of five TV bulletins and 
ten national newspapers (see our blog for more 
details). Our research focused on the relative 
prominence of rival parties and politicians, the 
issue agenda, and the evaluative direction of 
coverage found in the press. 
Figure 1 demonstrates the striking contrast 
between the 2015 and 2017 campaigns. Two 
years ago, the Lib Dems, SNP and UKIP featured 
prominently. By contrast, the 2017 campaign saw a 
‘two-party squeeze’ whereby the Conservatives and 
Labour both received more coverage on TV and in 
the press than in the last election (a combined 84% 
of appearances in the press and 67% on TV). 
The respective major party leaders dominated 
news coverage. Table 1 confirms that Theresa May 
was the most prominent politician (appearing 
in approximately 3 out of every 10 news items), 
while Jeremy Corbyn was second (featuring in 
roughly 1 in 4 items). In combination, May and 
Corbyn accounted for over a third of all appear-
ances by actors during the campaign. Other 
party leaders and politicians appeared with far 
less frequency: this was a highly presidential 
campaign focusing overwhelmingly on the two 
candidates for the premiership.
In terms of the issue agenda, ‘process’ coverage 
(i.e. a focus on the ‘horse race’, party strategies, 
polling, and so on) dominated the campaign – as it 
traditionally does. However, as Table 2 shows, this 
was markedly down on its equivalent share in the 
2015 campaign. Brexit/European Union was the 
most prominent substantive issue, but the focus on 
this topic was intermittent, and its dominance of 
the policy debate fell away during the election. In 
its place subjects like Health, Social Security and 
Defence/Security came to the fore at key moments. 
This was largely unfavourable to the Conservatives 
in terms of their attempts to control the campaign 
agenda given that issues that have traditionally 
favoured the party (e.g. Economy, Immigration) 
were relatively marginalised.
While UK broadcasters are legally compelled 
to be impartial, the British press are (in)famously 
partisan. Consequently, we evaluated how positive 
or negative newspaper coverage was towards the 
various parties, weighted by the respective circu-
lation figures of the ten daily titles in the sample. 
Figure 2 demonstrates that the Labour Party 
received the overwhelming majority of negative 
evaluations published by the press, largely due to 
the hostile coverage provided by higher circulation 
papers such as the Sun, the Daily Telegraph and the 
Daily Mail. Newspaper treatment of the Conserv-
atives was broadly more sympathetic but not con-
sistently: during the third week of the campaign, 
for instance, coverage of the party was more 
negative than positive, and negativity towards 
Labour was at its weakest. This was the period in 
which the Conservatives launched their manifesto 
and subsequently made a U-turn on what became 
known as the ‘dementia tax’. Although the party 
subsequently saw improvements in its evaluations 
by the press, newspaper coverage was mainly 
characterised by its negativity towards Labour and 
party leader Jeremy Corbyn.
Ultimately, however, this formidable 
advantage did not help the Prime Minister realise 
her ambition to win an enhanced parliamentary 
majority and mandate to negotiate Brexit. Theresa 
May’s claim that anything other than a vote for her 
would result in a ‘coalition of chaos’ has come back 
to haunt her and embarrass once loyal followers 
among the ‘Tory press’. 
A tale of two leaders: news media coverage of 
the 2017 General Election
Table 1: Most prominent politicians in 
campaign news coverage (total news 
appearances)
Rank Politician % items
1 Theresa May (Cons) 30.1%
2 Jeremy Corbyn (Lab) 26.7%
3 Tim Farron (Lib Dem) 6.8%
4 Nicola Sturgeon (SNP) 3.7%
5 Boris Johnson (Cons) 3.6%
6 John McDonnell (Lab) 3.4%
7 Paul Nuttall (UKIP) 3.4%
8 Amber Rudd (Cons) 2.8%
8 Diane Abbott (Lab) 2.8%
10 Emily Thornberry (Lab) 1.8%
11 Philip Hammond (Cons) 1.7%
12 Michael Fallon (Cons) 1.5%
13 Ruth Davidson (Cons) 1.4%
13 Caroline Lucas (Green) 1.4%
15 Jeremy Hunt (Cons) 1.2%
16 David Davis (Cons) 1.1%
17 Leanne Wood (PC) 1.1%
17 Jonathan Ashworth (Lab) 1.1%
19 David Cameron (Cons) 1.0%
19 Angela Rayner (Lab) 1.0%
19 Vince Cable (Lib Dem) 1.0%
Notes: Percentages=(number of appearances/number of items)
*100, rounded. Up to five actors could be coded per item.
Table 2: Most prominent issues in news coverage 
Rank Issue % (2017) Difference from 2015
1 Electoral process 32.9% -12.5%
2 Brexit/European Union 10.9% +7.8%
3 Defence/Military/Security 7.2% +4.7%
4 Health and health care provision 6.7% =
5 Taxation 5.7% -1.1%
6 Economy/Business/Trade 5.5% -5.9%
7 Social Security 4.6% +2.4%
8 Immigration 4.2% +0.8%
9 Devolution & other constitutional issues 3.3% -1.0%
10 Standards 3.0% -0.3%
Notes: Percentages=(number of issues/total number of issues)*100, rounded. 
Up to three issues could be coded per item. 
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Did broadcast stage-management create a 
vacuum for social media?
I described the 2015 election as “the banal theatre 
of the tightest, most sterile, stage-managed 
campaign ever”. Little did I realise that within two 
years we would see an even more closed on-screen 
campaign. But in 2017, did the broadcast 
clampdown backfire for Theresa May?
The logic of water-tight control was stronger 
this time for both main parties. The Conservatives’ 
advisors created a ‘Maybot’ who refused to engage 
in public debate with journalists, the public or 
rival politicians. Her appearances were confined 
to warehouses stuffed with party supporters and 
her utterances were restricted to the vocabulary of 
a ten-year-old. Other ministers were only allowed 
bit parts in the theatre of news. Their thinking 
was ‘why risk a 20-point opinion poll lead in a 
single-issue election?’
Initially, the Labour Party’s approach to broad-
casting was to take their leader to safe seats to orate 
before invited party members. Journalists from 
hostile newspapers were excluded. 
Neither party aimed to win a ‘general’ election. 
Corbyn sought to gain enough of the vote share 
to secure his leadership of the Labour party. May 
sought to increase her majority to allow her to 
ignore her party during the Brexit negotiations.
Broadcast journalists from the BBC’s Jeremy 
Vine to Channel 4 News’ Jon Snow took to Twitter 
to lament the failure of the leaders to engage. 
This barren broadcast landscape was made 
even more tedious by the marginalisation of the 
smaller parties. The reality of the polls and the 
political agenda meant they were not significant. 
Media enforced that. Small party leaders such as 
the Green’s Caroline Lucas had perfectly competent 
campaigns but they were unable to use TV ‘debates’ 
or broadcast media in general to intrude upon the 
main party narrative in the way that Clegg, Farage 
and Sturgeon had done in the past.
The TV set-piece programmes had dimin-
ished audiences and diluted impact. The opinion 
polls and the general journalistic narrative insisted 
that there was no contest. If broadcast election 
campaigns are soap-operas then this one had two 
weak characters and no plot twist.
And yet, something happened. Theresa 
May made a number of unforced policy errors: 
fox-hunting, ‘dementia tax’, school lunches.  That 
combined with her one dimensional and un-empa-
thetic style meant she lost momentum. 
However, the real story was the Labour ‘surge’. 
In a long dull campaign the broadcast media was 
significant in familiarising the public with Jeremy 
Corbyn as a character who was far less frightening 
than the press had suggested and relatively more 
engaging than his rival. The more they saw and 
heard of Corbyn, the more voters accepted his legit-
imacy. Labour’s campaign team were clever enough 
to realise this and pushed him further into the 
limelight to contrast with May’s life in the shadows.
But perhaps the main effect of this sterile 
broadcast campaign was the space it allowed for 
social media to have a galvanising effect? While the 
broadcasters were reduced to carefully balanced 
platitudes in the absence of any real engagement 
with the politicians, online a different, much more 
interesting campaign was happening.
In the past Labour has ‘won’ the online 
campaign with no positive impact on the actual 
result. Media effects are difficult to prove and the 
data is still being gathered. But qualitatively, the 
left-wing digital campaign was different to 2015 
and it exploited the broadcast vacuum.
Firstly, the ‘alt-left’ blogs like The Canary and 
AnotherAngryVoice spent a lot of time critiquing 
broadcast and other media as well as promoting 
Corbyn’s agenda. They gained as much traffic 
as many MSM articles and comparable to TV 
audiences overall.
Secondly, the Conservatives were aiming 
negative and attack adverts through Facebook 
at potential swing voters. These may have been 
effective at saying what broadcast would not allow. 
However, they were not shared widely.
In contrast, Labour’s official and unofficial 
online videos were widely distributed. This was, 
I would suggest, partly because they were more 
‘positive.’ They expressed passion about Corbyn 
and righteous anger at both the Conservatives and 
the news media. This combination of emotion, 
social justice and personal identity politics is 
precisely the editorial cocktail that works so well 
on networks such as Facebook and YouTube. It 
is very much the formula that has made Channel 
4 News’ Facebook videos go viral. The digital 
native Corbynites understood this intuitively 
and produced the kind of video and imagery that 
makes memes.
I had previously thought that this aggressive, 
polarising discourse would only reach a small echo 
chamber. I argued that it might even put off potential 
recruits. So what, if Facebook is full of images of 
Corbyn talking to huge, enthusiastic crowds? 
But in contrast to the lifeless and inorganic 
Conservative campaign it felt energetic and 
inclusive. It seems to have had a catalytic effect 
on Labour campaigners. In a limited campaign it 
might also have helped reach out to the voters who 
would go on to form the Corbyn coalition in a way 
that conventional appearances on broadcast news 
could not do.
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Ducking the debate
From the outset of the campaign the commen-
tariat were united in smug consensus: Corbyn’s 
Labour Party was about to face the mother of 
all electoral defeats and the Lynton Crosby-di-
rected Conservatives would win a landslide by 
incessantly incanting Maoist-like slogans. In 
such circumstances, why bother to go head to 
head in something as quaintly deliberative as a 
televised debate, as party leaders had done in 
2010 and 2015? As Sarah Arnold declared in 
the Independent, “Theresa May is coasting to a 
memorable victory on 8 June – taking the time 
out of a hectic pre-election schedule to debate 
Jeremy Corbyn live will not benefit her, or any of 
us”. The Conservative line was that May regarded 
televised debates as a distraction from “a tradi-
tional campaign where we can get out and speak 
to all the voters, so they see people personally” 
(Conservative spokesperson quoted in The Sun, 
31 May, 2017). Not all voters were convinced that 
this would serve democracy well. Apart from the 
fact that most of Theresa May’s encounters on her 
trips around the country were stage-managed to 
a degree that smothered any prospect of sponta-
neous human interaction, no amount of speaking 
to or at the voters could provide a substitute for 
robust and focused confrontation between pro-
spective leaders of a government. 
We have shown in our studies of the first ever 
UK televised election debates in 2010 and 2015 
that these media events are watched in significant 
numbers by people who said that they had little 
or no interest in politics and followed little else 
relating to election news during the course of the 
campaign; that they were particularly appreciated 
by first-time voters, who not only watched them, 
but talked about them while they were taking 
place and in the days after, both via social media 
and face-to-face; and that most debate-viewers 
reported knowing more about the competing party 
policies and the characters of prospective Prime 
Ministers than they had done before watching. 
When Sarah Arnold asked “What use is Jeremy 
Corbyn wailing about Brexit and Theresa May 
laughing off his anti-austerity measures going to do 
for actual voters?”, she was quite simply betraying 
her ignorance of research as well as her unfounded 
complacency. Most voters disagreed with her: 
a BMG Research survey commissioned by the 
Independent (25/04/17) found that 54% of the 
public thought that the leaders of the UK’s major 
political parties should participate in live televised 
debates during the election campaign, with more 
Conservative supporters in favour than against. A 
Change.org petition calling upon the broadcasters 
to ‘empty chair’ any party leader refusing to take 
part in the debates attracted 121,966 signatories.
But surely, a modern democracy in which 
most people receive their political information 
from television should not have to rely upon 
the whims of party spin doctors or the efforts of 
petitioning citizens to persuade those seeking a 
mandate to run the country to debate their views 
before the largest available audience of voters? In 
our study of the 2015 debates, Jay Blumler, Giles 
Moss and I argued that “It is now time to move on 
from the debate about whether election debates 
are worthwhile. We have now had TV debates in 
the UK in two general election campaigns and on 
both occasions the most striking conclusion from 
research was that they were good for democratic 
citizenship. We think that the default assumption 
should now be that debates happen. It is perfectly 
reasonable for parties to argue about the arrange-
ments for future debates, but that they will happen 
should now be accepted as a matter of principle”. 
We were right then and now that we have 
witnessed the consequences of allowing a party 
leader to veto such a democratic opportunity it is 
surely time for serious public discussion about the 
right of the electorate to be exposed to televised 
election debates. Is it now time to be thinking 
about an election debates’ commission, charged 
with the public duty of knocking the parties and 
broadcasters’ heads together? 
The ‘debates’ that occurred in May’s obdurate 
absence were strange events. They were a combi-
nation of non-debates in which opposition parties 
said what they would have liked to have said to 
Theresa May had she been there, interrogations 
by aggressive interviewers who seemed far too 
absorbed in their own polemical agendas to engage 
in anything resembling a reasonable conversation 
and studio-audience question times – which were 
good for democracy, but still not leaders’ debates. 
In the end, one of the reasons for the Conserva-
tives’ humiliation at the polls was the impression 
they gave of taking voters for granted. For once, 
the obnoxious Richard Littlejohn writing in the 
odious Daily Mail was quite right: “She [May] ran 
scared of going head-to-head with Jeremy Corbyn. 
That didn’t make her look presidential, it made her 
look weak. In interviews with Andrew Neil and 
Jeremy Paxman, she came across as humourless, 
wooden and slow-witted. The more people saw of 
her, the less they liked her.”
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“If this doesn’t get the BBC’s Laura Kuenssberg 
fired, nothing will”; “Ian Hislop stuns the panel by 
calling out BBC bias straight to the broadcaster’s 
face”; “The BBC is in hot water again over its bias. 
And this time the complaint is a biggie”.
None of these news headlines from the 
campaign was published on a traditional right-wing 
news outlet, or on a new alt-right media site. All 
three were published by the popular left-wing news 
site The Canary. These were just three of 75 articles 
published on the site during the campaign that 
alleged BBC political bias (from 19 April to 7 June).
There were similar accusations made about 
BBC election on other alt-left sites including 
Skwawkbox (“Sky Shames Kuenssberg On #La-
bourmanifesto #GE17”), Evolve Politics (“The 
BBC licence fee is now simply a charge to be 
spoon-fed right-wing propaganda”) and Another 
Angry Voice (“Another astounding display of 
pro-Tory bias from the BBC”). Novara Media 
hosted a podcast to discuss Tom Mills book The 
BBC: Myth of a Public Service? that argues the 
BBC is the voice of the Establishment. Across 
all of these outlets more than a hundred pieces 
alleged BBC bias during the campaign.
The allegations ranged from general criticisms 
of the Corporation, to accusations against particu-
lar programmes, to disparagement of individual 
journalists. BBC programmes such as Newsnight 
were singled out; “No wonder BBC Newsnight is 
on its way out,” The Canary writes, “after the stunt 
it just pulled”. Individual journalists were accused 
of deliberate or unconscious bias, including: Laura 
Kuenssberg, Nick Robinson, Norman Smith, John 
Pienaar, Kamal Ahmed, John Humphries and 
Andrew Marr. Kuenssberg was a particular focus 
for criticism, alleged to be “notorious for her anti 
Corbyn bias”.
The BBC, according to the alt-left media, acted 
as a filter for the right-wing press. It mimicked 
their political agenda, followed their stories, and 
– consciously or unconsciously – adopted some
of their political perspectives. Criticisms were
often based around the BBC’s failure to report
on specific events or ask specific questions. The
Canary called out Andrew Marr for ‘forgetting’ to
talk about privatisation in a discussion on the NHS
with Jeremy Hunt.
These criticisms should be put in the context 
of parallel attacks on the BBC in the right-wing 
press. The Sun, The Daily Mail, the Times and the 
Daily Telegraph have long been critics of the BBC, 
and their attitudes towards the broadcaster did not 
change during the 2017 campaign, though there 
were less critical of the broadcaster than the alt-left 
media. Their particular ire was directed at the 
BBC following the live leaders’ debate of 
31 May at which the audience appeared notably 
pro-Corbyn. “BBC’s ugly, uninformative and 
biased debate demeaned democracy” the Daily 
Mail commented. While the Sun reported that 
“BBC Election Debate 2017 slammed as ‘biased’ as 
stunned viewers react with anger at audience for 
leaders’ grilling”.
Further denunciation of the BBC’s impartial-
ity came from new right-wing news outlets like 
Breitbart London and Westmonster, though their 
disapproval tended to be centred on coverage of 
Brexit, rather than on election reporting. James 
Delingpole, for example, in a piece for Breitbart on 
4 May, wrote that “Kuenssberg was so flagrantly 
partisan that she might as well have done it to the 
strains of Ode to Joy while draped in the blue and 
gold-starred Euro flag and wearing a huge badge 
saying ‘I heart Jean-Claude Juncker’”. 
In some cases, the language and arguments 
used by the alt-left media and by the right-wing 
press about the BBC had noticeable overlaps. 
Alt-left media would cite issues and questions 
not asked by the BBC, and suggest the absence as 
evidence of pro-Conservative bias. Similarly, the 
Daily Mail asked why, during the BBC leaders’ 
debate, there was barely any mention of immigra-
tion. “Was it, as we suspect, because it was helpful 
to the Tories – with their strong immigration 
policies – and unhelpful to Labour…?”
The BBC therefore finds itself in the unenvi-
able position of being accused of political bias both 
by old and new media on the right and by new 
media on the left. It may be argued that this simply 
proves the broadcaster is successfully holding a 
middle path. Alternatively, the criticism could 
be written off as the self-interested perspectives 
of hyperpartisan and commercial media locked 
into an online contest for attention. This would, 
however, ignore the potential serious implications 
of the criticisms.
Alternative online news sites have a large and 
growing audience online. They will be energised 
– on both sides – by the surprise result of a
hung Parliament. As Buzzfeed reported early in
the campaign, news stories on alt-left sites “are
consistently and repeatedly going more viral than
mainstream UK political journalism”. Repeated
allegations of BBC bias made to significant
audiences from the right and from the left will
undermine confidence in the national broadcast-
er, at least among certain audiences. Equally, just
because criticisms come from both ends of the
political spectrum does not mean they are both
wrong. The continued allegations of bias also
undermine the principle of journalistic impartial-
ity and will make it more difficult not just for the
BBC, but for any news organisation to persuade
the public of its objectivity in future elections.
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In Conan Doyle’s story, The Adventure of Silver 
Blaze, there was no bark because the villain was 
familiar to the dog. That may be enough said, for 
some, to explain why a lapdog, pro-Tory press kept 
shtum on media policy issues. Yet I will pursue the 
naivety of asking (as in GE2015) what happened to 
media policy as an election issue in GE2017? 
Not much. But while you climb back onto your 
chair, it is worth probing further, not least as the 
party manifestos set out starkly contrasting visions. 
Labour foregrounded those differences, stating 
“Unlike the Conservatives, Labour will always 
support [the BBC] and uphold its independence”, 
and keep Channel 4 in public ownership. Similarly, 
the Lib Dems pledge to protect BBC independence, 
maintain World Service funding, keep Channel 4 
public and protect Welsh language broadcasters. 
The SNP seeks devolved powers over broadcasting, 
greater investment in BBC Scotland and benefits 
from the relocation of Channel 4 outside London. 
Likewise, Plaid Cymru seek devolved media 
policy for “a real Welsh media” that counters being 
“sidelined and forgotten”. Strap in as media perfor-
mance and policy become key sites of contestation 
as the turbulence of English nativism, empire 
revivalism and separatism play out around Brexit. 
The only reference to the BBC in the Con-
servative manifesto is its pledge to “place the 
BBC World Service and the British Council on 
a secure footing so they are able to promote the 
best of British values around the globe”. For public 
service supporters that is worrying enough, but 
the leverage of the DUP will add to concerns, with 
their call for a review of the BBC to “identify the 
opportunities for competitive tendering of key 
services and produce a plan that will either signifi-
cantly reduce the licence fee or abolish it”.
Aiding the creative industries sector looms 
large, with various nods to copyright reform. The 
Conservatives pledge pro-business support and 
deregulation, albeit shrouded in the code of a 
putative ‘level playing field’, but also interventions 
such as online child safety, with new requirements 
for social media to delete information held when 
young people turn eighteen. Labour goes furthest 
in promising policies on pay and employment 
standards to make the sector “more accessible to 
all”. Amid the mix of platitudes and particulari-
ties on offer, UKIP offers a curiously embodied 
apologia: “[e]lsewhere in this manifesto we 
condemn alien practices that oppress women, but 
we are not blind to our own failings” and promises 
to review codes so that “editorial coverage and 
advertising campaigns will treat men and women 
with dignity and promote healthy body images”. 
Watching how that party sifts (un)acceptable 
images might be grimly fascinating if the conse-
quences of hate speech weren’t so devastating. 
Labour, Lib Dems and Greens call for 
stronger action on media plurality, led by Ofcom, 
with oblique references to the Fox-Sky merger, 
alongside measures to support local commercial 
radio (SNP) and local news media (Labour). 
Yet, the greatest policy division is for the oldest 
medium: print. The Conservatives promise to halt 
the Leveson process and repeal Section 40, of the 
Crime and Courts Act 2014 which “would force 
media organisations to become members of a 
flawed regulatory system”, or risk higher libel and 
privacy court costs. Labour would implement the 
Leveson recommendations and “commence part 
two which will look into the corporate governance 
failures that allowed the hacking scandal to occur”. 
So, stark differences: how did the media dogs 
bark? Curiously silent; beyond brief summaries 
of policy and fleeting criticisms of Labour’s ‘press 
witch-hunt’ (The Sun 11 May). With the UK press 
the least trusted in Europe, it is perhaps unsur-
prising that readers were not led to ponder the 
merits of Tory complaisance with owners and 
editors, against the echo of that roar for action that 
Cameron was unable to avoid. 
So, if the beneficiaries of Tory press policy did 
not bark, what about broadcasting? A scan of BBC 
output awards Jo Coburn’s two-sentence summary 
of Tory press policy on Daily Politics (19 May) the 
most significant mention in the entire campaign. 
Yet something else did occur that bridges the 
eras of modernity and digitality. Accompanying 
Corbyn at some rallies were celebrity support-
ers Hugh Grant (also appearing on ITV’s Peston 
on Sunday 21 May) and Steve Coogan, both at 
the heart of the Leveson process, with Coogan’s 
address at Birmingham reaching six other rallies 
via satellite link. Corbyn’s quasi-local contact with 
voters through impartiality-regulated regional 
TV news has rightly been highlighted as a critical 
‘success’ factor. Local press coverage was significant 
too, with the calls for Leveson Part Two reported 
largely without the hostility of the Tory nationals 
who castigated Labour luvvies. Mass rallies, local 
press, celebrities, digital publishing and sharing: 
the ingredients of three centuries melded to make 
media, at least fleetingly, the election issue it surely 
deserved to be.
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Throughout the first half of the 2017 General 
Election campaign, that ever-present staple of tel-
evision news programming – the ‘vox-pop’ (from 
the Latin vox populi meaning ‘voice of the people’) 
– was used in an uncritical manner. Notably, as
the campaign became determined by the events of
the terrorist attacks in London and Manchester,
along with the campaign performances by Theresa
May and Jeremy Corbyn, the vox pop receded into
the background of news reports. There were, for
instance, some light news items such as the BBC
journalist Steve Smith’ supposedly comic tour of
non-marginal constituencies in Newsnight.
At the start of the campaign and before 
the manifesto launches, while politicians were 
deliberately kept away from the public, the town 
centres of marginal constituencies appeared to be 
over-flowing with roving reporters: 
“What is truly guaranteed, if you stand in 
the middle of Hull for around 10 minutes, is an 
approach from a BBC reporter. The same goes 
for marketplaces in numerous northern towns: 
anywhere, really, where the remarks will be pithy, 
and the passers-by both picturesque and certi-
fiably ordinary, which is to say, they speak with 
strong regional accents.” (Catherine Bennett, the 
Guardian, 30th April 2017)
For decades, ‘ordinary people’ have been 
stopped by interviewers to provide their political 
views during the campaign. These shades of 
public opinion have been presented as being 
legitimate when in reality they have little or no 
scientific rationale. 
In 2017, television news reporters on the BBC, 
ITN, Sky News and, most especially, Michael Crick 
on Channel Four News could be seen harassing the 
electorate for their views. Armed with oversized 
fury microphones, these journalists pounced upon 
random members of the public to record their 
every utterance - however insightful or inane. 
Conventional vox pops were complimented by the 
Guardian’s John Harris’s despairing online reports 
eponymously entitled ‘Anywhere but Westminster’ 
and seemingly designed to show a general public 
sapped of any political will.  
On 18 April, the day upon which the Con-
servative Prime Minister Theresa May called the 
snap election, ‘Brenda from Bristol’ made apparent 
her disgust that there was yet another chance to go 
the polls. She informed the BBC reporter Jon Kay, 
‘You’re joking?! Not another one! Oh, for God’s 
sake, honestly, I can’t stand this. There’s too much 
politics going on at the moment!’ Unsurprisingly 
her comments were played across the range of BBC 
News channels, bulletins and its website. Even less 
surprisingly, as her views reverberated across the 
social media, ‘Brenda’ became a news story in her 
own right.
Subsequently, vox pops formed a significant 
part of a news narrative which initially focused 
upon the virtues of May’s ‘Red Toryism’ which 
resurrected the values of ‘flag, family and faith’ as 
advocated by May guru Nick Timothy. In turn, 
eager news journalists sought out members of the 
public to reinforce the belief that May would be a 
‘strong and stable’ leader who could deal with the 
complexities of ‘Brexit’ in a Canute-like and xen-
ophobic manner. Conversely, the Labour leader 
Jeremy Corbyn’s political obituary was already 
written when one local commented, ‘I still believe 
in Labour [but not that] plonker Corbyn’.
Consequently, exacting broadcasting rules 
concerning balance and impartiality in electoral 
coverage were dropped in favour of journalists 
exchanging in pithy one-liners with bona fide 
‘men or women on the street.’ Such distortions 
meant that there was no way to know whether 
these supposedly ordinary members of the public 
were in any way representative of wider public 
opinion. Yet, the vox pop disappeared when May 
started to fatally make u-turns on the ‘worst 
manifesto in history’ making her ‘weak and 
wobbly’ while Corbyn’s canvassing connected with 
the public in record numbers. 
To conclude, the original over-usage of vox 
pops indicated how television new channels 
attempted reinforce the plutocratic values of the 
elite rather than truly engaging with the public. 
However, once the issues came to the fore, the 
populism expressed within the earlier vox pops 
receded when, perhaps, their usefulness for the 
news media agenda setters became less obvious 
and more counterproductive.  
The use and abuse of the vox pop in the 2017 
UK General Election television news coverage
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This was an election in which Rupert Murdoch’s 
titles finally failed to back a winner. Yes, the Tories 
may scrape a fragile working majority but no 
one is calling Theresa May a winner right now. 
Meanwhile the real target of the media establish-
ment, Jeremy Corbyn, was the clear victor earning 
Labour its biggest share of the vote since 2001 and 
its biggest increase in vote share since 1945. It is a 
delicious thought that, according to John Prescott, 
Rupert himself stormed out of a Times election 
party once he had seen the exit polls predicting a 
hung parliament.
This was an election in which the media’s 
hostility towards Corbyn, nurtured since the very 
first day of his leadership of the Labour Party, was 
intense but ineffectual. This was a campaign, in 
other words, that showed both the determination 
of powerful gatekeepers in the mainstream media 
to foster a pro-Tory agenda and the enduring 
ability of ordinary voters to ignore these voices. It’s 
time now to move on from believing either that 
it must have been ‘the Sun wot won it’ or that ‘the 
Sun didn’t win it’ in relation to political campaigns. 
Instead, we need a more complex understanding 
of media power as a phenomenon that distorts 
democratic processes but that has its own limita-
tions – as something pervasive but also contingent, 
fragile and unstable.
How do we make sense of this contradiction 
following the general election?
First, it is undeniable that whole swathes 
of reporting were hugely biased. Despite their 
appalling campaign, press coverage of the Tories – 
measured by circulation – was fairly neutral overall 
while Labour (widely acknowledged to have run 
a fantastic campaign) attracted far more negative 
coverage than any other party. In terms of endorse-
ments, the Tories received support from 80% of 
the Sunday press and 57% of the daily press with 
Labour receiving 20% and 11% respectively, hardly 
proportionate to the final tally. Of course, broad-
casters – forced to respect ‘due impartiality’ – were 
not partisan in such an open way but they never-
theless happily reproduced memes about Corbyn’s 
‘unelectability’, his alleged links to terrorists and 
his reluctance to send millions of people to their 
death by pressing the nuclear button. 
This was epitomised by Jeremy Paxman’s 
interviews with the two main party leaders where 
54% of airtime was devoted to issues pushed by 
the Tory campaign compared to 31% for issues 
pushed by Labour. Meanwhile, the BBC continued 
to circulate a Laura Kuenssberg report on Corbyn’s 
views on ‘shoot to kill’ that had been censured by 
the BBC Trust because of its misleading editing; 
it failed even to acknowledge that the clip was 
the subject of a complaint that had been upheld 
until the final day before the election. It would be 
foolish, in these circumstances, to think that the 
constant repetition of Corbyn as either dangerous 
or deficient had absolutely no impact on what the 
wider electorate was discussing. 
Having said this, it’s also clear that millions 
of people rejected the preferences of press moguls 
and the cynicism of the commentariat and turned 
to social media for a wider range of sources. When, 
after years of declining wages, voters were given 
the chance to punish Theresa May’s political op-
portunism and to vote for a distinctively progres-
sive, anti-austerity programme, some 13 million 
people took up this offer. 
This conundrum about media influence has 
led to some rather polarised claims. Predictions 
that the right-wing press have had their day or that 
media bias is no longer an issue are just as mis-
conceived as Sun editor Tony Gallagher’s assertion 
after the Brexit vote of the continuing power of 
newspapers. Both miss out on the fact that media 
influence is connected to the ideas that people 
hold at any one moment – a consciousness that is 
not fixed or immutable. During elections, pundits 
talk about ‘volatility’ and ‘swings’ as if these were 
mysterious processes with logics of their own. They 
are not. Campaigns, just like media, can change 
minds but it depends on what the message is, 
whether voters are actually exposed to it and how 
it connects to their own experience.
That’s why by far the biggest story of the 
election itself should have been about how voters 
changed their minds over the course of six 
weeks – about the ‘Labour surge’ and the virtual 
disappearance of the Tory lead in most opinion 
polls. Survation, for example, reported that a 17% 
poll lead for the Tories at the beginning of May 
had dropped to a single point just before election 
day. It asked a good question: ‘What’s going on?’ 
Tragically, this was not a question that many 
commentators bothered to ask. So while Corbyn’s 
energising of the whole election campaign should 
have been the lead story, this wasn’t a ‘frame’ that 
the media were prepared to adopt. And so long 
as the mainstream media fail to recognise just 
how dramatically politics in the UK has changed, 
media bias – and the need for media reform – will 
remain a major issue.
Media bias hits a wall
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The unexpected, ‘snap’ general election of June 
2017 was a pivotal moment in the history of the 
UK’s evolving democracy. Arguably, of course, 
nobody ‘won’ it in the sense of getting an overall 
majority, but the incumbent government remained 
in power, albeit as a minority administration. An 
important significance of the event, though, was 
the inability of The Sun and the rest of the right-
wing press to sufficiently influence the course of 
the election to prevent the shock loss of the Con-
servative Party’s majority – and more specifically 
to enable the party to sustain the massive opinion 
poll leads it consistently enjoyed until the end of 
the campaign.
The proud boasts of The Sun in May 1992 
that “It’s The Sun wot won it” and in May 1997 
that “It’s The Sun wot swung it”, following succes-
sive Conservative general election victories, were 
always controversial - and with the newspaper’s 
proprietor, Rupert Murdoch, switching its alle-
giance in advance of the Labour landslide of 1997 
there were suggestions that far from influencing 
those elections, Murdoch simply had a knack for 
backing winners. Despite those claims, however, in 
2017, neither Murdoch nor his peers in right-wing 
newspaper ownership seemed to realize until the 
shock exit poll that they had spent the whole of the 
election campaign backing losers.
The scale of the Conservative loss in 2017 
was amplified by the seismic shifts in opinion 
polling results over the period. Survation’s final 
poll was the closest to the actual result, but in 
mid-April, as Theresa May announced she was 
calling the election, the same company found the 
share of voting intention to be Conservatives 40% 
and Labour 29%. As Jeremy Corbyn’s campaign 
gained momentum, the tirade of Conservative 
propaganda and the smears levelled against 
Corbyn by the right-wing press failed to halt 
Labour’s unprecedented rise over such a short 
time to an eventual 40% share of the actual votes 
cast. That tirade included contributions from 
The Sun in the form of such headlines as “Jezza’s 
Jihadi Comrades” (7 June) and “Don’t Chuck 
Britain in the Cor-Bin” (8 June).
Why, though, have The Sun and the rest of 
the UK press lost so much of whatever influence 
they once had on the electorate? The answer must 
surely lie in the dwindling circulation figures for 
the printed press over time and a failure to reach 
large enough audiences electronically to mitigate 
against them. According to ABC, in the preceding 
ten years the daily sales of print editions of The Sun 
have fallen from almost 3 million to 1.75 million, 
while the Daily Mail has fallen from 2.3 million 
to 1.5 million and the Daily Express from 0.79 
million to 0.42 million. In 2016 the NRS survey of 
audience size estimated the audience reach of The 
Sun to be 3.9 million, or 7.5% of the adult popu-
lation over 15 years old. In total only 23.2% of the 
UK adult population aged 15 years and older - that 
is 12.1 million people - were reading national daily 
newspapers of any political persuasion.
By contrast, audiences for the broadcast media 
have remained relatively buoyant while newspapers 
have been in decline. The television audience data 
supplied by BARB indicate a weekly audience in 
2017 of 92.9%, and radio listening measured over a 
week by RAJAR remains stable at 90% of the adult 
population. Admittedly, only a small percentage 
of that viewing and listening may be to broadcast 
journalism content, but BARB shows a typical 
edition of the News at Six (BBC1) can attract an 
audience of five million viewers - and of course 
there are other news programmes at other times 
of the day and on different channels, meaning the 
cumulative audience for television news supplied 
by mainstream broadcasting outlets in the UK is 
much higher than that. Even music radio stations 
tend to broadcast news on the hour during 
daytime, so increasing the reach of broadcast jour-
nalism, including its election coverage.
The key difference between newspaper 
journalism and broadcast journalism lies in the 
tight regulation of radio and television here, that 
prevents the kind of partisanship that is com-
monplace in the press from influencing content in 
broadcasting. Particularly tight rules in the Ofcom 
Broadcasting Code and the BBC’s Editorial Guide-
lines relate to election periods and the impartiality 
required of broadcasters, including over balance 
in reporting. Countering the influence of the press 
even more, there has developed what we might call 
a “third force” in public discourse around politics 
and politicians generally through the growth 
of social media, which allows a much greater 
dissemination now of alternative information and 
comment as well as direct communication from 
parties that are traditionally disadvantaged, such as 
Labour, to new audiences online.
This relative muting of the press barons, in 
their attempts to subvert the course of elections 
in the UK, is very welcome - as in one sense 
democracy finally comes of age.
Declining newspaper sales and the role of 
broadcast journalism in the 2017 general election
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Newspapers’ editorial opinions: stuck between a 
rock and a hard place
In the eight days before Election Day newspapers 
made blatant and deliberate attempts to influence 
readers’ votes and, to a lesser extent, shape parties’ 
campaigning strategies. Measurements of salience, 
tenacity and circulation demonstrate that the weight 
of opinion within the British press was hugely in 
favour of the Conservatives. However, the surprise 
election outcome leads us to look beyond these rel-
atively basic measurements to consider how a more 
nuanced analysis of editorials can provide a more 
complete picture. 
With only the Mirror and the Guardian 
endorsing Labour, and the Observer recommending 
tactical voting (Table 1), Conservative partisanship 
was the most salient voice in the British national 
press (Figure 1). Five Conservative newspapers inter-
vened in 88% of opportunities, totalling 35 editorials, 
and tabloids published an editorial every day. The 
Mirror and the Guardian utilised 87% of opportu-
nities, totalling only 13 editorials and, more impor-
tantly, few that explicitly called for a vote for Labour, 
and even fewer that categorically endorsed Corbyn. 
Taking account of the creative and persuasive 
techniques of opinion leading, newspapers’ tenacity 
scores (Figure 2) illustrate that the vigour of opinion 
in favour of the Conservatives was four times (161) 
that for Labour (40). As one would expect, tabloids 
not only ‘pimped up’ their editorials to maximum 
tenacity but projected their views through a diversity 
of content (see Figure 3). 
The individualised ‘presidential’ focus on leaders 
put newspapers in the proverbial position of being 
stuck between a rock and a hard place. Both took pre-
dictable partisan lines but, significantly for the result, 
neither side mustered much enthusiasm for the 
leader of the party they endorsed. Left-wing critiques 
predictably discredited May’s ‘strong and stable’ 
claim, with the Observer calling for a vote against 
May’s ‘feeble plan for Britain’ and the Guardian 
decrying her Brexit policy. More importantly 
although right-wing papers, particularly the tabloids, 
gave Corbyn a rough time, their continuing absence 
of direct support for May is of equal note. Here, the 
Express was alone in its unreserved support, backing 
her with an appeal to nationalist Brexit sentiments. 
By contrast, the Sunday Times opposed May as “not 
Tory enough” and their opinion accurately summa-
rises the lukewarm support of right-wing broadsheets 
– “There are plenty of good reasons for not voting 
for Mr Corbyn and Labour, but Mrs May has not 
provided many good reasons for voting Conserva-
tive”. Support for May in the Sun and the Daily Mail
was conspicuous in its absence due to an all-consum-
ing focus on discrediting Corbyn. 
The tenacious opinions of right-wing papers 
clustered around the dominant claim that as a 
dangerous “extreme left-wing Marxist” with past 
affiliations to terrorism, Corbyn must be kept out 
of government due to his unfitness to govern and 
his policies amounting to fantasy. The severely 
hostile Express and Sun invoked notions of violence 
describing Corbyn and his cabinet as a gang, a mob, 
and thugs. The Daily Mail’s anti-Labour discourse 
was less individualised encompassing critiques of 
the shadow cabinet. In addition to repeating the 
claim that a vote for May would “save Britain from 
the terrorists’ friend” the Daily Mail focussed on 
Corbyn as “economically illiterate” claiming that he 
“would wreck Britain” and that a hung parliament 
may lead to a “coalition of chaos”. The less fierce 
Telegraph stated that Corbyn was “promising what 
he can’t deliver”, and criticised Corbyn as incompe-
tent, wrongheaded, dangerous. The Times was more 
reserved, focusing on his policies as fantasy, calling 
him a protestor not a politician. 
Left-wing papers left these emphatic anti-Cor-
byn discourses unchallenged and added to the dearth 
of support for Corbyn with reluctant and muted 
endorsements. Acknowledging their previously 
expressed criticisms of Corbyn as “ill equipped” to be 
PM, the Mirror hesitantly bridged the gap between 
the undesirability of Corbyn who is “not all we would 
wish” and their expression of far stronger support 
for Labour and its policies. The Guardian’s editorials 
not only lacked tenacity, they ignored Corbyn, who 
became the ‘elephant in the room’, only mentioned 
in one editorial five days before the election. In 
this, the only editorial which claimed that “Labour 
deserves our vote”, the Guardian devoted much 
space to criticising Corbyn “who unquestionably has 
his flaws” urging him and Labour to become more 
centre-left. Such disapproval combined with claims 
that ‘to limit the Tories by tactical voting makes 
sense’ undermined their endorsement. On polling 
day, the Guardian was so staggeringly pre-occupied 
with criticising May and worrying about Brexit that 
it forgot to endorse any party and didn’t mention 
Corbyn or Labour. Coupled with the Observer’s 
strong critique of Corbyn, and papers’ comparatively 
modest critiques of May as feeble, foolish, weak and 
wobbly, left-wing papers were an unconvincing trio 
of Labour support. 
With newspaper readership and Conservative 
voters skewed towards older generations, readers 
may well have responded to the ambivalence of 
newspapers’ endorsements of May. Yet on the same 
note, Labour’s gains defied the determination of 
right-wing papers’ denunciation of Corbyn and the 
highly qualified endorsements of left-wing papers. A 
tentative explanation points to the limited influence 
of left-wing papers due to low readership in com-
parison to the right-wing press, and to the impact of 
the new cleavage in British politics – age. The Labour 
surge has been attributed to young voters who consti-
tute a dwindling proportion of newspaper reader-
ship – the young people who voted Labour were 
not tuned into newspapers’ anti-Corbyn editorial 
opinions. If newspapers’ opinion leading roles are to 
endure they must ask: where were young people and 
how can newspapers get there?
Newspapers
Sun/Sun on Sunday Conservative
Daily Mirror/Sunday Mirror Labour
Daily Mail/Mail on Sunday Conservative
Daily Express/Sunday Express Conservative (change from UKIP in 2015)
Times/Sunday Times Conservative
Telegraph/Sunday Telegraph Conservative
Guardian/Observer Labour/ Tactical vote against Conservative (change from 
Labour in 2015)
Table 1: 
Editorial 
endorsements
Editorial Endorsement
Figure 3: 
Examples of 
maximum tenacity 
editorials
Figure 2: Tenacity 
score of editorial 
voices 1-8 June
Key for figure 2:
The tenacity score is the aggregate 
daily score for each paper with 
points awarded for each of the 
following: 1 for each editorial 
comment; 3 when one editorial 
took up the entire editorial space; 
3 for a full page editorial; 3 for 
editorial appearing on the front 
page; 1 for a photo or cartoon. 
Figure 1: 
Salience of 
editorial voice 
1-8 June
(Number of 
days editorials 
published)
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It’s the Sun wot lost it
In the early hours of Friday morning, as the results 
poured in and validated the unexpected broad-
casters’ exit poll prediction, I came up with the 
title of this piece. Feeling smug at my originality, it 
wasn’t long before I discovered the phrase popping 
up all over social media and the blogosphere. 
Others had also looked at the Sun and the Mail’s 
extraordinarily nasty coverage of Labour and 
Jeremy Corbyn and noted the distaste of, particu-
larly, the young electorate. 
The tabloid press and the Conservative party 
ran a campaign concentrating on sustained neg-
ativity and personal abuse. Conversely, Corbyn’s 
policy of delivering his party’s message of social 
justice and his refusal to engage in the modern 
politics of abusing your rivals clearly enthused 
many young people.
There is little doubt that newspapers have 
some influence on the issues that people think 
about, but there is no consensus about just how 
they influence public attitudes. The press’s impact 
on voting patterns also arouses differences. Did 
the Sun really ensure John Major’s Conservative 
government in 1992 when they claimed it was ‘The 
Sun Wot Won It’?  The argument that there was a 
late Conservative swing among Tory tabloid paper 
readers but not among pro-Labour Daily Mirror 
readers has been fiercely debated. Some assert that 
if newspapers have any effect it is in the cumulative 
effect of anti-Labour reporting.
Some research of newspaper preferences, 
readership and voting patterns in the 2015 general 
election maintained that the right-wing press won 
that election for David Cameron. Perhaps. But one 
thing we can all agree on is that the right-wing 
press coverage of Labour in the post-Blair years has 
been uniformly hostile. 
In 2015, academic studies had argued that the 
general election campaign was characterised by a 
press hostility to Labour not seen since 1992. For 
this election, the coverage for Corbyn and Co by all 
sections of the right wing press made the ridicule 
heaped on Ed Miliband seem positively benign. 
In general, Miliband was portrayed as a mostly 
incompetent Wallace with Ed Balls as Gromit.  His 
inability to eat a bacon sandwich gracefully was 
the inspiration for the Sun’s election week headline 
‘Save our bacon’. 
By contrast, during this election Jeremy 
Corbyn was consistently portrayed as a ‘shameless 
apologist for evil’, and was nearly always featured 
wearing his apparently communist cap. That 
cap became his identifiable feature in political 
cartoons, like Harold Wilson’s pipe.  Labour’s 
manifesto, despite wide public support, was 
described by the Sun as a ‘Marxist masterplan’ 
which would transform Britain into a ‘crumbling 
ruin’, no doubt led by ‘Jezza’s Jihadi comrades’.
The Sun’s election-day front page headline, 
‘Don’t chuck Britain in the Cor-bin’, accompanied 
by a mock-up of Corbyn peering out of a 
dustbin, aroused a considerable backlash on 
social media. Inside and with no hint of irony, 
the Sun damned his ‘fervent followers’ who had 
‘bombarded social media with abuse’ to intimi-
date potential Tory voters. 
It would be nice to report that the pro-Labour 
Daily Mirror displayed more restraint, but their 
election-day headline ‘Lies, damned lies and Theresa 
May’, accompanied by a picture of a snarling prime 
minister, added to the tabloid nastiness. 
The Daily Star confounded expectations. After 
a remarkably even-handed front page on June 
8th  headed ‘Tezza vs Jezza’ – although Corbyn 
was displayed in a somewhat comical pose – a 
full two-page inside spread’s run down of party 
positions on key policies was a model in popular 
politic coverage. That said, readers were advised to 
‘cheer up’ and guided to a centre-spread featuring 
bikini-clad celebrities below the headline ‘Ballots 
to the election, we vote Beach Party’. You can’t 
have everything …
At the beginning of the election campaign, the 
Sun predicted ‘Blue Murder’ for Corbyn’s Marxist 
‘madness’ and a Tory landslide for the ‘impressive’ 
Mrs May. At the end, the women the Mail had 
called ‘Britain’s New Iron Lady’ in January 2017 
became the scapegoat for their failure to engineer 
her expected coronation.
Of course, the use of the phrase ‘it’s the 
Sun wot won it’ and the seriousness with which 
academics treated the claim, implies extraordinary 
power to our newspapers and their hold over their 
diminishing readership. And the election result 
is already raising questions about the declining 
influence of national newspapers who almost all 
backed Theresa May. 
Few go online at the Sun and the Daily Mail 
for their political news. It may be that falling 
physical print sales mean their role as political 
agenda setters is almost over, replaced by partisan 
blogs such as pro-Labour Another Angry Voice 
and Conservative Home. In the post-election 
blame game, Theresa May’s co-Chief of Staff Nick 
Timothy chose to give his reasons for resigning 
on Conservative Home. The future looks bleak for 
printed newspapers and, after 2017, perhaps even 
bleaker for their political influence via any medium.
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The 2017 General Election was a profound shock 
to the political system and overturned much of the 
conventional wisdom about the role of the media in 
the British political system. In this article, I present a 
research agenda for understanding what changed – 
and why. I believe we can best understand the changes 
in the media’s role in GE2017 by taking a longitudinal 
approach, comparing it to the 2016 Brexit referendum 
and the 2015 General Election campaign.
1. Why wasn’t it the Sun wot won it? The failure of 
agenda setting
There is a widespread belief that the right-wing 
tabloid press (notably the Sun and the Daily Mail) 
have an inordinate influence in shaping electoral 
outcomes. After GE2017, this influence is now called 
into question. Comparing GE2017 with the Brexit 
campaign, where the tabloids appeared to have a 
decisive influence, would be useful. In general, agen-
da-setting theory would suggest that the press is more 
likely to be influential where the issues they portray 
are less well-known and understood by the public; 
for example EU regulations vs the state of the NHS. 
Some other specific factors include:
There was not enough time to establish strong 
narrative frame: The short campaign, and short 
time May had been in office, made it more difficult 
to establish a dominant narrative. In contrast, the 
tabloids had worked for 20 years to establish their 
anti-EU agenda which was fully deployed, relentlessly 
every day in the Brexit campaign.
The Tory message was confused: Even within 
the short time frame, the Tories failed to frame 
a coherent offer to voters beyond the ‘strong and 
stable’ slogan.
Tabloids attacked the Tories’ mistakes: It was 
the tabloids who seized on the ‘dementia tax’ as 
an issue which undermined the Tory attempts at 
broadening their agenda. 
The election stayed off the front page: The two 
terrorist attacks kept the election off the front pages 
during the key time in the campaign, and blunted 
Tory attempts to reshape their political message. 
2. Television: reframing the debate
Television – still the main source of election news - 
blunted the tabloid attack on Corbyn’s credibility. His 
performance in the televised debates, and his effective-
ness with audiences, contrasted with May’s ducking 
of the party leaders debate, and her awkwardness 
with audiences. Corbyn’s well-staged and televised 
campaign rallies helped mobilise his supporters. 
Subsequently, in the final weeks of the campaign the 
Tory press, especially the Daily Mail, launched a fierce 
attack on the supposed bias of the BBC.
3. Social media and the youth vote: receptive audiences
Both sides attempted to use social media to 
influence voters. But we need a much more dif-
ferentiated view of how and in what form social 
media is effective in campaigns, particularly in 
targeting young people. Spontaneous organiza-
tion by young Labour supporters appears to have 
played an important role in mobilizing the youth 
vote for Labour and was more effective that the 
Tory investment in paid Facebook ads. Millions 
of young people viewed videos such as ‘Liar, Liar, 
Liar’ and ‘Tory Britain 2030 (Daddy Do You Hate 
Me?)’ and many activists made use of internet 
tools such as ‘My Nearest Marginal.’ In contrast, 
during the Brexit referendum, pro-remainers were 
slow and late in using social media, and appealed 
to facts rather than emotions, while the Brexiters 
targeted different audiences by running two 
separate social media campaigns.
 
4. The end of austerity: the frame that disappeared
In marked contrast to GE2010 and GE2015, 
austerity was no longer the frame that was used to 
judge the parties’ credibility in GE2017. How did 
this sudden turn in framing of debates come about?
The Brexit referendum was unique in its both 
in its focus on issues, and its rejection of the remain 
campaign’s message of more austerity to come. The 
framing after the Brexit vote was of the need to do 
more for the losers from globalization, not pacify the 
financiers. This is the key that fundamentally changed 
the parameters of the political debate in 2017. 
The Conservatives abandoned austerity as 
a dominant theme, replacing it with a largely 
symbolic group of policies meant to appeal to 
working class voters.
The effective launch of Labour’s manifesto 
(through a series of leaks) set up an alternative 
narrative. Labour stayed on message throughout the 
campaign, repeating its popular pledges on tuition 
fees and more money for schools and hospitals.
Expert criticism of Labour’s economic policies 
failed to resonate with voters, echoing the distrust of 
experts that emerged during the Brexit debate.
5. Trust: the missing dimension
The reduced influence of the press in the 2017 
campaign also stems from a broader develop-
ment that is fanning the populist revolt across 
the Western world – the sharp decline in trust in 
politicians, the media, and experts alike. The lack 
of trust in conventional politicians, helped boost 
Jeremy Corbyn’s appeal as an authentic outsider. 
Many voters were sceptical of the exaggerated 
media claims of the tabloid press when it did not 
relate to their own experience. For young people, 
alternative grass-roots channels of communica-
tions mobilized them to vote. It is too early to 
write off the influence of the mass media, par-
ticularly the tabloids, but we must be careful, in 
future research, to understand the limits of their 
influence, and to examine the new circumstances 
that are reshaping political communication in the 
age of populism.
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Britain’s predominantly right-wing press welcomed 
election day with a wholly predictable barrage of pleas 
to their readers: give the reigning queen Theresa the 
mandate she was demanding and administer a bloody 
good kicking to the socialist terrorist-hugging Corbyn. 
Long-term observers of our national newspapers 
will have recognised the particular style adopted by 
each of the Conservative Party’s four main cheerlead-
ers: for Paul Dacre’s Daily Mail, a fawning genuflection 
to the Tory incumbent combined with nasty scare-
mongering about her opponent. For Rupert Murdoch’s 
Sun a light-hearted pun with a profoundly serious 
undertone (Corbyn peering out of a dustbin below 
the headline “Don’t chuck Britain in the COR-BIN”). 
While the Daily Express confined itself to a simple 
“VOTE FOR MAY TODAY”, the Telegraph quoted 
May’s rousing entreaty that “Your country needs you”. 
Conventional wisdom (though not, of course, 
academic research) suggested that these blaring 
front pages and the weeks of propaganda that 
preceded them would help to deliver May’s inevi-
table coronation. 
So when the results confounded commentators, 
pollsters, politicians and voters alike, some media 
pundits were quick to pronounce the end of tabloid 
power. “This election proves that media bias no 
longer matters” announced Peter Preston, suggesting 
that while the printed press “has seldom seemed 
more overwhelming” in its pro-Tory bias, 2017 
heralded the final supremacy of social media over the 
dinosaurs of the printed press. Veteran media com-
mentator Ray Snoddy also proclaimed “the decline in 
power and influence of the right-wing tabloids”. 
That, however, is a simplistic conclusion. While 
social media clearly played a vital role, particularly 
as a conduit for the Corbyn campaign, there are four 
reasons why Britain’s press still exerts considerable 
power over the UK’s national conversation and its 
political direction – and will remain a powerful 
force at the next election.
First, Britain’s national newspapers continue to 
set news agendas for broadcasters. Research from 
Cardiff University has demonstrated how press 
reporting of the 2015 general election influenced 
television news, citing as one example a Telegraph 
front page splash about a business leaders’ letter sup-
porting the Conservatives which led that day’s news 
bulletins (in contrast to a Guardian report of 140 
senior doctors criticising coalition NHS policies, 
which barely featured). Leading TV personalities 
such as Robert Peston and Sky’s John Ryley have 
both conceded the importance Britain’s national 
press in determining broadcast agendas.
Second, despite the cutbacks and redundancies 
dictated by a faltering business model, the UK press 
still commands a high proportion of original partisan 
newsgathering resources. While broadcast jour-
nalism is circumscribed by strict impartiality rules, 
newspaper editors can and do direct their reporters 
to find stories that suit their anti-immigration, 
anti-human rights, anti-Europe political agendas. 
Front page stories in pursuit of those objec-
tives – many of dubious provenance and even more 
dubious accuracy – can create a firestorm which 
is difficult for even the most robustly impartial 
broadcasters to ignore completely. Journalistic 
groupthink will often demand a follow-up to a front 
page tabloid story, even if it has its roots in deliber-
ate political mischief. 
Third, those print headlines make frequent 
guest appearances across the broadcast media on 
newspaper review programmes and segments of 
news programmes. A recent report by Professor 
Adrian Renton and Dr Justin Schlosberg analysed 
one month of newspaper coverage across the BBC 
from the day that Theresa May called the 2017 
election. It found that the BBC was giving 69-95% 
more coverage and discussion to papers supporting 
the Conservatives compared to other parties. 
This problem is exacerbated by pundits 
working for those same newspapers being regularly 
invited onto discussion panels of news magazine 
programmes such as Newsnight, Marr, Peston and 
Daily Politics. Despite the supposed proliferation of 
online news sites such as Huffington Post, Buzzfeed 
and Vice News, writers from those sites rarely 
feature on TV and radio. 
Finally, evidence is emerging that time spent 
engaging with articles in hard copy is significant-
ly greater than online, with implications for how 
much emphasis we should be placing on the “new 
plurality” of internet news sites. In a recent article 
for the British Journalism Review, Neil Thurman 
analyses audience data to argue convincingly 
that “online channels are not attracting anywhere 
near the levels of attention commanded by print”. 
Newspaper circulation may be declining, but 
a quarter of the population still read them and 
their overwhelming bias offline. Their capacity to 
influence voter opinion may yet be significant.
Thus, despite an emerging consensus that “it 
was social media wot won it” for Labour (or at least 
prevented a Conservative victory), it is equally 
possible that a dominant and loudly partisan right-
wing press inhibited either an outright Labour 
victory or the abilities of other left-leaning parties to 
be heard at all. The challenge now is to ensure that 
impartial broadcasters are properly scrutinised for 
disproportionate dependence on traditional print 
media (both their stories and their columnists); and 
to ensure that partisan publishers are held accounta-
ble for their own versions of “fake news” which could 
prove as destructive to informed democratic debate 
as those that emanate from Macedonian bedrooms.
Note: Since affiliations were based on the 2015 election, classification of 
Conservative papers did not even include the heavily right-wing Express 
newspapers which had then supported UKIP. In 2017, they reverted to 
strong Conservative support. Had this analysis been extended to 8 June, it 
would almost certainly have seen even more biased results.
Is our national press a fading dinosaur? Don’t 
bank on it
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A mixed mailbag: letters to the editor during the 
electoral campaign
Just as with other aspects of coverage (see the 
analyses by Loughborough University, both in 
2015 and 2017), the letters to the editor published 
during this electoral campaign signalled the singu-
larity of this election. Whilst in 2015 letters tended 
to show monolithic support for the party endorsed 
by each newspaper, letters were more diverse 
in 2017, and some doubts were cast about the 
personality, the background, and the performance 
of party leaders; the feasibility and desirability of 
proposed policies, as well as about the campaign 
itself. This article is based on a systematic analysis 
of letters to the editor on the election published 
between 19th April and 8th May in The Sun, the 
Daily Mail, the Daily Mirror, The Daily Telegraph, 
the Daily Express, and The Guardian.
Generally speaking, the views of readers 
and newspapers coincided. Most letters favoured 
(or opposed) the same parties and leaders as the 
newspaper in which they were published. Theresa 
May, the Conservative party, and its policies were 
mainly presented under a positive light in all news-
papers but the Mirror and The Guardian (the latter 
being the only newspaper which did not publish 
a single letter in favour of May or the Tories). 
Overall, letters in The Guardian and the Mirror 
endorsed Labour and were critical towards the 
conservatives, but also published letters that ques-
tioned parties in the centre /centre-left. Despite its 
endorsement of Labour, and its opposition to the 
Conservatives, letters in the Mirror were particu-
larly critical of Jeremy Corbyn and his manifesto, 
which was often portrayed as unrealistic. Diane 
Abbott’s media performances were vitriolically 
attacked in the Mirror, as well as in The Sun.
Theresa May received her share of criticism in 
the letters published in the newspapers favouring 
her. Her decision not to participate in TV debates 
generated mixed reactions: some readers criti-
cised it (mainly for her unwillingness to defend 
her policies), whilst others embraced her deter-
mination to stay away from these events, often 
characterised as an American import, or as a 
media circus. What has come to be known as 
the ‘dementia tax,’ means testing the winter fuel 
allowance, and abandoning the triple lock for 
pensions were – by far – the most controversial 
policies in May’s manifesto, to the extent that 
many letters published in newspapers supporting 
the Tories declared they would no longer vote for 
them. The proposal to vote on the fox hunting ban 
was also met with controversy amongst readers. 
There was a surprising consensus amongst 
readers in the Sun, the Mail and the Daily Express 
with regards to Britain’s foreign aid budget, which, 
according to these readers, should be slashed and 
invested in the UK. Some readers in The Guardian 
were also proactive, but focused essentially in the 
need to protect the environment instead. Similar 
to general coverage in this election, letters to the 
editor mostly focused on the two main parties (and 
their leaders). In addition to party leaders, Diane 
Abbott, John McDonnell, and Tony Blair received 
some criticism too, as well as Boris Johnson. Occa-
sionally, readers questioned the presidential nature 
of the campaign, and the need to incorporate more 
voices into the electoral campaign. 
For many reasons, letters to the editor should 
not be taken as a fair representation of the views 
of the electorate. Newspapers select the letters 
they publish following their own editorial line, 
and the perceptions they have about their readers’ 
views and preferences (which are not always coin-
cident with the parties endorsed by newspapers). 
On this occasion, however, letters to the editor 
help to understand how citizens reacted to some 
policies in the Conservative manifesto, particular-
ly amongst its supporters. Following the consist-
ent and continued negative portrayal of Jeremy 
Corbyn across all media (which has been largely 
documented, and was censured in a number 
of letters published in The Guardian), it is not 
entirely surprising that letters to the editor failed 
to capture the surge of the Labour party amongst 
the electorate, as well as the growing popularity of 
Jeremy Corbyn.  
 Similar to what happened in 2015, letters to 
the editor did not constitute a vibrant platform for 
citizens to debate policies and political options. 
Letters were often used to attack certain politicians 
(mainly Jeremy Corbyn), and to undermine their 
credibility by presenting their policies as impracti-
cable. On this occasion, however, letters displayed 
a slightly more diverse range of options and voices 
than in the previous election, particularly in the 
newspapers that endorsed the Conservatives. 
In these newspapers, letters also helped to raise 
concern about certain policies that did not go 
down well with some citizens, contributing to 
diversify the range of views readers get exposed 
to. Although very limited in scope, it could be said 
that letters to the editor contributed to enrich the 
political debate (at least in the Tory press). 
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Long live the wisdom of the phone-in crowd
There are many ways of following an election – 
through the newspapers, the TV bulletins, online 
or any combination of the three – but as a result of 
being confined to a sick-bed for the past five weeks, 
I gave perhaps more attention than is healthy to 
the phone-ins on the talk radio shows. Whatever 
negative effects I might have incurred as a result of 
all this radio listening, it did give me some insights 
about the media, the polls and politics that until 
now had eluded me.
Having been involved in covering elections for 
ITN and the BBC for the past forty years, this was 
a very different way for me to follow a campaign. 
Listening to the campaign conversation being 
played out on talk radio was initially a little more 
than a mild distraction and then suddenly assumed 
a greater significance following the launch of the 
Conservatives’ manifesto. It contained a series of 
measures that, to put it mildly, were unlikely to 
appeal to their core older demographic – reducing 
the worth of their old age pension, means-testing 
their winter fuel allowance and most importantly 
of all the so-called dementia tax on social care.
Listening to Veronica in Stockton or Edward 
in Stourbridge, I was genuinely taken aback by the 
ferocity of the backlash about the dementia tax 
in particular, among older people calling in who 
described themselves as ‘life-long Conservatives’. I 
thought this would be a very big story the following 
day and this would soon be reflected in the polls, 
but in the immediate aftermath of the manifesto 
launch nothing much appeared to change.
But the rage of the phone-in callers continued, 
so I tweeted about Veronica and Edward and 
predicted that something was stirring in the Tory 
undergrowth – only to receive a series of gentle 
rebukes from my fellow academics and journalists, 
reminding me that phone-in contributors were 
anything but typical of the population at large. 
They might not be, but there is a well-established 
theory of media effects – the two-step flow -  that 
suggests that Veronica and Edward’s views should 
be taken more seriously than is normally the case.
This theory, first developed by Paul Lazarsfeld 
in his landmark study of the 1944 US presidential 
election suggests that one mechanism of media 
influence on voting behaviour can be found by 
looking at so-called opinion-formers in society. 
They monitor political news more closely than 
most and the convey their version of events, and 
their opinions, to whoever is available to listen.
These opinion-formers might be the obvious 
people in positions of community leadership, local 
politicians and teachers, for example, but can also 
be the person in the bar or staff room who speaks 
most authoritatively, or simply most loudly. Today, 
perhaps their ilk is the phone-in contributor. They 
might not be particularly knowledgeable about 
politics but it is not what they know that counts, 
but their determination that everyone else should 
also know what they know and think, and that is 
the decisive factor.
And sure enough, after two or three days, as 
the full import of the Conservatives’ proposals 
sank in, the media picked up on the story, the 
polls began to shift and then, five days later, so did 
Theresa May.
The second ‘insight’ I gained was the relevance 
of other media theories - the notions of dominant 
narratives, framing and indexing – in understand-
ing the political communications process.
During the campaign, I heard countless 
radio and TV vox pops of ‘staunch Labour voters’,  
in what were considered to be safe seats in the 
Midlands and the North of England, saying that 
they couldn’t vote for a Corbyn-led Labour party. 
Presumably these packages had been based on 
editors responding to the dominant narrative 
that Corbyn was ‘unelectable’ and then assigning 
journalists to head out into these constituencies to 
produce radio and TV packages along these lines.
The basis of framing is, as defined by Robert 
Entman, that the media “select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text”. In this case, the overall frame 
was that the Labour vote was ‘soft’ in its safer seats 
and this was due to the ‘Corbyn effect’.
It takes a courageous journalist, sent out to 
cover one story, to come back saying: ‘It’s not like 
that, I’ve done a different story.’ Hence we avid 
radio listeners and television viewers were left with 
the impression that Labour’s support in its core 
seats was collapsing.
Dominant narratives come to dominate, 
sometimes because they reflect a reality but 
sometimes because they reflect something else: 
prejudice, political bias or just plain ignorance. 
Echo chambers can affect not just ‘them out 
there’ but journalists, politicians, even pollsters. 
This is the so-called Indexing Hypothesis, which 
argues that the narratives of elite groups in 
society - politicians, journalists and pollsters for 
example - will tend to dominate conversations 
within the public sphere.
When I heard these packages, I took what they 
were telling me seriously because of what appeared 
to be represent the overwhelming consensus – 
but, along with my fellow pundits, I was wrong. I 
should have put more faith in the phone-ins.So, 
the lesson of my election campaign monitoring 
is that the wisdom of the crowds can’t always be 
divined via an online poll or phone interview – 
and that a little listening can go a long way. Treat 
dominant narratives with scepticism and long live 
the wisdom of the phone-in crowd.
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After an EU referendum campaign riddled 
with dubious claims on both sides and a certain 
cynicism toward experts, not to mention the US 
election and Trump’s ‘alternative facts’, the press 
raised concerns early in this election campaign 
about the need for fact-checking.  Interestingly, 
these concerns seemed to pertain chiefly to ‘fake 
news’ articles shared via social media rather than 
their own inadequate systems of verification.  Of 
33 election-related articles mentioning ‘fact-
check(ers/ing)’ from the start of the campaign to 
election day, nine were about fact-checking rather 
than conducting it, seven of these related to Face-
book’s efforts to flag ‘fake news’ in partnership with 
third-party fact-checkers, and only one referred 
to its role to “discern spin from falsehood, and 
political manoeuvring from sinister manipulation” 
by politicians.  Probably not coincidentally, this 
appeared in the i-Independent (8th June) one of 
the two newspapers (with The Times) to run their 
own ‘fact-check’ articles.  
With limited space, I will focus on the three 
main fact-checking blogs, Channel 4 News’ 
FactCheck, BBC Reality Check and independ-
ent charity Full Fact.  As you might expect, BBC 
Reality Check was scrupulously fair in checking 
an even number of claims from both main parties, 
though both FactCheck and Full Fact checked 
more Labour claims.  However, the subject of the 
claims was far more often Conservative policy (30) 
or their performance in government (61), perhaps 
inevitably as the incumbent party.  According-
ly, the Labour claims selected for scrutiny tend 
to be criticisms of the Tories record in power 
since 2010 (63.6%) rather than their own policy 
(24.2%), whilst Conservative claims were mostly 
on their own policy claims (53.3%) or performance 
(46.7%), but significantly, none of the Tories’ criti-
cisms of Labour were fact-checked.  
The issues that dominated were not wildly 
different from the patterns in overall coverage 
indicated in the Loughborough University 
research, with fiscal/tax, health and policing/
security all featuring prominently, but Brexit-re-
lated claims appeared to receive less scrutiny, 
though immigration a little more.  One surprise, 
though, was that the top issue was employ-
ment, three-quarters of which checked (mostly 
Labour) claims on the Conservatives’ record on 
low pay and stagnant wages.  However, given 
that the Tories claimed to promise the “biggest 
expansion of workers’ rights by any Conserva-
tive government”, we might have expected to see 
some scrutiny of those policy proposals.  Labour, 
in contrast, were primarily scrutinised on the 
costings in their manifesto and whether their ‘sums 
added up’, with the IFS the most common source.  
In contrast to their broad judgements about the 
scale of interventionism quoted in the right-wing 
press, the fact-checks focused on the IFS’s specific 
arguments, but much was still taken on trust in 
their expert judgement.  For instance, it’s not clear 
why they judged insufficient the amount that 
Labour had earmarked to take account of behav-
ioural change reducing the amount raised from 
increasing tax rates. 
One shortcoming of fact-checking is that 
they rarely scrutinise claims made by news media.  
Only Full Fact fact-checked a tabloid scare story 
(the Express on replacing council tax with land 
tax, which they characterised as a ‘garden tax’), 
though FactCheck and Reality Check did obliquely 
addressed the personal attacks on Corbyn as a 
‘terrorists’ friend’, with checks on his voting record 
and statements condemning violence.  
Examination of how these fact-checks have 
informed the general news reporting, however, 
still finds journalists outsourcing scrutiny of 
factual challenges to other interviewees, generally 
opponent politicians, ‘balancing’ truth claims 
rather than adjudicating.  One illustrative example: 
Labour talked about a schools funding crisis whilst 
the Conservatives argued that they had protected 
or even increased funding.  C4 News FactCheck 
concluded on 10th May that the total schools 
budget had been protected in real terms since 
2010, but with pupil numbers and staffing costs 
rising, the IFS calculated the impact to be an 8% 
real terms cut in spending per pupil.  
On Channel 4 News that evening, Cathy 
Newman did challenge Conservative Neil Carmi-
chael on his insistence that education spending was 
the highest of any government in history, interject-
ing “not in real terms”, which he conceded, with 
another dubious caveat.  Although the reduction 
per pupil was not mentioned, this shows a willing-
ness by a presenter to press a politician on factual 
truth claims.  In contrast, two days later on BBC 
Radio 4’s Today programme, a presenter shut down 
Labour MP Karen Smyth’s challenge to Conserv-
ative Mark Harper’s claim to have “increased 
education funding”.   When she objected “not per 
pupil”, Justin Webb interjected “Let’s park that 
there, they say they have, you say they haven’t”, the 
very epitome of he-said, she-said journalism.  
None of this is to say that audiences will be 
convinced by expert fact-checks, since research 
indicates that other heuristics such as ideology 
have a strong role, as well as a general persistence 
of belief in the face of contradictory evidence, but 
swift, prominent and specific correction can only 
help overcome the lack of trust.  
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Fact fact-checks 3rd May - 8th June
60
The prominence of fake news as an issue in 
election campaigns, as a topic in news coverage, 
and as the subject of academic and public enquiry 
is on the rise. Newspapers and broadcasters have 
covered how to spot it, the House of Commons 
launched a ‘Fake news’ inquiry in January 2017, 
and Google Scholar—a rough indication of 
scholarly attention—returns over 2,000 results 
published in 2017 with ‘fake news’ in the title.  
If ‘information is the currency of democracy,’ 
fake news has the potential to disrupt our usual 
mechanisms of political accountability, representa-
tion and legitimacy. The term fake news is not 
new and the study of misinformation has a long 
history within academic literature. Surveys also 
have a long history of documenting that the public 
often holds incorrect beliefs—that is, they are 
misinformed. Yet, today, misinformation is easier 
to spread and share on social media: fake news is 
used to attract clicks to generate traffic to sites, and 
bots can amplify a story without actual humans 
having to share. 
What is the extent to which potential voters 
are misinformed? During the GE2017 campaign, 
we assessed the extent of a misinformed public and 
what might lead to certain statements being more 
believable than others. In an online survey, we 
asked respondents if they had heard of a number 
of claims that had been corrected or verified on the 
FactCheck.org website and whether they believed 
each claim. The most commonly heard claim was 
that the NHS was under pressure due to immigra-
tion with an additional 1.5 million extra patients 
in the last three years. The next most often heard 
claims were about an increase from ‘thousands 
to millions’ in users of foodbanks and that the 
number of people in employment is at an histori-
cal high. In each case, these claims have been fact 
checked and corrections either to the statistics or 
the explanation were made. Yet over 50% of the 
respondents felt the first two claims were believ-
able, while approximately 40% found the latter 
believable. The most believed statement was that 
the Treasury loses £40 billion a year due to tax 
avoidance, with almost 60% reporting they found 
the statement believable (while the correct figure is 
closer to £10 billion).
Who is likely to embrace claims that are 
wrong? Some early research on information effects 
confirmed that information from trusted sources 
is more believable. Traditionally, the news media 
has played this trusted role; however, trust in 
the media has plummeted over the past several 
decades. According to the British Social Attitudes 
annual survey, the proportion of the British people 
reporting that the press is well run declined from 
53% to 27% over a 30 period (between 1983 and 
2012). In the ICM Litmus survey, 51% did not trust 
general election coverage on social media, whereas 
trust in the BBC was 45% and only 27% say they 
trust UK newspapers. Therefore, fake news is 
injected into an environment in which people 
distrust information. Without a clear set of trusted 
sources, it is increasingly difficult to minimize the 
persuasive power of fake news  
Can these misperceptions be corrected? Fact 
checking from organizations such as FullFact.org, 
as well as fact checking units embedded in major 
media outlets, were working to issue corrections 
or further explanations when necessary during 
the 2017 campaign. We examine whether this 
independent fact checking outlets succeed in 
correcting misinformation in the context of the 
2017 campaign. After asking respondents about 
the believability of the claim concerning immigra-
tion placing pressure on the NHS, we randomly 
assigned respondents to either receive a correction 
explaining that an ageing population, increases 
in wages, and health technology were larger cost 
burdens on the NHS, or to receive no correcting 
information. The good news is that there was a 
significant decrease in the believability of the claim 
after the correcting information, compared to indi-
viduals that did not receive correcting information. 
Moreover, we observe this tendency to correct 
misperceptions when focusing fact checking infor-
mation provided by both independent organiza-
tions and traditional media sources. 
Because news media are often portrayed as 
biased or purveyors of their own misinformation, 
independent fact checking organisations such as 
Full Fact, or attempts by social media platforms to 
provide their own fact checking algorithms, may 
appear to be the credible alternative to correct 
incorrect statements. In our experiment, we also 
varied the source of the correction and actually 
found that newspapers were slightly more effective 
at correcting information than the independent 
organisation.  Even in an age where newspapers are 
distrusted and readership is on the decline, these 
traditional media appear to retain a capacity to 
correct misinformation.  
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Tweets, campaign speeches and dogs at polling 
stations: the election on live blogs
Although live blogs are a regular feature of large 
mainstream news websites, reporting on a range 
of news stories ‘as they happen’, elections are 
probably some of the longest events they cover. 
The Guardian, the BBC and the Daily Telegraph 
websites, for instance, reported on the campaign 
live on a daily basis, except when the campaign was 
suspended due to the terrorist attacks in Manches-
ter and in London. The regularity of updates varied 
between 3 or 4 per hour on quiet days and several 
per minute when developments culminated on the 
evening of the election results. 
Different types of content made up this 
constant steam of coverage: live updates from 
unfolding events in the campaign, such as pol-
iticians’ rallies; links to and reports on content 
appearing on other mainstream media; social 
media posts by politicians, journalists, experts and 
ordinary people; short features on different aspects 
of the election; journalistic commentary and 
analysis; pictures by readers and photojournalists. 
This constant ‘real time’ updating gave a 
sense of immediacy to the campaign both when 
events were unfolding and when they were not. 
As with rolling news on television, time - or 
space in this case - had to be filled even when 
nothing major was happening. For example, in 
the morning of the election the BBC website live 
election feed featured several pictures of dogs 
at polling stations (following the relevant social 
media hashtag), a tweet by a cricket commen-
tator, stills of BBC election night presenters 
from previous decades and weather updates for 
different parts of the country.
Indeed, neither the liveness of the coverage 
of the election was something specific to the 
digital platform (although perhaps its length was, 
as television live coverage could not have stayed 
on the same event for the whole duration of the 
campaign), nor the need to fill in time/space when 
little was happening. Arguably the contribution 
of live blogging to the election debate was the 
aggregation and curation of information and views 
from a wide range of old and new media sources. 
With the exception of the websites’ own journal-
istic analysis, all the other content in the live feeds 
involved links and summaries of material freely 
available on other platforms like Twitter or other 
newspaper and television websites. What the live 
blogs offered was to pull everything together and 
to present it in a coherent narrative structure. The 
editorial perspective of the website was a little 
more discernible on the newspaper websites than 
on the BBC, as would be expected, but overall the 
role of the live blogs was to provide a narrative of 
the campaign as this evolved.
During the night of the election results, all 
three live blogs intensified their coverage, and 
particularly the BBC blog added new content 
every few seconds. Seat declarations, commentary, 
statements by politicians and experts on BBC’s 
and ITV’s live television coverage, social media 
content, and result summaries made up the 
majority of the updates. 
Live blogs found their early application in the 
coverage of sports, particularly cricket and football, 
allowing users to keep up with developments in the 
game without watching it constantly. They are also 
routinely used in the coverage of unfolding, un-
predicted, ‘breaking’ events, like natural disasters 
or terrorist attacks. On the night of the election 
results their role was more akin to these uses, 
providing readers with updates on the ‘score’ and 
reactions from the two camps in the game of the 
election, and minute-by-minute information on an 
event whose outcome was not easy to predict. Even 
if readers had simultaneous access to alternative 
live coverage on television, the live blogs com-
plemented this by integrating digital, social and 
mainstream media in a circular relay of narratives. 
Often the content on the live blogs was a direct 
commentary on something said in the television 
live coverage and this was the case as much on the 
newspapers’ live blogs as on the BBC’s. At a time of 
ongoing debate around the continuing relevance of 
‘old’ media in the political public sphere, live blogs 
demonstrate that no news platform, old or new, 
operates in isolation and that digital and tradi-
tional media feed off each other and can work in a 
complementary fashion.
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Despite disproportionate support for the Con-
servatives in the highly partisan British press, 
the election was much closer than anybody was 
expecting, resulting in a hung parliament. Just 
days after the result, there has already been much 
commentary that the result shows the power of 
the right-wing press over the political process is 
waning. Coupled with the decline in newspaper 
circulations and rise of online platforms, it is 
pertinent to analyse the kind of news stories and 
information available in the online environment 
during the election. To this end we conducted an 
analysis of five online news sources to examine 
the agendas, perspectives offered by the most 
prominent digital news providers in the UK. We 
analysed BBC Online, Mail Online, Guardian 
and Huffington Post UK because these digital 
news providers represent the top four outlets for 
UK users, according to research by the Reuters 
Institute, and we included Buzzfeed UK as the next 
most popular online-only provider. 
May called the election with the aim of 
gaining a substantial majority before the poten-
tially catastrophic Brexit negotiations began by 
establishing the contest as a highly presidential 
campaign, emphasising her own competence 
and leadership credentials in an effort to contrast 
herself favourably with Jeremy Corbyn. She 
also sought to emphasise that whoever won the 
election would be negotiating Brexit. Our analysis 
shows that online news largely followed this lead, 
with its attention on the two leaders and the 
prominence of Brexit as a theme, however not 
necessarily in the way the Prime Minister would 
have liked or expected. 
Online news outlets tended to focus on the 
electoral process itself, accounting for almost 
43% of the themes recorded (Table 1). This was 
by far the most prominent theme and indicates 
the appeal of the ‘horse race’ for online news. 
Moreover, ‘media’ was the third most prominent 
theme. In this case, online news seemed par-
ticularly interested in responding to what legacy 
media were reporting, featuring an abundance of 
stories about accusations of media bias, or stories 
assessing the public reaction to key interviews such 
as the BBC Leader’s Question Time specials and 
Jeremy Corbyn’s difficult interview on Women’s 
Hour by examining social media trends. 
The next most salient policy theme was Brexit, 
which regardless of its seriousness only accounted 
for 7%. This is perhaps lower than might have been 
anticipated given the efforts from certain sections 
of the media labelling this the ‘Brexit Election’ and 
despite the glaring lack of detail about the planned 
agenda for the negotiations. Beyond this the sub-
stantive issues which arose most frequently were 
social security, the NHS and taxation as a result of 
parties announcing their manifestos. The promi-
nence of health and social security mainly referred 
to the Conservatives’ disastrous ‘dementia tax’ 
policy and subsequent U-turn.  Much attention was 
also given to Labour’s increased tax rate for those 
earning over £80,000. Other prominent themes 
followed on from broader political events, with law 
and order stories increasing in the days following 
the Manchester and London Bridge Attacks. 
The two most prominent campaigners were 
the only realistic candidates for Prime Minister, 
Theresa May and Jeremy Corbyn (Table 2). They 
appeared almost as frequently as each other, with 
May appearing in 37.3% of news items and Corbyn 
in 36.4%. This illustrates the highly presidential 
nature of the campaign and reflects May’s attempts 
to frame the campaign as a choice between 
herself and Corbyn. The presidential nature of 
the campaign is also reflected by the fact that the 
leaders of smaller parties made up the majority of 
the top ten. 
The most prominent parties featured in the 
coverage were the Conservatives and Labour, the 
two largest parties (Table 3). The Conservatives 
were slightly ahead in terms of the proportion of 
coverage, on 27.5% compared to 25.3% for Labour, 
perhaps reflecting that they were the incumbents. 
The smaller parties gained much less coverage and 
gives some credence to the notion that this election 
indicates a return to two-party politics - at least as 
far as online news coverage is concerned. 
There is marked variation between the online 
news outlets studied which there is no space to 
discuss here, but overall it is striking to what extent 
online news displayed very similar characteristics 
to mainstream media, in terms of the issues they 
covered and the persons they focused on. The only 
major difference detected was the sheer volume 
of process coverage and stories about other media 
that online news which seems to have outstripped 
equivalent sources in broadcasting and the press. 
Whilst online news could potentially offer an 
important counterweight to mainstream news 
agendas, as some academics have argued, this must 
be qualified in relation to our evidence suggesting 
a lack of diversity and issue-based content in the 
news that people actually access online.  
Process, personalities and polls: online news 
coverage of the UK General Election 2017
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Online election news can be bloody difficult 
(for a) woman
Theresa May’s unexpected accession to the Tory 
leadership after the historic EU referendum means 
that for the first time since 1987, the next General 
Election was called and contested by a female 
Prime Minister. Despite repeated assurances to 
the contrary, May called the election after formally 
triggering Article 50 and just eight weeks prior 
to the opening of negotiations to establish the 
manner in which the UK would extract itself from 
the EU. May sought to present herself as a strong 
and competent leader who would make use of 
her reputation as a ‘bloody difficult woman’ to 
negotiate the best deal possible. 
Despite the highly presidential nature of 
the campaign and the extent to which the news 
coverage reflected this in terms of its focus on 
the two main party leaders (see Harmer and 
Southern in this volume), the online coverage of 
this election proved to be difficult for any women 
who were not politicians (particularly leaders) 
to receive any news coverage at all. My analysis 
of five online news sources (conducted with 
Rosalynd Southern) demonstrates that women 
accounted for 36.8% of all individuals featured 
in the news coverage (Figure 1). Given the fact 
that the most prominent politician in our study 
was the Prime Minister (who appeared in 37.3% 
of all items in our study) it seems surprising that 
women still cannot reach parity with male cam-
paigners in news coverage of elections. 
Looking in more depth at our findings demon-
strates that although there were a variety of women 
politicians who received a good deal of attention, 
the traditional struggle for other women to be 
heard was exacerbated by this highly-presidential-
ised campaign. A breakdown of all political parties 
and other groups of people who are called upon to 
comment in news coverage shows which political 
parties or which groups of sources received higher 
levels of mediated representation.  
For the Conservatives, 60.7% of all individ-
ual appearances were by a female politician – the 
vast majority of these were, of course, the Prime 
Minister herself. Other political parties whose 
female leaders dominate their parties’ appearances 
were the Scottish National Party (with 71.4% of 
their appearances being made by women repre-
sentatives), Plaid Cymru (77.8% - mostly made up 
of appearances by Leanne Wood) and the Green 
Party, for whom 66.7% of outings in the news were 
made up by women (mainly joint leader Caroline 
Lucas). Labour Party sources instead tended to 
be dominated by men (mainly Corbyn, again 
reflecting the presidential nature of the campaign) 
as Labour women only accounted for 22.6% of 
all appearances by Labour sources. UKIP and the 
Liberal Democrats managed the fewest women 
campaigners in online news, accounting for 12.9% 
and 10.1% respectively (Figure 2).   
Ordinary women also received lower 
representation than might be expected given how 
accessible members of the public are to journal-
ists. Women accounted for 39% of all citizens 
featured in our study of online news. Women 
in non-political roles were very marginal in the 
coverage. Despite the presence of a reasonable 
volume of voices from other media and online 
platforms in online news coverage, just 29.7% of 
media sources and 20.8% of bloggers referred to 
were female (Figure 3). Other kinds of sources 
were completely absent. Every individual pollster 
or other kind of expert who received any mention 
or reference in the news was male. This dearth of 
women’s expertise is also reflected in the author-
ship of online news items. Just 31.8% of all items 
with a single author were authored by women. This 
shows, as with studies of offline news coverage, 
than online political news is still dominated by 
male authors. 
It remains to be seen whether these patterns 
are a quirk of online news, and whether women 
experts fared any better in mainstream broad-
casting and print coverage will be revealed in 
time. However, given the increasing importance 
of online news, this complete erasure of women’s 
political expertise from the coverage is discour-
aging. Ignoring women as experts limits the 
perspectives and range of ideas that are deemed 
to be relevant to the political realm and serves to 
reinforce the male dominance of politics, but also 
impoverishes our understanding of the political 
process.  Although we have a good level of rep-
resentation of women in key political leadership 
positions, other women continue to find it difficult 
to gain access to the news.  
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In the hours that followed the shock of the exit 
poll, a narrative quickly emerged amongst political 
pundits to help explain the unexpected surge in 
support for the Labour Party: “It Was the Young 
Wot Won It”. Youth engagement has been a key 
factor throughout this election. From musicians  
JME and Stormzy spearheading the #grime4Cor-
byn campaign, to a massive voter registration drive 
that resulted in over one million applications from 
18-24-year olds, young people have been consist-
ently touted as potential difference-makers in the 
outcome of #GE2017. While our understanding of 
precisely who voted will remain somewhat sketchy 
until the publication of the British Election Study 
later this year, early indications point to a signifi-
cant and substantial growth in youth engagement.
This leads us to ask, what information sources 
did these young people draw on when deciding 
how to cast their vote? Although the robust media 
analysis conducted by Loughborough University 
covers broadcast and print media, the outcome of 
this election highlights the pressing need to also 
explore those digital news sources that directly 
target younger voters. We analyse how this 
election was reported to younger audiences by two 
new-media organisations, BuzzFeed and VICE.
Founded in 2006, BuzzFeed is renowned for 
its cat memes, quizzes, and listicles. While initially 
focusing on light-hearted content, over the past 
four years the company has invested significantly 
in its news operation. Under the stewardship of 
editor-in-chief Janine Gibson, BuzzFeed News 
commands an online news audience comparable 
to The Mirror and The Telegraph. Despite their 
growing reach, some cast doubt on whether the 
tone and style that BuzzFeed adopts is suited to 
rigorous journalism.
As expected, BuzzFeed maintained a journal-
istic style that blurred the lines between informa-
tion and entertainment. From illustrating their 
readers’ surreal dreams about the election, to a 
compilation of the best reactions to Theresa May’s 
confession that the naughtiest thing she had ever 
done was to “run through fields of wheat”, humour 
was  a constant feature. However, this approach 
belies the sophistication and depth of their 
election reporting. BuzzFeed were at the forefront 
of coverage on the digital campaign, identifying 
how political parties were using micro-target-
ed adverts on social media to bypass election 
spending limits, flagging up misinformation 
shared online,  and producing detailed analysis 
of the growing influence of left-wing political 
blogs. Alongside pieces on the daily developments 
of the campaign, they also focused on LGBTQ 
rights, race, and those working in the gig-econo-
my.  While evidently many of these stories reflect 
the interests of their target demographic, what is 
striking about their coverage is its form, language, 
and style: BuzzFeed taps into a particular digital 
vernacular to connect with its audience. The use 
of quizzes, dank memes, and cute photos of dogs 
at polling stations represents a new form of digital 
storytelling, one that can act as an important entry 
point for younger citizens into a range of complex 
political stories.
Emerging as an underground counterculture 
magazine in Montreal in 1994, VICE’s current 
editorial style chimes with its abrasive and con-
troversial CEO, Shane Smith. Launching its UK 
arm in 2002, VICE strongly oppose conventional 
orthodoxy in journalism, seeking to offer hip, 
edgy, alternative perspectives to the legacy media 
agenda, such as their behind the scenes look at 
the Syrian conflict, or their guide to North Korea. 
With an average age of 27, their staff speaks to—
and for—their target audience. 
VICE organised much of their coverage under 
two sections, Oh Snap and Tory Week, setting the 
overarching tone of the election coverage: either in 
dismay to be dragged to the “hell’s waiting room” 
of yet another election, or in merry enjoyment, 
provoking Conservative voters and blaming them 
for the catastrophic state of things. Like an amused 
biologist hiding in the bushes, VICE described the 
Tory as a unique species and scrutinised “Toriness” 
as a mode of life. If the tabloids were biased against 
Jeremy Corbyn, VICE attacked the Conservatives 
with comparable levels of fearless partisanship. 
With a fierce conviction that the election result 
would depend on youth turnout, VICE explained 
to their young readers the importance of strategic 
voting and peer-mobilisation, and urged them to 
not vote for the Conservatives under any circum-
stances. The language was witty and sarcastic, 
comfortable with swearing, and chose to hover 
between the othering of Conservative supporters 
and pushing a serious news agenda. Their Gon-
zo-inspired political coverage is as familiar as a pub 
discussion with your hilarious — maybe already 
tipsy — but still well informed mates.
Both publications are examples of digital 
disruption in election reporting. More than dis-
tributing content, BuzzFeed and VICE embrace 
the culture of social media. They draw on the 
ideas, language, and behaviours of the social web 
to connect with their audience. In doing so, they 
challenged the traditional values and norms of 
news making during this general election.
Not just swearing and loathing on the internet: 
analysing BuzzFeed and VICE during #GE2017
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When the dust settles, one of the key lessons of 
the 2017 General Election may be a simple yet 
enduring one: to win the battle for hearts and 
minds, you must win the battle for authenticity. 
And in this election season’s race for authen-
ticity, Jeremy Corbyn came out miles ahead. But 
what does it mean to be an authentic politician? 
Scholars have grappled with this question for 
decades, and if anything, it has become more 
urgent than ever at a time where populist politi-
cians across the political spectrum – from Jeremy 
Corbyn and Bernie Sanders to Donald Trump 
and Nigel Farage - have garnered support for their 
supposed authenticity. 
The discourse theorist Martin Montgomery 
has argued that authenticity is characterised by 
natural and spontaneous talk which captures the 
experience of the speaker and is true to their core 
self. For media scholar Gunn Enli, a politician is 
perceived as authentic when they come across as 
trustworthy, likeable and genuine.
My analysis of UK national newspaper stories 
on Jeremy Corbyn’s authenticity shows that he was 
seen to be authentic in exactly these ways, amongst 
journalists across the political spectrum. First of 
all, journalists acknowledged Corbyn’s sincerety. 
Charles Moore, writing in the Telegraph on June 
3, linked Corbyn’s authenticity to that of other 
populist political leaders:
Over the last decade, the restless global quest 
for authenticity has lighted upon figures as various 
as Donald Trump, Alexis Tsipras, Marine Le Pen 
and now Mr Corbyn. In his television debates and 
interviews, he has projected some small symptoms 
of humour, modesty and sincerity.
Another Telegraph writer, Tom Harris, 
described Corbyn’s authenticity as expressed in 
a spontaneity that could never be matched by the 
Prime Minister: “The Islington MP, perhaps under-
standing he has nothing whatever to lose, is risking 
face-to-face meetings with the general public in 
an unrehearsed way that May has not yet had the 
courage to copy.”
Indeed, Corbyn’s authenticity was frequently 
contrasted to the perception of the Prime Minister 
as a cold and heartless control freak. Writing in The 
Times on June 3, Janice Turner observed:
“He’s so authentic,” people cry, as he presents 
homemade jam to The One Show while con-
demning the low-wage economy, calmly, without 
artifice or spin. “Bless! He seems so real!” And so 
he does, compared with Theresa May, a broken 
pull-string doll who can’t even utter her five pre-
programmed phrases.
Similarly, Marina Hyde, writing in The 
Guardian, argued that May’s “primary means 
of showing solidarity with workers is to deliver 
answers so robotic that they suggest even her own 
job has already been automated.” 
Hyde’s observation highlights the ways in 
which understandings of authenticity are tied to 
emotional qualities – an “authentic” politician is 
someone who is able to feel compassion for voters, 
to be able to deliver the policy changes they 
need. The contrast between Corbyn’s perceived 
emotional empathy and May’s cold and remote 
performance was a common theme throughout 
the election. It gained momentum after May’s 
performance on a BBC Question Time Election 
special. Here, she dismissed the concerns of 
an NHS nurse who had not received a pay rise 
since 2009, stating “there isn’t a magic money 
tree that we can shake that suddenly provides for 
everything that people want.”
As Brian May wrote in The Mirror, now “that 
the blinkers are off, we see Theresa May in her 
full glory - a ruthless insatiably ambitious woman 
with not a shred of compassion for man or beast.” 
Miranda Sawyer suggested in The Observer that 
Corbyn’s “appeal is not in his grasp of numbers but 
his understanding of emotion.” 
The fact that candidates for office must 
show themselves to be “ordinary folks” who can 
empathise with citizens is nothing new. It has, for 
example, been a long-standing theme in writing 
on American presidential rhetoric. But it would be 
wrong to see the election results as determined by 
the personality of the main party leaders. Public 
debate around the campaign was, in fact, strongly 
focused on issues. This was particularly true as 
debates over the party manifestos unfolded and led 
to a significant backlash against the Conservative 
Party’s ‘dementia tax’ and a rise in public support 
for the progressive policies of the Labour Party.
But given the presidentialisation of British 
politics, these policies were seen to be under-
written by the trustworthiness and likeability 
of the party leaders. Rather than viewing an 
emphasis on personality and policy as mutually 
exclusive, we should understand the two as in-
extricably interlinked in contemporary politics, 
and the relationship cemented through the 
discourse of authenticity. 
Methodological note: I carried out a Nexis UK search for the period April 
18-June 9, 2017 in UK national newspapers, using the search terms 
“Corbyn” AND “authentic” OR “authenticity” anywhere in the story. This 
yielded a total of 62 stories, out of which 52 reflected on the perceived 
authenticity of the Labour leader.
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Was it the Labour doorstep or the Labour 
smartphone that swung it for Jeremy?
Although we need more research before we can 
categorically confirm that it was ‘the young wot 
swung it for Labour’ at the General Election, it 
looks more than possible. And, although their 
support for Jeremy Corbyn was rooted in more 
than just tech-savvy campaigning, we can’t afford 
to dismiss its role in converting youthful enthusi-
asm into actual votes on the day.
One of the fascinating things about what 
happened on 8 June is that very few people saw 
it coming. Election analysts, going on past expe-
rience, figured that the young people pollsters 
managed to sample either wouldn’t bother to 
turn up on the day or, if they did, would end 
up simply adding to Labour’s support in seats it 
would win anyway.
Even more interesting, however, is that the 
parties and their candidates themselves had no 
more idea than the rest of us of what was about to 
hit them. Conservative campaigners on the ground 
only began to get worried a few days out – if they 
were lucky: many didn’t wake up to the wave that 
was about to break over them until groups of 
young voters began rocking up to polling stations 
on the day itself.  And many Labour activists will 
admit privately that they didn’t have much more of 
a clue than their opposite numbers: just as pollsters 
find it notoriously difficult to get hold of young 
people – no landlines, not in (or awake) in the day, 
out in the evenings, not into party politics, etc. – 
so, too, do canvassers.
But this poses a puzzle.  If canvassing didn’t 
ID these young Labour voters, then they weren’t 
brought to the polls by traditional means like 
‘knocking up’ (i.e. by their names appearing on 
a list of promises, that list being checked against 
records taken by tellers at polling stations, and 
then, if they weren’t down as having voted yet, 
them being contacted and urged to do so).
That doesn’t mean, however, that Labour 
activists had no role whatsoever in getting the 
youth vote out. Rather, it means that we probably 
have to adopt a broader view of what constitutes 
activism nowadays – and adopt a slightly less 
sceptical view of the utility of online rather than 
offline campaign activity.
As part of an ESRC-funded project on party 
members run by me and Monica Poletti at Queen 
Mary University of London, along with Paul 
Webb, from the University of Sussex, we surveyed 
thousands of members of six UK parties: the Con-
servatives, Labour, Lib Dems, SNP, UKIP and the 
Greens.  Most of them were questioned just after 
the May 2015 general but, in Labour’s case, because 
of the huge influx of new members, we sent out an 
additional survey after the 2016 local elections.
Those surveys give us some idea of how Labour 
members compare to Conservative and other party 
members when it comes to different campaign 
activities.  Cutting to the chase, what it reveals is 
that Labour is some way ahead of the Tories when it 
comes to online if not offline activities.
If we take offline activity first, then the two 
parties’ memberships are fairly evenly matched: 
leaving aside the thorny topic of over-claiming 
(which, importantly for our purposes, is no more 
likely to affect one party’s members more than the 
other’s), some 43% of Tory members claimed to 
have delivered leaflets at some stage during the 
2015 general election, compared to 42% of Labour 
members.  The proportion saying they did a bit of 
canvassing (either by phone or in person) was 36% 
for both parties.
If we then look at online, however, there 
are big differences.  Some 40% of Tory members 
claimed to have liked something from their party 
or one of its candidates on Facebook at the 2015 
election; but the figure for Labour members was 
51%.  As for tweeting or re-tweeting messages 
supporting their party or its candidates on Twitter, 
the figures were 26% and 37% respectively.
When we asked Labour members who joined 
the party after the 2015 General Election, many 
of them, no doubt, to vote for Jeremy Corbyn, we 
found they were much less likely than pre-2015 
members to have leafletted or canvassed, although 
whether this was because they were less inclined to 
go ‘on the doorstep’, or because they hadn’t yet been 
asked to or because no-one gets as excited about 
local elections as they do about general elections, 
we don’t really know. But the proportion who’d 
campaigned on Facebook (54%) and Twitter (34%) 
was very similar to the one we found in 2015.
Could it be that it was this sort of activity, 
rather than the traditional kind, that mobilised 
younger voters to come out for Corbyn (and not 
May) on 8 June, explaining why their imminent 
appearance at polling stations wasn’t picked up 
beforehand?  If so, ‘clicktivism’ is something we 
should take much more seriously from now on.
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The election at constituency level
Taking part in a local constituency election 
campaign is a good way to revisit many issues 
about political communication that one finds in 
the literature. Of these, one keeps repeating itself, 
namely: where is the election campaign actually 
taking place?
When you knock on someone’s door, you 
quickly become aware of the fact that their 
response to you – if they open the door, that is – is 
made up of a whole host of accumulated bits of 
information that they have acquired over the years, 
and more recently. The simple question, ‘will you 
vote for us?’ is unlikely to be answered by anyone 
who has actually read the manifesto, met the local 
MP and/ or the party leader. The response is most 
likely to be drawn from a combination of personal 
experiences, impressions, received knowledge, 
things heard or read about the election, and so on 
(activists have also been known to come across 
members of the public who were unaware that an 
election was taking place!).
The point to note here is not that voters do 
not inhabit the same world as the activist or the 
‘politically informed’; the point is that the interac-
tion at the doorstep reveals the activist’s inability to 
penetrate the reality that produces the decision to 
vote and the direction of that vote. In this respect, 
it is still appropriate to ask where is the contest 
actually taking place: is it on television, in the 
press, on social media, the leaflet handed out, the 
garden sign, at the doorstep?  What part/s of this 
mixture of intermingling messages and influences 
is/are open to change? How do they impact on the 
texture of the campaign and the shifting fortunes 
of individuals and parties?
Students of political communication should 
also be humbled by their inability to precisely 
identify how decisions about who to vote for are 
made and, by extension, how activists – and others 
– should then intervene in that process so as to 
produce the desired outcome. Should the emphasis 
be on door knocking, leafleting and garden signs, 
i.e. the ‘ground wars’ strategy? Should the effort be 
on Facebook or Twitter, i.e. the ‘digital’ targeting 
strategy? Are these of lesser or more importance 
than appearances on BBC1s The One Show or 
Question Time, i.e. the ‘television’ election? What 
of May’s ‘bad press’ after the ‘Dementia tax’ 
policy U-turn (or not, according to May), i.e. 
old fashioned journalism at a manifesto launch? 
Which of these should the party and party activists 
focus on in order to sway voters? The answer: 
probably all of them as each contributes something 
to the texture of the campaign (and we don’t quite 
know in what proportions!).
In fact, students of political communica-
tion will have become only too aware that the 
mysteries of the electoral process and voters’ 
decision-making have deepened over the years as 
digital electioneering has increased its profile and 
utility (although there is an upside here in that it 
has opened up a whole new vista for research. The 
adage that ‘more research is needed’ has never been 
truer). Consequently, we now need to add social 
media and targeted communication (forms of psy-
chological profiling and analytics) to the analysis 
of newsprint and broadcast output. The addition 
of electioneering behind closed doors and straight 
to people’s screens has made it more difficult to 
get a full and measured sense of all the influences 
that are likely to have a bearing on voters. It is no 
longer the case that every communication is as 
open, as public and as shared as it might have once 
been. This introduces challenges to researchers but 
also to political parties and to activists.
All this makes elections and electioneering a 
complex and puzzling affair, perhaps more so at 
the constituency level. As the activist delivers yet 
another leaflet, she can but wonder whether she is 
having any impact on what is going on. She may be 
feeling good about what she is doing – in Nielsen’s 
words: ‘How campaigns are waged matters, not 
only for electoral outcomes but also for what dem-
ocratic politics is.’(2012, 7. Emphasis in original)  
- but the puzzle still remains.
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Over-managing the media: how it all went wrong
We have seen orchestrated and controlled election 
campaigns before, but the 2017 one reached a new 
level of media management. Whatever happened 
to the days of campaign rallies and politicians con-
fronting noisy hecklers? There are many famous 
clips of politicians (from Quintin Hogg to Harold 
Wilson) dealing with unruly crowds and delivering 
their message to a mixed reception at best. In this 
campaign we saw nothing like that. #GE2017 was 
simply a process of carefully controlled appearanc-
es both before the media and the chosen publics. 
Forget the lively morning election press 
conferences where journalists could lob all manner 
of tricky questions to a panel of senior politicians. 
Forget too visions of the soapbox – famously 
reinstated in 1992 by John Major – in town squares 
across the land to an assembled crowd of whoever 
wanted to turn up and listen. Any chances of 
senior figures meeting with a real voter were 
minimised and sanitised. Each side preferred well 
controlled encounters with true believers. The 
Corbyn rallies were rousing appearances before the 
faithful – creating the same vibe that we saw in the 
recent Labour leadership contests. And the effect 
was an almost pop festival like atmosphere, where 
week by week the attendances rose so that by the 
end huge crowds were thronging to hear their 
beloved Jeremy. 
On the Tory side only a few times did the 
Prime Minister venture out and face unscripted 
unvetted encounters. Her media appearances were 
similarly curtailed. Aside from the famous and 
toe curling ‘One Show’ with Mr May, there were 
a few set piece broadcast interviews and minimal 
encounters with real people. Some of the most 
memorable occasions in past elections have been 
when politicians face unvarnished probing by 
normal voters. Both Tony Blair and John Prescott 
had such experiences. In 1983 the highlight of the 
campaign was Bristol voter Diane Gould asking 
Mrs Thatcher about the Belgrano. Or remember 
the Election Call phone-ins of the Robin Day era 
where every day a senior politician (including 
party leaders) was grilled by questions from the 
ordinary voting public. Not much of that happened 
in 2017. In fact there were no Radio 4, Channel 4 
or even (Mrs Thatcher’s favourite) Radio 2 outings 
for the PM. John Humphreys, Jon Snow and 
Jeremy Vine were all rebuffed. 
A high point of Jeremy Corbyn’s campaign 
was his last minute decision to attend the televised 
debate in Cambridge. Theresa May only further 
damaged herself by declining to participate – and 
then refusing even to appear on Women’s Hour. 
The campaign was a monotone and monochrome 
series of well organised photo opportunity en-
counters – where the PM was shown speaking to 
carefully curated groups.  By excluding much of 
the media and restricting real people, it became a 
sanitised and even cynical operation. Spontaneity 
and nimbleness of response are crucial in effective 
politician campaigning. This was rarely in evidence.
Several times during the Trump era selective 
media (variously the BBC, CNN, New York Times 
etc) have been excluded from events as a ‘punish-
ment’ for being over critical or telling a story that 
the administration disliked. And there were even 
echoes of such high handed behaviour in the UK 
campaign. Local media in Cornwall were told that 
they could not question Theresa May when she 
visited there and apparently were locked out of the 
event. International media encountered obstacles 
when they tried to question the Prime Minister on 
the campaign trail. Even Sky News (part owned by 
Mrs May’s friend Rupert Murdoch) was apparently 
denied access to cover the campaign properly - and 
shunted off the bus.
The overwhelming impression was of an 
operation which disdained and disparaged much 
of the Fourth Estate. Maybe it is appropriate in 
a period where the UK fell back to a pitiful 40th 
place in the Reporters Without Borders’ World 
Press Freedom Index, that the media were seen 
to be constrained and limited in reporting on a 
crucial democratic process. 
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Aristotle and persuasive copywriting in the 2017 
General Election
In an election campaign lasting six weeks what Party’s 
say on policy has limited effect on changing voting 
behaviour, that is done in the months/years preceding 
the campaign. Rather, campaigning helps parties 
identify, reach and mobilise those already sympathet-
ic to them. The ‘air-war’ is dominated by advertising 
and increasingly social media, however, the Cinder-
ella of online campaigning, e-newsletters, can play 
a narrow but important role.   The attention in the 
2017 online campaign has been on the high profile 
use of social media, but email has a role by imparting 
complicated information and enhancing existing 
relationships. E-newsletters are sent to those who 
are ‘warm’ to a party and can remind the receiver of 
important events, such as Manifesto launches.  More 
importantly, they can make appeals for money and 
volunteers to enable ‘colder’ supporters to be reached 
by other means.  E-newsletters prime purpose is to 
mobilise resources that can be used elsewhere.
Professional copywriter Andy Maslem (2015) 
applied psychology to writing persuasive copy.  He 
suggested that Aristotle’s Rhetoric provided a usable 
framework.  Aristotle identified three components to 
being persuasive:
Ethos – the credibility of the source;
Pathos – creating an emotional link;
Logos – offering a rational argument.  
While most of us might think the argument is key, 
Aristotle stressed the source whereas Maslem believes 
copywriting is essentially about emotions.  
During the election campaign the public e-news-
letters of four political parties (Conservatives. Labour, 
Liberal Democrats and the Greens) were analysed 
to see whether they applied Aristotle in constructing 
persuasive copy.  
Ethos plays a fairly limited role, possibly because 
all subscribers opted to sign up to receive the emails 
and so knew the parties.  Early on in the campaign 
the credibility of the message sender was stressed.  
In the Conservatives first e-newsletter, which was 
from Theresa May, she said “Last week I stood on the 
steps of Downing Street”, emphasising she was more 
credible as the incumbent.  She went on to say “Every 
vote cast for the Conservatives will strengthen my 
hand in the Brexit negotiations”, highlighting her role. 
Even though the UK is not a presidential system, this 
was a clear attempt to contrast her credibility to be 
Prime Minister with that of Jeremy Corbyn. Labour’s 
first email sought to establish Jeremy Corbyn’s 
credibility in a different way, “Today at PMQs, Jeremy 
Corbyn raised the concerns of people struggling 
under this Tory Government.”  It then went on to list 
questions asked on behalf of named citizens.  May’s 
Ethos was based on her position and unique ability to 
carry out her responsibilities, whereas Corbyn’s was 
that he represented every-day people.
Pathos was central to the parties’ copywriting, 
with emotional appeals being a common tactic in 
most emails.  Emotional arguments were used in five 
different ways.  First, appeals for money sought to 
create a belief the individual could make a difference.  
For example, the Liberal Democrats said ‘We want 
you to be able to say “I helped make that happen.”’  All 
of the parties made reference to the amount of money 
they had raised, and why they needed more.  Second, 
appeals to specific groups, so the Greens highlighted 
LGBT rights worldwide were under threat.  Labour’s 
most common theme that they represented the many 
not the few is also an emotional appeal to groups 
of people.  Third, social norms were invoked, so in 
launching their Manifesto the Labour Party said 
“We’re been joined by thousands of you rallying to 
action”, in other words you are not alone support-
ing us.  Similarly, several financial appeals stressed 
how many people had donated, again emphasising 
supporter numbers.  Fourth, a sense of urgency was 
attached to several appeals.  The Labour Party gave 
a free tote bag to donors, but pointed out there was 
limited supply, so the message was donate before 
they run out.  The Conservatives started one appeal 
for donations with “This is urgent”.  The rest of the 
message explained that time was short for people’s 
donations to make a difference.  Lastly, one tactic 
from the Conservatives and Greens was the use of a 
signature from the sender, implying a personal touch 
to make them more  likeable.  Emotional appeals are 
central to how the parties used their e-newsletters.
Logos was less frequently used, but was linked 
to the launch of the Manifestos.  The Greens stated 
“Today we set out policies which don’t just defend 
our rights, but celebrate and extend them.”   Indeed, 
in several emails the Greens highlighted reasons why 
the environment should be protected.  Similarly, 
Liberal Democrats several times outlined briefly 
their position on Brexit.  Labour made reference to 
the Dementia Tax, and then linked this to a fund-
raising appeal.  However, the e-newsletters were not 
primarily used to persuade on policy.  
Overall, e-newsletters tended to use emotional 
appeals, though there were slightly different ap-
proaches.  Ethos was the Conservatives’ main 
approach  consistently using “strong and stable lead-
ership”, suggesting Theresa May was more credible. 
The opposition parties were much more likely to 
stress emotional messages, and to a lesser extent 
logical argument.
Applying Aristotle we can suggest that persua-
sion is about offering a credible source, engaging with 
the brain and stirring the heart.  However, this is not 
the case with e-newsletters where copywriting was 
more likely to support Maslem’s view that emotion 
drives action. Party e-newsletters are used as a mobi-
lising tool, whereas flyers and leaflets fulfil different, 
more policy led, purposes.  The parties’ e-newsletter 
copywriters primarily applied Pathos by appealing to 
the heart, not the brain.
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Rhetoric of the 2017 General Election campaign
When the House of Commons gave Theresa 
May the required majority of votes to call a snap 
election she appeared to be in a commanding 
position to increase her number of MPs. In 
contrast to this Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party 
seemed set to lose the election dramatically, with 
some pollsters suggesting Labour may return with 
as little as 185 seats. 
As is well documented elsewhere, the election 
was called to strengthen May’s hand in the Brexit 
negotiations as a way of showing the European 
Union negotiators that the British electorate were 
behind her. In the event, the Conservatives went 
on to suffer a major defeat. Such was the scale of 
the defeat that May not only failed to secure the 
landslide demonstration of support she wanted, 
but lost MPs to the point where the Conserva-
tives no longer had a Parliamentary majority. As 
a rhetorical show of strength to the EU this was a 
spectacular failure. But why did the campaign fail 
so dramatically?
In the academic study of political rhetoric 
there are the Aristotelian modes of persuasion. 
These are ethos, pathos, logos. The first refers to 
character/credibility; the second refers to use of 
emotion; the third refers to empirical evidence. 
These represent an analytical framework around 
which it is possible to deconstruct political speech 
as a means of highlighting how an audience can 
be (de)motivated by a rhetorician. In terms of the 
General Election, May’s ethos was as a strong and 
stable leader who would push hard for a right deal 
for Britain. Her pathos was patriotic, insomuch as 
she sought to instil national pride in the electorate, 
and her logos was one of economic prosperity. In 
contrast, Corbyn’s ethos was compassionate and 
caring, his pathos was one of anger at social ine-
quality, and his logos was economic investment and 
fairness. These two leadership positions contrast 
sharply and so offered very different trajectories for 
the United Kingdom.
However, as the campaign progressed May’s 
ethos (character) began to shift. Although the 
message of strength and stability was repeated 
often, her level of engagement with the campaign 
prevented her from expanding on what those 
points meant or how they would be of benefit 
in the Brexit negotiations. For example, the 
rhetorical ethos of leader is communicated to 
audience’s via media engagement. Yet May made 
it clear she would not participate in debates, her 
public meetings were largely stage managed, 
and her speeches tended to be to pre-existing 
supportive audience. Consequently she rarely 
spoke to audiences who did not agree with her. By 
avoiding the voters in this way May was unable 
to convince doubters to lend her their vote, or 
even to confirm to sympathetic audiences that 
she was indeed strong and stable. By not growing 
her ethos in a way that would instil confidence in 
her leadership, the audience rarely listened to the 
logos of her argument. 
In contrast to this Corbyn’s rhetorical strategy 
was one of mass audience engagement. He often 
pulled in large crowds in safe Labour seats that 
were then transmitted by mainstream and social 
media towards undecided voters. By doing so 
Corbyn was able to communicate his message in a 
way that May was incapable of emulating. 
Ordinarily in a Parliamentary system we 
would not be simply looking at the leaders, 
however given May sought to run the campaign in 
a largely presidential manner the leaders of the two 
parties became focal points for the performance 
of their respective parties. Indeed, the branding 
of the Conservatives election literature revolved 
firmly around May whilst Corbyn became a firm 
figurehead of Labour’s campaign. 
Finally, it is worth reflecting on why both May 
and Corbyn performed as they did. Put simply, 
May was untested in a campaign where she would 
be the focus of attention. For example, she did not 
campaign beyond the Parliamentary Conservative 
Party in the 2016 leadership election, nor was she 
prominent in the EU referendum. Had she been so 
she may have gained some of the necessary skills 
of defending an argument to an unsupportive 
audience and, by doing so, growing her ethos and 
personal confidence. In contrast Corbyn has had a 
political life of campaigns. As well as a lifetime of 
campaigning he fought for and won the leader-
ship twice. His experience as a campaigner shone 
through in this General Election. Consequently, 
whilst Corbyn was able to grow his ethos to every 
growing crowds, May’s ethos slowly declined 
thereby leading the Tories into a major defeat right 
at a time when she wanted to strengthen her hand 
in the Brexit negotiations. 
At the time is writing it is unclear whether May 
will remain leader, but whoever leads the Tories into 
the next election will need to be a seasoned cam-
paigner if they are to defeat Jeremy Corbyn. 
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When is an electoral ‘bribe’ not a bribe?
As I have been consistently reminded these last few 
days, ‘we’ did not win the election, so why does it 
feel like ‘we’ (non-Conservatives) did? What can 
account for this feeling of (slight) hope? What can 
account for the fact that I am heartened by the 
result of the latest General Election? This feeling 
is not through any particular party loyalty (‘my 
party’ continues to have only one MP, in Brighton 
Pavilion) but is perhaps best explained by the fact 
that in securing a 40% share, a 9.5% rise on the 
previous election and with 12,878,460 votes in 
total the Labour Party under the leadership of the 
much maligned Jeremy Corbyn, demonstrated 
that running on an explicitly social democratic 
platform, contrary to some predictions is not nec-
essarily the road to electoral oblivion. 
After 7 years of the (always ideological) and 
now seemingly abandoned austerity, the Labour 
Party under Corbyn’s leadership, launched a 
manifesto that promised not only to end austerity, 
but to govern unashamedly in the social democrat-
ic (not socialist) tradition. 
The Labour Party manifesto was in direct 
contrast to that of Theresa May’s (yes, it was hers, 
if you run an election on an explicitly presiden-
tial platform, then Theresa May gets to ‘own’ the 
result). Pitched to a population still suffering fully 
9 years after the global financial crisis, a public 
exhausted and impoverished by austerity, the Tory 
manifesto promised nothing but more ‘tough 
decisions’, it was bereft of hope. Where Tories 
offered more pain, Labour offered a positive vision 
for the future. 
Although reliable data is not yet available, 
this vision of the future certainly seems to have 
captured the imagination – and the votes – of the 
younger generation. It is not difficult to see why. 
Contrary to the story of 20th century capital-
ism - where each new generation is materially 
richer than that which preceded it - this next 
generation are likely to be materially worse off 
than their parents. If you’re between the ages of 
18 and 30, with possible student debt; precarious 
labour; a zero hours contract; perhaps in a job 
but with contracting wages; collapsing health and 
social services; increasing rents; average house 
prices now 7.6 times the average salary; little or 
no chance to save for a deposit; then why would 
(m)any of that generation vote for the status quo? 
The status quo has not delivered for them, for 
‘the many’. Is it any wonder then, that 40% of the 
population fancied something less painful, more 
hopeful, with a positive vision of the future? 
Of course, still amazed by the result, it was 
not long before some commentators and even 
politicians complained that Corbyn had essential-
ly ‘bought’ the youth (particularly student) vote 
with ‘bribes’ over tuition fees). Two points about 
this: Between 2013 and 2017, the Labour Party 
increased its membership from 189,000 to (at least) 
517,000. Many of this membership base are young, 
newly engaged and were energised way before 
any policy on tuition fees was announced. This 
young voter base - repeatedly told they’re naive 
and stupid for supporting Corbyn – have been 
there campaigning and supporting for two years, 
not because of bribes but because they believe in 
something. Secondly, why, when it’s a policy on 
tuition fees is it a ‘bribe’, but when it’s a policy of 
‘triple-lock pension guarantee’ (shoring up the 
grey vote) is it not a bribe? You could say the same 
of any popular policy with a likely voter base: 
Tax cuts for the rich? A bribe? Or ‘trickle-down 
economics’? Cuts to corporation tax? A bribe? Or 
‘encouraging investment’?
Regarding ‘investment’, we are often told by 
the neoliberal hawks that cutting corporation tax 
encourages investment. However, despite cuts 
over the last 7 years, this race to the bottom has, 
thus far, not produced particularly compelling 
results. The UK is among the worst performers in 
terms of investment as % of GDP (ranked 124th 
in the world). With the pledge to raise corporation 
tax (gradually) to 26%, the press ran numerous 
scare-stories about the ‘Marxist Corbyn’. But the 
last time Corporation tax was as ‘high’ as 26%, was 
under the Coalition Government in 2011. When 
Thatcher left office, Corporation Tax was 32%. 
Does that make Thatcher a Marxist, a socialist or a 
social democrat? Further, how do ‘our competitors’ 
measure up? The most successful European state 
many would argue is Germany. Is anyone seriously 
suggesting that Germany is not among the most 
innovative and dynamic economies in Europe (or 
even the world)? Germany has a range of indus-
tries: heavy, light, innovative and digital. Their 
corporation tax? Currently 29.7%. Has this been 
a drag on industry and innovation? Germany has 
higher rates of tax but uses those revenues to invest 
in innovation, industrial strategy and education. 
Germany has one of the most highly educated pop-
ulations in the world and most German states have 
no (or very low) University tuition fees. 
Invest in people, invest in infrastructure - 
physical and intellectual - and you collectively 
invest in the future. Perhaps then, Labour under 
Corbyn, and the young voters flocking to the 
party, might be on to something after all. They 
did not win this sprint race, but they may win the 
longer one.
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Party Election Broadcasts look ever more like 
something from a different age of politics, an 
anachronism from the 1950s in a hyperme-
dia age of campaigning. In 2017 it seemed as if 
PEBs were increasingly being forgotten by many 
voters and some campaigners more interested 
in online media spaces. To give an example, the 
Conservative candidate Greg Knight found with 
his brief amateur video being viewed more than 
half a million times on YouTube, that a lack of 
quality need not mean a lack of reach - even if 
the audience is a mostly mocking one. Compared 
to views for the Ken Loach-directed Labour PEB 
on YouTube of just over 5,000 by June 7th (a not 
atypical number of viewers for the main parties’ 
PEBs on YouTube), Knight and others might think 
that all the effort put into PEBs’ high production 
values isn’t worth the time and effort. 
In more conventional modes of viewing, 
entering the last week of the campaign, Loach’s 
PEB was the only one to feature in the top 30 most 
viewed programmes for any channel, with an 
audience of 4.1 million on May 15th, the 25th most 
viewed programme on the BBC that week. With 
the rescheduling of two PEBs due to the Man-
chester terrorist attack as well, total audiences for 
PEBs are likely to be down on previous elections – 
though 4 million people is still a sizeable audience 
for a party to reach with a single piece of content. 
Perhaps because of that still potentially large reach, 
even despite the snap election context, parties 
seemed to take some time and effort to produce 
relatively polished PEBs compared to the rather 
cut and paste work seen in the Vote Leave ref-
erendum Campaign Broadcasts last year. Mostly 
these were not concept or gimmick ads but rather 
conventional public and party vox pops, and some 
party leader-focused material. Indeed, observed 
trends since the 1980s and the days of the Saatchi 
brothers for the ever-increasing predominance of 
principles and practices of political marketing in 
PEBs, involving attributes of commercial brand 
advertising such as celebrity endorsements, 
emotional appeals, and personalisation, seems to 
have possibly peaked. 
The snap election might have been a factor in 
production complexity, but also the more “Wild 
West” frontier of social media channels arguably 
offers a more productive space for commercial 
political advertising styles that can be targeted 
directly to (hopefully) receptive audiences for 
pithy, brash and often outright attack ads. By com-
parison, the rather staid platform of the PEB for a 
general audience arguably requires a more circum-
spect approach, though they do offer parties the 
space of several minutes of broadcast time – an age 
in advertising terms – to present something more 
sustained and substantive, an increasingly rare op-
portunity in the age of multi-media campaigning.
Whether that opportunity for substance 
achieved much in 2017 is hard to see. Only UKIP 
leader Paul Nuttall’s appearance drew any com-
mentary around PEBs, as one framed him in a 
manner that made him look like he was walking 
oddly on the spot. Even the agenda-setting 
function of PEBs – garnering news coverage if 
not viewers – seems to have waned to the point of 
only unintended coverage. The Green Party, who 
had generated the only real PEB interest with their 
“change the tune” broadcast in the 2015 campaign, 
again went for a concept ad, produced by the same 
team as their previous “hit”, this time under the 
slogan #changethegame. With a family playing a 
board game called ‘The Race to Number 10’, the 
PEB satirised the damaging policies and empty 
slogans of the major parties. It was watched more 
on YouTube than the main parties’ PEBs (over 
32,000 views by June 7th), and commended by 
the ad industry but was still not as noticeable as 
its 2015 forebear (watched nearly a million times 
to date). The 2010 and 2015 results established 
a basis for more screen time for minor parties, 
though their presence on television specials and 
debates seemed more of a focus than an extra PEB 
or two, and the return to much more of a two party 
framework in the 2017 results might see the range 
and number of PEBs diminish in future elections 
as well.
Whether PEBs can retain a purpose in future 
elections remains to be seen. Change in British 
politics around broadcasting is slow – televising 
Parliament only since the 1990s, televised leader 
debates only since 2010 – so PEBs might be around 
for a while yet. Even after being drowned out by 
television news coverage, PEBs retained potential 
for image and news management for many years, 
but perhaps now they are little more than a ritu-
alistic curio, retained more out of nostalgia than 
electoral value.
Labour PEB, 15th 
May 2017
Green PEB, 
12th May 2017
UKIP PEB, 10th 
May 2017
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‘Strong and stable’ to ‘weak and wobbly’: Tory 
campaign, media reaction and GE2017
Theresa May was described as the ‘second Iron 
Lady’ amid inevitable comparisons to Thatcher on 
becoming the first post-Brexit Conservative Party 
Prime Minister in 2016. However, following the  em-
barrassing result of the election, credible comparisons 
between May and Thatcher will likely cease abruptly. 
The Conservatives’ central message of ‘strong 
and stable’ leadership was repeated incessantly. Like 
brand Cameron in 2010, the Conservative Party 
strategy centred on Theresa May as the primary 
brand, with her face and name featuring on most 
party communication. Ultimately, in addition to a 
number of political communication blunders, this 
proved to be a significant miscalculation. In the first 
few hours and days following the indecisive election 
result, May’s so-called strong and stable leader-
ship looked like metaphorical rhetoric as she was 
described ‘weak and wobbly’; ’robotic’; the ‘zombie 
prime minister’; and a ‘dead woman walking’. 
So, what went so terribly wrong for the Conserv-
ative campaign, especially in the context of the Tories’ 
main political opponent being the much derided 
Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn? This brief analysis of 
the Tory campaign explores this question through 
an examination of the main political communication 
features of the Conservative campaign and reaction 
to it across traditional and digital media channels. 
Following the election, May attempted to cling 
onto power through forming a minority govern-
ment, which, in keeping with the strong and stable 
theme, she claimed would offer ‘certainty’. However, 
television news networks suggested the opposite was 
the case in reporting that financial indicators had 
reacted negatively to the ‘uncertainty’ of a minority 
Tory administration in negotiations with Northern 
Ireland’s controversial Democratic Unionist Party 
(Bloomberg). Furthermore, TV news largely framed 
the outcome of the election around notions of crisis 
and uncertainty (Sky News); and May’s role in the 
Conservative Party and EU Brexit negotiations as 
significantly weakened (EuroNews).
In a political marketing sense, the ‘strong and 
stable’ message was well suited to building a Thatch-
er-like personal brand. However, to gain traction in 
the wider populace, the product, in this case Theresa 
May, had to some extent live up to the image being 
created. This can be thought of as brand credibility. 
Steve Hilton, David Cameron’s former director of 
strategy, appeared on Fox News stating the election 
was meant to be the ‘Brexit election’, but instead it 
became a referendum on May’s ability to lead. 
The strength of May’s leadership came into 
question early on in the campaign following her 
awkward U-turns on policy and manifesto com-
mitments. Furthermore, in terms of credibility, her 
apparent ineptitude in communicating convincingly 
via twenty-first century media was perhaps more 
important to the overall campaign narrative. It 
became a theme of media analysis and critique. For 
example, Michael Crick (Channel 4 News) broadcast 
an entire feature questioning the Conservative's 
overly cautious media management, which, like the 
calling of the snap election, ultimately seems to have 
backfired. Engagement, credibility and trust can be 
closely related factors in this interactive age.
In keeping with this theme, May’s credibility 
as a strong and stable leader took a nosedive when 
media headlines and narratives became dominated 
by the Prime Minister’s refusal to take part in any 
televised debates. May’s notable absence left a 
silence that spoke volumes. In contrast to and at 
odds with an image of a strong and stable premier, 
May inadvertently communicated to the electorate 
that, in actuality, she was much more timid, uncon-
fident and weak than she wanted voters to believe. 
Therefore, from the outset, the central campaign 
message became an oxymoron that could be flipped 
by opponents of the Conservative Party to undermine 
the Prime Minister’s credibility. Furthermore, the 
overuse and repetitiveness of the phrase ‘strong and 
stable’ morphed into anti-Tory media witticism both 
on- and off- line, which appears to have spread virally 
via people power through grassroots uses of social 
media. Rachel Gibson refers to this type of activity as 
‘citizen-initiated campaigning’.
Anti-Conservative citizen-initiative cam-
paigning seems to have played a significant role 
in the 2017 campaign insofar as, in this politically 
charged post-Brexit context, many personal social 
media pages, which would have perhaps otherwise 
remained personal in an election period, sprung into 
political action. Early indications suggest this was 
largely due to younger sections of the electorate, large 
numbers of whom are thought to have been inspired 
by Corbyn, becoming politically active. This did not 
escape the attention of political commentators, some 
of whom suggested in this election social media 
activity replaced the role of the tabloids in shaping the 
political mood (BBC Radio 4).
Pierre Bourdieu described elections as a ‘subli-
mated form of civil war’. In the post-Brexit context it 
seems the UK has split into two camps that have been 
at war for at least the last year. However, the outcome 
of the 2017 election seems to have been most 
impacted by the Conservative’s lacklustre campaign. 
Sun Tsu’s ‘Art of War’ famously advises never to 
underestimate your opponent. If the Conservatives’ 
unpreparedness in terms of policies, presentation 
and communication of message is anything to go 
by, bearing in mind the Tories held all the cards and 
advantages of being the governing party calling a 
snap election, it seems the party underestimated its 
opponent in Jeremy Corbyn and ultimately overesti-
mated Theresa May’s strength as a leader.
The resultant outcome of May’s seemingly weak 
and wobbly leadership, three days after the election, 
is somewhat summed up by the most influential Tory 
Party blog, ConservativeHome, stating: ‘Conservative 
MPs do not believe that May can lead them into the 
next election. Nor, reluctantly, do we.’
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The Greens and the “progressive alliance”
In the aftermath of the June 8th election, some 
have spoken of “the return of the two-party 
system” (Channel 4 @FactCheck on Twitter, 9th 
June). Whilst, on the surface, the numbers support 
that analysis, it misses the grassroots significance 
of the ‘progressive alliance’. 
The Greens wrote to the Liberal Democrats, 
Labour and Plaid Cymru in 2016 proposing an 
anti-Brexit alliance in the event of a snap general 
election, which they suggested could prevent a 
Tory / UKIP / DUP coalition. Caroline Lucas, with 
Labour’s Lisa Nandy and the Liberal Democrat’s 
Chris Bowers, published The Alternative: Towards 
a New Progressive Politics (2016). The Greens made 
the call for a coalition again the day after May 
called the general election. 
Lucas remains the Green Party’s sole MP, 
but doubled her majority in Brighton Pavilion 
on June 8th - thanks to an alliance where the Lib 
Dems stood down, and many Pavilion Labour 
activists concentrated on campaigning in nearby 
Kemptown. However, she consistently punches 
above her party’s weight. Elsewhere, Green parties 
have entered national government in Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany and Italy - coalition 
being “the dominant mode of party government 
in democracies” (Poguntke, 2002, Environmen-
tal Politics). Here, the goal must be proportional 
representation (PR). Today’s political landscape 
(the rise of UKIP and the SNP, each of which may 
yet resurge) means others are listening. Corbyn’s 
Labour and the Greens have much in common, 
from fracking opposition to the scrapping of 
tuition fees. Lucas’ calls for a ‘progressive alliance’ 
were taken up, at grassroots level, by Green and 
some Labour and Liberal Democrat activists. 
Several ‘progressive’ tactical voting websites 
also operated: Tactical17, Avaaz’s ‘Vote Smart’ 
and The Progressive Alliance set up by Compass. 
The PA Twitter publicised suggestions: Lib Dem’s 
Vince Cable for Twickenham and Labour’s Fiona 
Onasanya for Peterborough, both of whom did win 
their seats from the Conservatives. On the other 
hand, their picks of Vix Lowthion for the Greens on 
the Isle of Wight, Raushan Ara for Labour in South 
Thanet and Chris Clark for Labour in Sevenoaks did 
not. It is notable the Greens stood down in Twick-
enham, and UKIP stood down in Peterborough, 
part of the other unofficial alliance of this election, 
between UKIP and hard-Brexit Conservativism. 
These uneasy alliances, unfolded in the 
marginal seat of Bury North. UKIP stepped 
aside, because the Conservative incumbent was a 
Brexiteer. The Greens likewise, potentially lending 
their votes to Labour, and the Lib Dem candidate 
suggested his supporters vote tactically. Labour 
took the seat. But, the Lib Dems still picked up 
votes. Labour’s win can be attributed partly to the 
alliance (with the Greens’ full commitment and the 
Lib Dems’ partial one) and partly to the UKIP vote 
peeling substantively towards Labour as well as 
towards the Conservatives. 
The Labour leadership and National Executive 
Committee took an official negative line on the 
progressive alliance. In Jeremy Hunt’s constituency, 
local Labour, Lib Dems and Greens collaborated 
to support the National Health Action Party in 
a bid to unseat the Health Secretary. The Greens 
withdrew and the other two parties agreed not to 
campaign. Three Labour activists were expelled 
from the party as a result, adding to grassroots 
antipathy towards General Secretary Iain McNicol 
(ignited by purges of members during Corbyn’s 
leadership bids, which saw expulsions merely for 
re-tweeting Caroline Lucas). Labour did not stand 
down any candidates for the Greens. Constitution-
ally, it cannot do so. Nonetheless, there were some 
local arrangements which saw the Greens step 
aside to help Labour, as (successfully) in Bristol 
North West, key being an MP’s support for a sec-
ond-referendum on the EU exit deal and for PR. 
Electoral risks prevented the Liberal Democrat 
and Labour leaderships from officially support-
ing alliances. The Lib Dems worried after their 
collapse following coalition with the Conserva-
tives, and Labour wary after Cameron’s insinuation 
of an SNP / Labour coalition played badly for Ed 
Miliband. Whether the Greens will go into the 
next election pursuing the same high-minded 
long-game strategy (of holding the Lib Dems to 
an anti-Tory position and softening Labour up to 
support proportional representation) given what 
were only partially reciprocated collaborations, 
remains to be seen. Lucas, in an interview on 
Radio 4 on 9th June sounded a little despondent 
as she said the Greens had been “squeezed” in the 
election and it was difficult to get their voice heard. 
Nevertheless, whilst there are many elements 
to which we might ascribe the 2017 Labour 
surge, the Green drive for progressive alliance 
was undoubtedly one. We saw this in Brighton 
Kemp Town, Bristol North West, Bury North and 
Derby North swings to Labour, where the Greens 
stood down and the Lib Dems agreed to reduce 
campaigning. A less piecemeal alliance could help 
prevent the Tory / DUP arrangement next time. 
Had the Liberal Democrats joined the Greens 
in not fielding a candidate against Amber Rudd, 
Labour would likely have gained her seat. 
The youth, whom this election has newly 
energised, are green-inclined. Fox hunting, 
although it received almost no mainstream media 
traction, was a big issue on Facebook this election. 
Youth are also talking about PR and don’t view 
first-past-the-post as fair (Channel 4 News, 9th 
June). Green Party strategy would do well to 
engage vigorously and build support for PR in 
grassroots conversations, online and offline. And, 
given that we are living in an era of hung parlia-
ments, Labour would do well to listen. 
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I’ve been researching the relationship between 
gender, politics and media for 20+ years but 
GE2017 provided me with my first opportunity 
to consider a British general election campaign 
which had a woman in the top job.  Would 
designer style and décolleté feature as strongly as 
‘Brexit-means-Brexit’ and border closures?  As 
it turned out, campaign coverage in relation to 
gender was rather more complex and mostly, 
journalists were not overtly sexist in terms of their 
coverage but more subtle strategies of undermin-
ing and trivialising women as political actors were 
still in evidence. The precedent set in GE2015 for 
set-piece leaders’ debates to include the leaders of 
the smaller parties was carried over to this election 
so that Caroline Lucas, Nicola Sturgeon and 
Leanne Wood all had premium airtime and the 
media’s verdict on their performances was reasona-
bly even-handed. 
For Wood, the behaviour of two male 
panellists towards her - David Davies (Question 
Time, 4 May) and Paul Nuttall (Leaders’ Debate, 
18 May) - provided two explicit and very public 
examples of sexism. In the case of Davies who was 
manspreading into her space in a faux avuncular 
fashion, Wood was soon trending on Twitter with 
her “I won’t be intimidated by anyone” tweet after 
the show ended. In the Leaders’ Debate, Nuttall 
repeatedly addressed her as ‘Natalie’ which she 
corrected him each time but his apparent failure 
to hear her and thus repeated misnaming was 
parodied as his inability to distinguish one woman 
from another. Both these examples were political 
own-goals on the part of the perpetrators and the 
speed with which both incidents went viral on 
Twitter meant that mainstream media were forced 
to pay attention and cover the stories, boosting 
Wood’s visibility and calling out sexism.  
Theresa May, on the other hand, went on 
the gender offensive from even before the get-go, 
saying in an interview with the BBC (2 May) that 
she intended to be a “bloody difficult woman” 
during the Brexit negotiations.  When asked 
about her remark, Jean Claude Juncker’s chief of 
staff Martin Selmayr said adroitly that his boss 
believed her to be an “impressive woman and a 
very impressive negotiator.” Difficult or impressive, 
or impressively difficult, readers with a political 
memory which extends as far back as last year 
will recognise May’s appropriation of this phrase, 
originally uttered about her by Ken Clarke in an 
unguarded moment and subsequently broadcast by 
Sky and #bloodydifficultwoman was soon trending 
on Twitter. Unfortunately, May was unable to make 
much capital out of this initial ploy because her 
media (non)strategy was significantly criticised by 
parts of the media, reinforced by the Twitterati and 
condemned by the public through various talkback 
shows. Slogan politics can only ever work if the 
slogans are matched by action and in May’s case, 
‘bloodydifficultwoman’ and ‘strongandstable’ were 
undermined by her refusal to participate in any 
of the televised leaders’ debates, her withdrawal 
from Woman’s Hour and her appearance on the 
One Show (9 May) with husband Philip where she 
insisted that there were ‘girls’ jobs and ‘boys’ jobs 
in the May household. 
It is absolutely the case that women politi-
cians, including Prime Ministers, provoke a media 
attention which is different to their male counter-
parts and this propensity, coupled with the slide to 
infotainment resulted in women on both sides of 
the political divide being particularly vulnerable to 
gleeful accounts of ‘car crash’ interviews, from May 
herself, to Justine Greening to Diane Abbott. While 
the reporting of these women’s failures, mostly for 
not knowing how the numbers stack up, was not 
overtly sexist, the ‘car crash’ designation was used 
almost exclusively about women, slyly implying 
a biological predisposition for incompetence, the 
male exception being Jeremy Corbyn. 
However, as Theresa May retreated from the 
media gaze apart from some tightly managed 
spots, Emily Thornberry (Shadow Foreign 
Secretary) took every opportunity to provide 
commentary on defence, Trident and numerous 
other topics, articulate and confident. Michael 
Fallon was expertly ambushed by Thornberry on 
the Andrew Marr show (14 May), showing that 
the skills she had honed as a barrister were being 
gainfully and effectively employed in her political 
life.  Aside from the accident-prone Abbott, 
Thornberry was one of a handful of MPs, both 
women and men, who managed to rescue the 
news-consuming public from the univocal horse-
race focus on the May/Corbyn dyad in #elec-
tionsoboring, particularly in the final days of the 
campaign, playing the engaging ‘straight woman’ 
to Nuttall’s less intelligible madman. Although her 
appearances were not that frequent and the Fallon 
encounter saw her castigated by some parts of the 
pious press for uttering ‘bollocks’, albeit uttered 
sotto voce, they were passionate and memorable, 
reinforcing the point that not all publicity is good 
but good publicity is gold. Her final election 
hurrah saw her back-footing David Dimbleby 
as the results came in, challenging him to be 
even-handed: she was comfortably returned but 
May’s future is a little less certain.
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Dogwhistle sexism
It began with politics as usual; another masculin-
ised election campaign.  The election was called 
and initially framed as focused around Brexit. 
May promised ‘strong and stable’ leadership, 
and claimed the term ‘bloody difficult woman’ 
(which had originally been intended as an insult) 
as a marker of her strength. She could do the 
job as well as any man was the implied message. 
Newspaper headlines picked up extensively on her 
‘war on Brussels’ soundbite.  Militaristic language 
is long recognised as a masculinised way in which 
political authority can be asserted. 
As we moved closer to the election the war 
metaphors proved prophetic; events in the last 
two weeks of the campaign overtook: three terror 
attacks made headline news. While May responded 
by asserting her militaristic and masculine 
strength, Corbyn’s response was one which was 
more nuanced. But his argument that we need 
to look to our own foreign policy was lambasted 
across many media outlets.  While a YouGov poll 
showed that 53% of the population agreed with 
the claim that the wars fought and conducted by 
the UK are in part responsible for terror attacks 
against the UK and only 24% disagreed that we 
have played a role, still The Sun duly castigated 
Corbyn as a terrorist sympathiser (with headlines 
such as “Jezza’s Jihadi Comrades” on the day before 
the election).
We saw Corbyn ‘emasculated’ and character-
ised as weak, whereas May was masculinized and 
presented as strong, militaristic, ready to fight – by 
whatever means necessary – the war on terror. We 
saw Corbyn seek to elevate the discussion: asking 
us to think and talk about the causes of the terror 
attacks means we can also have conversations 
about those who are impacted (and here, while 
soldiers die in warfare, we know that women also 
bear significant costs – which again are less likely 
to feature in war coverage).  We know that wars 
are ways in which leaders win elections, Thatcher 
and the Falklands for example, we also know that 
media discourses focus on the what has happened 
rather than the why it has happened. And in this 
cumulative closure of wider debate about our own 
complicity in the contemporary climate, we saw a 
reassertion of the ideal way to ‘do’ politics: strong 
and single minded rather than nuanced and reflec-
tive; militaristic rather than considered or peaceful. 
This election also saw women representing an 
average of 30% of those candidates standing. An 
analysis of women, gender of their relationship 
with politics often focuses around the numbers of 
women who are MPs, and/ or the way we talk about 
women (so why focus on Theresa May’s leather 
trousers, and yet not the trousers that her male 
counterparts wear?).  What a gendered analysis 
also enables us to reflect on is not just the critical 
mass of women within the Parliamentary system, or 
the ways that they are depicted in media coverage, 
but it also allows us to consider the ways in which 
discourses of politics themselves are conducted. 
Despite the increasing numbers of women standing 
for office this time, throughout the campaign, 
we still saw the activities of politics discussed in 
militaristic, individualistic, masculine ways: the way 
we do politics is through war, and a readiness to 
do whatever it takes to win that war. This assump-
tion that war and those able to conduct war are 
the best way for us to ‘do’ politics, means that we 
still discursively construct politics in masculinized 
ways. This ‘below the radar’ dogwhistle sexism, thus 
becomes an inherent feature of election campaigns 
and political discourse.  But in recognising this, we 
do also see that there is the possibility to conduct 
and talk about our politics differently, and more 
peacefully. And while post-election analysis focused 
attention on Brexit ‘regret’ as a way to explain the 
outcome, perhaps what we also witness from the 
electorate is a desire for a different, more consid-
ered, less masculinised politics. 
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The Women’s Equality Party and the 2017 
General Election 
The Women’s Equality Party (WEP) started with 
a (seemingly) throw-away comment made at the 
Women of the World Festival in March 2015, 
from British author and journalist Catherine 
Mayer. Frustrated by a panel discussion on 
women in politics, Mayer intervened from the 
audience: “Let’s form a women’s party and see what 
happens. I’ll be in the bar afterwards if anyone 
wants to discuss it.” By the end of the festival, 
Mayer acquired a party co-founder in comedian 
and presenter Sandi Toksvig. WEP was officially 
registered with the Electoral Commission in July 
2015, and, in the same month, Sophie Walker was 
announced as the party’s new leader. Just two years 
later, the party has acquired more than 65,000 
members and supporters, with over 50 branches 
across the nations of the UK, and fielded candi-
dates for the first time in 2016 in the devolved and 
London mayoral elections. 
Unsurprisingly, for a new party, organising 
for a snap election was a challenge. WEP decided 
it was unlikely to field a full slate of candidates. 
Instead, it worked closely with local branches, 
evaluating whether or not to stand a candidate 
on a constituency by constituency basis, with the 
ultimate decision was taken centrally. The party 
targeted seven seats, but did not concentrate their 
efforts on particular regions or parties.
The party fielded an all-women list of parlia-
mentary candidates including two BAME women. 
In all other constituencies, WEP claimed that 
they were looking to ‘forge alliances’ with other 
parties who shared their values. WEP came to an 
agreement with the Green Party: in exchange for 
the latter standing aside in Shipley, where party 
leader Sophie Walker was challenging Conserva-
tive MP Philip Davies, WEP agreed not to stand 
in five key seats being contested by Green women 
(Brighton Pavilion, Bristol West, Bath, Isle of 
Wight and Sheffield Central). 
WEP’s presence in two of these races proved 
controversial. In Shipley, a safe Conservative seat 
held by high-profile anti-feminist Philip Davies, 
the party attracted criticism for potential vote 
splitting and for its failure to engage with local 
feminists, the Shipley Feminist Zealots (so named 
after Davies described feminists as “zealots who 
want to have their cake and eat it”). The second 
controversial contest was Hornsey and Wood 
Green, held by Labour MP Catherine West. Walker 
had previously declared that the party would stand 
candidates against female candidates who failed 
to demonstrate support for its goals; yet their 
decision to stand against Catherine West appeared 
to be motivated more out of a desire to stand in 
a seat where they had a large concentration of 
members rather than because of West’s record. The 
party fielded Nimco Ali, a high profile anti-FGM 
campaigner, who had to repeatedly justify 
her candidacy, arguing that she was ‘standing 
for equality’, rather than against a particular 
candidacy. The day before the election, the party 
called the police to investigate a series of threats 
targeted at Ali. 
The party provided a costed manifesto which, 
in addition to building upon its seven core policy 
issues (equality in healthcare, representation, pay, 
parenting, education, media treatment and an 
end to violence against women), also detailed the 
party’s vision for a caring economy, Brexit and im-
migration. The party also filmed themselves hand 
delivering their manifesto to the other parties, 
promoting this with the hashtag #nickablepolicies, 
to encourage other parties to adopt their policies. 
Staff members at all the parties accepted a copy 
apart from Labour, which WEP said refused.
This was a snap election, making it difficult to 
reach sweeping conclusions about WEP’s perfor-
mance. However, the party has struggled to make 
an electoral impact, losing all seven of its deposits. 
And while WEP has high profile members and 
significant media savvy, its policy positions failed 
to cut through the election headlines – particularly 
in a context where all of the main British parties 
have responded to demands for women’s individual 
and collective representation. The UK’s first-past-
the-post electoral system, as well as the seeming 
return to two-party politics in the 2017 GE, 
present significant obstacles for the party. But the 
campaign will have galvanised WEP’s supporters, 
and afforded campaign experience for WEP party 
members and activists. Moreover, the political un-
certainty resulting from the 2017 GE, particularly 
over Brexit negotiations, may create further spaces 
for the Women’s Equality Party to engage with the 
electoral process and get women’s issues on the 
political agenda.
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Table 1: constituencies contested by WEP
Constituency Region Incumbent (sex) Share of the vote
Hornsey and Wood Green London Labour (female) 0.9%
Manchester Withington Manchester Labour (male) 0.4%
Shipley Yorks & Humber Conservative (male) 1.9%
Stirling Scotland SNP (male) 0.7%
Tunbridge Wells South East Conservative (male) 1.3%
Vale of Glamorgan Wales Conservative (male) 0.3%
Vauxhall London Labour (female) 1.0%
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The resurrection of ethical foreign policy
With the fallout from the Iraq war and conflicts in 
Libya and Syria, ethical foreign policy in Britain can 
be argued to have gone out of style. Theresa May 
made this clear in January 2017 when she stated 
that “The days of Britain and America intervening 
in sovereign countries in an attempt to remake 
the world in our own image are over”. Her speech 
suggested that the active protection of human rights 
globally by the UK, whether in terms of justification 
for action or realistic aim, no longer carries such 
weight in Downing Street, and many may well be 
pleased to hear such a promise. However, foreign 
policy, like all policy areas, is complicated and 
slogans and soundbites rarely explain its complex-
ities. While the conflicts in Iraq, Libya and Syria 
have undoubtedly been problematic, the down-
grading of human rights as an issue seems equally 
problematic, if not disastrous for all involved.
To be fair to the Blair government, an 
ethical foreign policy was never proposed by 
them. Robin Cook, in his infamous speech in 
1997 called for ‘an ethical dimension’ to foreign 
policy. This ambiguous statement raised as many 
questions as it answered, largely because there 
was no discussion in the speech about where in 
the political hierarchy of priorities human rights 
fit. Since 1997, human rights have been used as 
a justification, and an excuse, for military action 
in numerous nations, not always with positive 
results. May’s speech indicated an end to such jus-
tifications. This is not surprising when consider-
ing the impact of Brexit on foreign affairs. In the 
light of Britain’s exit from the EU, the government 
will need to build strong business relationships 
with some global nations with less than glowing 
human rights records. Some of these nations, 
including Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, are already 
important arms customers. It therefore comes as 
no surprise that May would seek to ease minds 
on the importance of human rights to Britain, 
although it could easily be argued that Britain’s 
preoccupation with human rights has rarely led to 
a restriction in arms sales to repressive nations.
While foreign policy seemed to be largely 
overlooked in the 2017 election campaign, the 
Labour party sought to change that, by focusing 
their attention again on ethical foreign policy. 
While Emily Thornberry made little headway, the 
Manchester bomb changed the political environ-
ment. Corbyn’s speech on foreign policy, delivered 
just days after the bombing, questioned the impact 
of British overseas military action on domestic 
security. Putting his timing to one side, the speech 
caused consternation in some quarters, with Ben 
Wallace, former Security Minister, describing the 
speech as ‘crass’ and ‘appalling’. Corbyn’s allies 
argued that the speech was attempting to consider 
foreign policy in a more nuanced way, moving 
away from the flag-waving, jingoistic message 
which is often repeated by politicians. Instead, 
Corbyn argued that the actions of the British 
government overseas had allowed terrorist cells to 
paint Britain, and the west, as aggressors, acting as 
a form of recruitment for these terrorist organisa-
tions. Considering the linkages of the Manchester 
bomber with Libya, it seems likely that Corbyn 
may have been raising a valid point, certainly 
worthy of consideration, but was this General 
Election campaign the time to raise it?
The Blair and Cameron approach to military 
action was certainly not identical, but there were 
some similarities in their justification for military 
action, with some notable exceptions. While 
human rights was often mentioned, security 
concerns tended to be the issue on which both 
Blair and Cameron hung much of their military 
action. Be it the supposed threat from Iraq and the 
45 minute claim or Cameron’s concerns over mass 
migration from Libya and Syria into mainland 
Europe, the threat to the UK is often identified as 
being a compelling factor for British action. May 
has argued that human rights concerns cannot be 
a factor for military action, but will the accompa-
nying security concerns? For Corbyn the picture 
is even less clear. Like Cook, Corbyn is offering 
no detail on how he would balance human rights 
violations with domestic security, and it is clear 
why. Such a sliding scale is hard to explain under 
normal circumstances. It is near impossible in the 
aftermath of a terrorist attack, as Corbyn attempted 
to do. Inevitably he has been portrayed by some 
as an enemy of the British state, tying into the 
existing concerns over his links to the IRA and 
Hamas. May has wrapped herself in the Union 
Jack, suggesting that Britain will no longer place 
itself at risk by protecting abstract concepts such 
as human rights. For the British public, making a 
decision on foreign policy is not easy, with neither 
party being able to suggest a realistic plan to end 
terrorism in Britain. 
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Why immigration faded from view in election 2017
Immigration had been the number one issue of 
public concern before the start of the General 
Election campaign. Traditionally, this has benefited 
the Tories over Labour and the other parties. 
Several difficulties came up during the campaign 
that undermined support for the Tories and 
rendered immigration not only less of an issue, but 
weakened the Conservative Party’s grip on it.
First, the Tories offered surprisingly little on 
how they would change immigration policies – 
and their message became increasingly confused. 
Their election manifesto committed them to the 
same net migration target of 100,000 and by the 
same means – placing their hopes that leaving the 
EU would make it possible to meet their target. 
The message was confusing. On the one hand, a 
net migration target would be in place, but on the 
other admittedly not met until long after Brexit 
talks concluded likely into next Parliament. At a 
time where voters have little trust in their politi-
cians to deliver on immigration reform, this was 
an admission of kicking a major issue into the 
long grass.
Second, what was new on immigration was 
feeble. Parliament passed the Immigration Act 
2016 launching a new surcharge on employers 
hiring non-EU labour. This was meant to raise 
money to fund apprenticeships and provide a 
disincentive on hiring from abroad. There is no 
evidence yet that numbers are down or new jobs 
created as the new fee now comes online, but yet 
the Tory manifesto pledged to double it – raising 
questions about what, if any, evidence was used to 
change a policy only just passed. More importantly, 
to say employers will have a new fee as the new 
means to cut net migration by over 100,000 didn’t 
get far on the doorstep.
Thirdly, the Tories are more vulnerable on 
immigration now that they have a record. It was 
easy to attack Labour’s policies using the latest 
migration statistics, but now they are proving 
very damaging to the Conservatives. While public 
opinion is still critical of Labour, it is now fact 
that the UK’s net migration has never been higher 
than under Tory-led governments breaching over 
300,000 per year. Perhaps the public could forgive 
the Tories and blame Labour for the first year 
or two of results, but nearly a decade of broken 
promises can only get Conservatives so far. 
Fourthly, the Tories had mixed success on key 
immigration statistics during the campaign. They 
finally hit the headlines with achieving the first 
drops on their watch for two successive periods. 
This might normally be seen as a real boost. But 
the data behind the new figures showed they were 
driven by more EU nationals leaving what was 
perceived as an increasingly hostile environment 
– and the gains could be almost fully accounted 
for by the numbers of British nationals choosing 
to leave or not come back over the past 12 months. 
This highlights a long-term concern that raising 
immigration hurdles can actually be a disincentive 
to British nationals staying and raising families, 
especially when married to non-UK nationals.
Fifthly, the big issues were neither immi-
gration nor Brexit. A US Presidential-styled race 
around Theresa May as “strong and stable” hit 
the rocks almost immediately with a U-turn over 
what became known as the dementia tax. This 
wavering in the face of intense pressure only four 
days after the Tory manifesto was published did 
serious damage to claims of being strong and stable 
for obvious reasons – and May never seemed to 
recover. It turned attention largely to the NHS and 
social care which generally favour Labour.
Finally, the Labour Party greatly improved their 
policies around immigration for their manifesto. 
While 2015 was characterised by mugs claiming 
“controls on immigration” later etched into the 
so-called Ed Stone (now reduced to rubble figu-
ratively and literally), Labour developed a more 
detailed programme in line with their progressive 
commitments. It opposed use of arbitrary targets, 
favoured focusing on impact not net migration, 
defended a crackdown on exploitation of workers, 
called for reintroducing the migration impacts fund 
and a national review into immigration laws to build 
a system more fit for purpose than the largely ad hoc 
creature we see now. While Labour’s new immigra-
tion policies were never going to win an election 
by themselves, they were more popular and helped 
make the issue less of an electoral liability.
Together, these six reasons help explain why 
immigration was not the major issue by the end of 
the campaign that it was at the beginning, why the 
issue did not benefit the Tories in any case and why 
Labour was able to confound most predictions. It’s 
a cocktail few saw coming, but unlikely to change if 
another General Election is called in the next year 
or less.
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Invisible enemies, wars without winners: when 
‘khaki elections’ fail
Troops on the streets, covert Cobra briefings, terror 
threat raised to ‘critical’. Semantic salami-slicing 
by security top brass about whether code red 
means another terrorist attack ‘is’ or merely ‘may 
be’ imminent. Baleful words of defiance from the 
Downing Street podium about the need to defend 
‘our values, our country and our way of life’. 
Two weeks before polling day, Theresa May 
and Amber Rudd’s politically calculated reply to 
the carnage in Manchester arguably bore all the 
symbolism of what Policing the Crisis memorably 
dubbed ‘law and order panic’. From its ‘enemy 
within’ rhetoric to its authoritarian actions, the 
Government’s default battle-lines starkly echoed 
the apocalyptic responses from politicians, judges 
and law-enforcers that pepper Stuart Hall et al’s 
atomization of an earlier ‘crisis’ of values, country 
and way of life – one played out through a distinct-
ly 1970s cocktail of street crime, strikes, protests 
and (periodic) IRA bombs. 
 Of course, there is much that is different 
about the nature of today’s marauding ‘folk devils’ 
– not least that, compared to the largely specious 
threat posed by the central bogeymen of Policing 
the Crisis (black ‘muggers’), our latest enemy 
within, ‘radical Islamist terrorism’, is real (if also 
simplistically racialized and, at times, exaggerated). 
The more ‘militarized’ nature of the present threat 
also allows the state and its agencies to conflate 
law and order and defence under an overarch-
ing umbrella of ‘security’ - both in framing the 
problem and prescribing policy solutions. Faced 
with a back-pedalling pacifist as her principal rival 
- one repeatedly (if disingenuously) accused of 
opposing ‘shoot-to-kill’ policing on Britain’s streets 
– by the time terrorists struck again, less than 
two weeks after the Manchester attack, Downing 
Street’s ‘strong and stable’ incumbent should have 
made light weight of mobilizing a wave of public 
scepticism about Jeremy Corbyn’s principled, but 
presentationally opaque, nuances. Indeed, in her 
fleet-footed move to take ownership of the earlier 
terror threat upgrade – appropriating the right to 
announce it from the independent Joint Terrorism 
Analysis Centre (JTAC) – May had shown every 
sign of following the Crosby crib-sheet to the 
letter. Similarly, her swift deployment of battle-clad 
troops onto Britain’s streets symbolized a readiness 
to revive the ‘war on terror’  discourse long since 
publicly abandoned by UK ministers, with the 
armoured trappings of a state of emergency.
But, for all the ‘strong and stable’ imagery, 
Churchillian grand-standing and warnings of 
dire peril if ‘terrorist sympathizer’ Corbyn were 
elected, this was never going to be a clear-cut 
khaki election. For one thing, the rhetorical 
devices used to construct one were barely fit for 
purpose. With the image of May’s ‘snap election’ 
statement still fresh in voters’ minds, and amid 
criticism of her reluctance to meet ordinary 
people or debate her fellow leaders, her Number 
10 podium now looked to be more protective 
barricade than public-facing platform. Even the 
mediatized ‘spectacle’ of her dispatches from 
Cobra seemed more transparently stage-man-
aged than usual – with wider than usual tabloid 
exposure of the acronym’s meaning, ‘Cabinet 
Office Briefing Room A’, betraying a level of 
bureaucratic banality more redolent of Yes, Prime 
Minister than Graham Greene or Ian Fleming.
More importantly, what marked out the 
historical Tory khaki triumphs of 1900 and 1983 
and the more pyrrhic 1918 win for Lloyd George’s 
controversial coalition was that each played out 
against recognizable iterations of conventional 
warfare: with, in turn, fixed bayonets, trench 
warriors and seaborne taskforces vividly mobilized 
against ominous, all-too-visible enemies. By 
contrast, war against Daesh and its adherents – 
invariably home-grown guerrillas capable of living 
(and plotting) undetected among us – is a wholly 
different proposition. Quite apart from the now 
widely recognized absurdity of waging war on 
an abstraction  – ‘terror’ – what can victory ever 
hope to look like against a phantom enemy? And 
it is victory, above all else – dressed up as military 
conquest or the mere restoration of law and 
order – on which success in elections fought on 
securitized agendas depends.
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Cybersecurity and surveillance circumvention 
are not famed as classic election campaign issues. 
Yet both figured prominently at different times 
throughout the 2017 UK General Election, 
triggered by three devastating attacks during the 
campaign: the WannaCry ransomware attack that 
ground the NHS to a halt in early May; the Man-
chester Arena bombing on 22nd May that killed 23 
and injured 119 people; and the London terrorist 
attack 3rd June that left 8 dead and 48 wounded. 
The WannaCry ransomware attack affected 
computers worldwide (including several transnation-
al companies), propagated through a vulnerability 
in computers running older versions of Windows. It 
reportedly affected around 45 NHS organisations across 
the UK with thousands of computers locked down, 
rendering patient records, appointment schedules and 
internal phone lines inaccessible. While the NHS was 
keen to stress that no patient data had been compro-
mised, blame was quickly attributed to Government 
underspending on NHS IT infrastructure.
The Guardian reported back in May 2015 that 
the Government refused to renew a £5.5M million 
deal with Microsoft to extend support for end-of-
life software. The NHS was singled out as one of 
several public bodies perceived as “exploitable by 
relatively low-skilled attackers”. Much maligned 
Jeremy Hunt was attacked again in May 2017, 
accused of ignoring “‘extensive warning signs’ that 
could have prevented an unprecedented global cy-
ber-attack which has plunged the NHS into chaos”. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Manches-
ter Arena attack, the Conservative Government 
briefed reporters that they intended to enact parts 
of the Investigative Powers Act called Technical 
Capability Orders that would require technology 
and communications companies to break their 
own security and encryption to facilitate access for 
security services. According to anonymous ‘senior 
ministers’, “The social media companies have 
been laughing in our faces for too long” – with 
WhatsApp and Telegram messenger apps often 
singled out as having been used by terrorists.
May reignited the same calls for crackdown on 
encryption following the London Bridge attack. In 
what was widely perceived as a politicised intervention, 
she called for international collaboration to “regulate 
cyberspace” and argued that “We need to deprive the 
extremists of safe spaces online”. This seemed to revive 
former PM David Cameron’s plans from 2015 to ban 
end-to-end encryption, which was widely derided by 
industry experts and even opposed by Conservative 
stalwarts like Brexit Minister David Davis (who success-
fully challenged the Conservative Government on this 
issue in none other than the European Court of Justice). 
May’s calls for stronger surveillance capabilities also 
triggered detailed scrutiny of the Conservative record – 
and Theresa May’s six year tenure as Home Secretary in 
particular - on national security and cuts to policing.
May’s comments on encryption were entirely 
consistent with her previous record on internet regu-
lation. The 2017 Conservative manifesto echoed this 
tough stance, proclaiming that “we do not believe that 
there should be a safe space for terrorists to be able to 
communicate online and will work to prevent them 
from having this capability” (p. 79). It is important to 
remember that these manifesto promises come in the 
context of the recently passed Investigative Powers 
Act, which “allows for some of the most extensive and 
intrusive surveillance practices in the world”. And 
that this is broadly speaking a Conservative crusade.
Whilst Labour promised to “provide our 
security agencies with the resources and the 
powers they need to protect our country”, they also 
took care to balance this against ensuring “such 
powers do not weaken our individual rights or 
civil liberties” and to “reintroduce effective judicial 
oversight over how and when they are used, when 
the circumstances demand that our collective 
security outweighs an individual freedom” (p. 77). 
The Liberal Democrats were even more explicit 
in their opposition, by promising to “Roll back 
state surveillance powers by ending the indiscrim-
inate bulk collection of communications data, bulk 
hacking, and the collection of internet connection 
records.” (p. 76), alongside other commitments to 
control and regulate surveillance. It was also the only 
manifesto to overtly pledge to “Oppose Conservative 
attempts to undermine encryption”. 
The Green Party simply called for the internet to 
“be free of state and corporate surveillance, with our 
rights and freedoms protected.” (p. 21). The Conserv-
ative party’s new bedfellows, the DUP, promised in 
their manifesto merely to “support the expansion of 
cybersecurity research in Northern Ireland” (p. 17). 
The most detailed anti-surveillance manifesto pledges 
were from the small Pirate Party (it received only 
2,321 votes in total), while others – including SNP, 
UKIP, Sinn Féin, or Plaid Cymru – failed to make any 
specific mention of cybersecurity, internet regulation 
or surveillance in their manifestoes. 
The lack of detailed policies or manifesto pledges in 
this area should be of considerable concern. Opponents 
as diverse as Brexit Minister David Davies and BoingBo-
ing’s Cory Doctorow, highlight that the entire premise for 
all of our everyday digital interactions (from banking to 
the health sector) is predicated on the ability to commu-
nicate securely. However well intended, any backdoor 
into such processes will paradoxically undermine not 
only the ability of your adversary to communicate 
securely, but also enable them to strategically target 
weaknesses in our own communicative systems. Case in 
point: the WannaCry ransomware that nearly brought 
the NHS to a halt at the start of the election campaign, 
was spreading via a Windows exploit stolen from the 
NSA. That is, the NSA identified the vulnerability 
and used it to create a backdoor for its own offensive 
surveillance work rather than reporting it to Microsoft 
to be patched  – exposing weaknesses in the very same 
principles and methods advocated by Theresa May.
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Corbyn, Labour, digital media, and the 2017 
UK election
The 2017 election result was truly extraordinary 
in many respects but here I want to discuss what it 
reveals about the role of digital media in reshaping 
the Labour party.
The deep question here is to what extent 
Labour’s surge during the campaign — and remember 
it was really only during the final two weeks of the 
campaign that the surge became evident — can be 
explained by broader, below-the-radar systemic shifts 
in political engagement in UK party politics and how 
elections are being reshaped by ongoing changes in 
our media system.
Central to this are new forms of engagement 
through digital media and how they jell with the 
evolving ground war on the doorstep and online, 
as well as longer-term cultural shifts in how people 
experience politics. As Jenny Stromer-Galley and 
I argued in the introduction to a special issue 
on digital media, power, and democracy in parties 
and election campaigns the growth of digital media 
in citizens’ political repertoires has affinities with 
a broader shift toward youth engagement and a 
general skepticism toward authority. There is now a 
willingness among many individuals to see elections 
and party participation as fair game for social 
media-fuelled contentious politics of the kind that 
has been so important for non-party protests and 
mobilizations over the last decade. This is happening 
among those significant sections of the public who 
have started to channel their social media-ena-
bled activism into party politics and to integrate it 
with face-to-face doorstep campaigning under the 
guidance of the new Labour party leadership and 
Corbyn’s ancillary movement Momentum.
We saw similar forces at work with Bernie 
Sanders’ campaign in last year’s U.S. presidential 
election. We saw it with Italy’s M5S and Spain’s 
Podemos. Key here is the process of organizational 
and generational cultural change and how it fits 
with changes in how digital media are now used in 
political activity.
When Labour lost the 2010 election, and even 
as Corbyn continued to attract a huge influx of new 
members for his party during 2015 and 2016, much 
commentary revolved around the “death” of social 
democracy and even of the party form itself. But 
what June 9 suggests is that, for Labour and its half 
a million-plus members, the party organizational 
form is alive and kicking.
Rather than dissolving, Labour looks like it is 
going through a long-term process of adaptation 
to postmaterial political culture and is leading the 
way in new organizational strategies that combine 
online and offline citizen activism. Skepticism about 
Labour’s new members, suggesting that they are not 
prepared to help out on the doorstep and are merely 
“clicktivists” who do not see the value of old-style 
campaigning now seems wide of the mark.
This is a complex process. Interactions between 
the organizations, norms, and rules of electoral 
politics, the new, flexible, ad hoc, connective styles 
of political engagement, specific issues, and the 
affordances and uses of digital media will make the 
difference. National, regional, and local contexts will 
also shape overall outcomes.
Digital media and the party-as-movement mentality
But still, digital media foster cultures of organiza-
tional experimentation and a party-as-movement 
mentality that enable many individuals to reject 
norms of hierarchical discipline and habitual partisan 
loyalty. Substantial numbers of the politically active 
now see election campaigns as another opportunity 
for personalized, contentious political expression and 
for spreading the word in their online and face to face 
networks. As a result, Labour is being renewed from 
the outside in, as digitally enabled citizens, many 
(though not all) of them young people, have breathed 
new life into an old form by partly remaking it in 
their own participatory image. The overall outcome 
might prove more positive for democratic engage-
ment and the decentralization of political power than 
many have assumed.
So far, this shift has not touched the Con-
servatives. They remain a declining party, with a 
shrinking membership of fewer than 150,000, stuck 
in the elite-driven, broadcast-era mode that they 
(and Labour) perfected a generation ago, bolting on 
digital media targeting without the engagement.
Turnout among young voters rose significantly 
during this election. A reported 63 percent of 18–34 
year olds voted Labour. The campaign saw a massive 
voter registration drive led by Labour, Liberal 
Democrats, and Greens, but missed in the coverage 
is that the parties were also joined by online 
movement 38 Degrees who ran their own crowd-
funded registration campaign including targeted 
Facebook advertising that generated four million 
“register to vote” ad viewings. It looks like it worked.
At the same time, it pays to remember that 
these extraordinary changes are also accompanied 
by persistent, long-term trends in our media system. 
The election day front pages of the Sun, the Star, 
the Mail and the Express were outrageous even by 
the usual standard of these outlets.
The Conservatives achieved more than 42 
percent of the popular vote and will be forming 
a government, albeit a weak one. Labour surged, 
against all the odds, but it seems difficult to suggest 
that the incessant campaign against Corbyn in the 
British press did not make a difference to the overall 
outcome of the campaign.
How long the Conservative minority Gov-
ernment will last is anyone’s guess. But there are 
deeper changes underway on the British left. 
Digital media logics, in complex interactions with 
older media logics, older organizational forms, and 
evolving patterns of participation are playing a role 
in these changes.
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The 2017 UK General Election has shown that 
social media are the real battleground, and this 
plays by rules typically found in Adland.
Facebook is where the action has been. Using 
technologies built with advertising and commerce 
in mind, political parties have targeted voters on 
the basis of age, gender and postcode. Regional 
targeting allows hyper-local messaging of a 
kilometre wide, allowing campaigners to pitch 
policies to resonate with hyper-local interests. 
Furthermore, Facebook allows parties to segment 
by our ‘likes’ and online engagement, what we 
say and what photos we post. This grants richer 
insight into life-stage, employment and views 
about issues. It also allows for automated psycho-
logical profiling at scale – in particular, targeting 
people’s emotional triggers. 
While analysis of the emotional valence of 
the UK 2017 General Election has yet to materi-
alise, the 2016 EU referendum provides insights 
into emotional profiling and targeting of voters. 
Dominic Cummings (campaign strategist for ‘Vote 
Leave’) documents the potency of Leave’s message 
on ‘Turkey [i.e. immigration]/NHS/£350 million’. 
While dedicated voters are unlikely to change their 
views on the basis of ads, others can be persuaded 
by data scientists and their behavioural insights. 
Indeed, it only takes a small number of ‘per-
suadables’ to swing a close election: according to 
Cummings, Brexit came down to ‘about 600,000 
people – just over 1% of registered voters’. 
Cummings also explains that, given Vote 
Leave’s many campaigning disadvantages 
(including inability to control the referendum’s 
timing, the fact that Vote Leave bucked both the 
government’s wish and the status quo, and that 
British broadcasters were pro-‘Remain’), Vote 
Leave relied on data scientists. Vote Leave spent 
98% of its budget on digital (rather than main-
stream media) advertising, with most spent on ads 
that experiments had demonstrated were effective, 
these positioned at the campaign’s end as ‘adverts 
are more effective the closer to the decision 
moment they hit the brain’. 
Debate about the role of hyper-targeting, 
analytics and what is essentially information 
warfare was intensified when the alleged role of 
Cambridge Analytica in 2016’s EU referendum 
and US presidential election campaigns was 
revealed. We should not depict this as a democrat-
ic collapse, not least because advertising technol-
ogies are not as effective as their sales teams tout. 
However, the prominence of analytics companies 
is cause for concern, especially regarding trans-
parency of their activities to the Electoral Com-
mission. The issue is this: technology platforms 
and companies are typically partisan, they have 
insight into what we think and feel, and this 
raises questions about scope for unhealthy and 
non-transparent influence.
Particularly revealing was a Sky News report 
on 16 May 2017 focusing on comments by Will 
Critchlow, chief executive of digital consultan-
cy Distilled. Concerned about the UK’s lack of 
oversight on digital campaigning (for instance, 
parties are not required to publically record all 
their spending on social media), Critchlow warned 
about Facebook’s hyper-targeted, hyper-local 
messages that, due to their nature, are invisible 
to most people (including journalists). Other 
techniques are: (a) creation of fake pages to attract 
opponents, using this to plant cookies in their 
browsers and then delivering attack adverts; (b) 
rankslurs – namely, creating damaging websites 
designed to appear in Google’s search rankings for 
your opponents; and (c) impersonation - namely 
pretending to be a candidate’s aide on Twitter, then 
expressing plausible but damaging opinions. 
Whether done by bots or human influencers, 
that people may be surreptitiously emotionally 
engaged in online debates is deeply worrying. 
There are precedents for such targeting of 
sentiment and feelings, not least the Facebook 
Mood study that revealed evidence of emotional 
contagion. This showed that exposure to a particu-
lar type of emotional content in users’ Facebook 
news feeds stimulates posting behaviour that 
reflects the emotional charge of that content. In 
other words, change the informational context and 
you can change behaviour. 
What political campaigners are doing is 
feeling-into online collectives, measuring individ-
ual and collective sentiment, and gauging ‘fel-
low-feeling’. The scope to employ what McStay calls 
‘empathic media’ to quantify emotional life means 
that big technology companies will only improve 
at profiling and quantifying our interests, fears, 
concerns and hopes. It further opens the door for 
automated targeting on an unseen scale, not least 
through algo-journalism and software capable 
of hyper-localised and increasingly realistic fake 
news. Indeed, analysis of Twitter in the 2017 UK 
General Election campaign shows that 16.5% of 
traffic about UK politics was generated by highly 
automated accounts. Furthermore, while profes-
sional news organisations accounted for 54% of the 
relevant content shared, fake news accounted for 
11% - a not insignificant figure.
Due to technology and wealthy political 
interests, election campaigning is no longer 
transparent. What is evident, however, is the rise 
of automated online political profiling, measuring 
emotions, stimulating behaviour, algo-content, 
involvement of technology giants and rich donors 
happy to subvert electoral processes. It is surely 
time to critically challenge profiling designed to 
invisibly push our emotional buttons. 
Was it ‘AI wot won it’? Hyper-targeting and 
profiling emotions online
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Sharing is caring: Labour supporters use of 
social media #GE2017
Social media has opened up a new tactical front for 
political campaigns, and the 2017 General Election 
showed how citizens – armed with smartphones, 
computers, and tablets – actively enlisted their 
support in the online electoral battleground. In 
this report, we look at how Labour supporters 
leveraged the platform-specific features of different 
social media to widely promote their favored 
candidate or cause. 
Despite all their glitzy features, social media 
are virtual spaces built from rather unglamor-
ous lines of code. These codes construct a social 
media’s digital architecture: the functions that 
govern what we can – and cannot – see and do 
through a social network. Every social media 
platform needs a distinctive architecture that is 
constantly updated to keep users engaged and 
drive advertising revenue. Almost by definition, 
the ‘social’ aspect of social media requires that 
each platform offer some way for its users to 
share information. Sharing is not only a defining 
characteristic of social media; it is also becoming 
an increasingly strategic campaign tactic for both 
political parties and citizens. 
Facebook, for example, has steadily decreased 
the direct visibility of posts from a public page 
(the type of account that political parties use) to 
encourage pages to pay-to-promote. With their 
so-called ‘organic’ reach limited by Facebook’s 
digital architecture, political parties can only reach 
a fraction of their followers on Facebook for free 
– less than 10%. However, by successfully encour-
aging supporters to use Facebook’s share feature,
campaigns can increase their reach by channeling
their message through citizens’ personal networks.
Critically, citizen sharing enables a campaign to
reach users who might not otherwise be exposed to
its political messages.
In this election, Labour appears to be the 
party who most skillfully mobilized an active 
base of citizen sharers, helping extend the party’s 
reach across the Facebook and Twitter spheres. On 
Facebook, Labour garnered over 1 million shares 
during the entire campaign – three times as many 
as the Conservatives. Granted, Labour also posted 
over three times as often (547 compared to 161 
posts). Although the Conservatives averaged more 
shares per post, the sheer amount of Labour’s shares 
– enabled by an active citizenry online – guaranteed
the party a ‘strong and stable’ presence on Facebook
and helped mitigate the risk of their message being
washed out by the Facebook algorithm.
Political accounts tend to have relatively small 
followerships; many citizens try to avoid politics 
on social media. (Run a search for tweets using the 
terms ‘Social Media’ and ‘Politics’ on Twitter, and 
you’ll find the large majority of results bemoaning 
the encroachment of political discourse on social 
networks). One should be careful in looking 
only to parties’ Facebook pages to find citizen 
campaigning.  The most shared political story 
about the election comes from an alternative 
media source – a blog called An Angry Voice. 
The post, “How many of Jeremy Corbyn’s policies 
do you actually disagree with?”, has been shared 
on Facebook over 100,000 times. This more than 
doubles Labour’s most shared post (48,730) and 
is slightly more than the Conservatives’ (92,773 - 
although it’s worth noting that this post, an attack 
ad against Jeremy Corbyn’s soft approach on terror, 
was a massive outlier). 
Sharing is also a key function for Twitter’s 
architecture, which supports messages travelling 
outside of a user’s network through hashtags. 
Throughout the campaign, retweets outnumbered 
tweets, with original messages representing only 
about one-quarter of the total GE2017 discussion. 
For campaigns, sharing by citizens may be even 
more necessary on Twitter, given its low level of 
algorithmic filtering and the resulting short life-span 
of a tweet. Here, too, Labour was able to mobilize its 
supporters, who pushed @jeremycorbyn to become 
the most retweeted and most mentioned political 
account. Moreover, Labour hashtags (i.e. #VoteLa-
bour) ranked as the third most used after informa-
tive and media labels such as #GE2017 and #BBCqt. 
Twitter digital architectures also allow bots 
(algorithm-driven accounts) that can automatically 
share messages from given accounts or with certain 
hashtags. Even though it is uncertain who is 
exactly behind accounts such as @Corbynator2 or 
@JeremyCorbyn4PM, these are clearly supporting 
Labour and their tweets are being shared 10,000 
times, so they contribute to the further spread of 
party communication.
Instagram and Snapchat lack the ‘share’ feature 
often seen as integral for mobilizing political 
activity and were not used widely during this 
campaign. Users can contribute their pictures 
from the campaign but cannot easily distribute 
external posts. The power of these platforms is, 
rather, that their digital architectures are built 
around close ties; thus, uploaded content may be 
more persuasive peer-to-peer. Snapchat was barely 
used politically in GE2017, and there is no data on 
politicians’ followers there. On Instagram, the best 
measurement of reach available is the number of 
followers, and Labour has one over the Conserv-
atives: 33,200 followers vs 6,555 (partly because 
Labour established an account in 2012, compared 
to 2017 for the Tories). 
Future election campaigns will be the ground 
to test whether the ‘share’ feature helps explain 
the dominance of Facebook and Twitter in terms 
of political use, and will show whether Instagram 
and Snapchat will adapt their architectures 
(possibly by building in a more distributive func-
tionality) in order to become more attractive for 
political campaigning.
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Conventional wisdom has it that election 
campaigns make little difference to the overall 
election result. However, this doesn’t appear to 
be true of 2017, as Labour – who had been slowly 
losing ground to the Conservatives in polling 
conducted before the election was called – reduced 
a gap of 24 percentage points (by some estimates) 
to less than 3 points in the final result. 
Much of the analysis of the 2017 election 
will therefore be focussed on the campaigns. 
Many believe that the Conservatives ran a flawed 
campaign, and this is undoubtedly part of the 
story. Labour both appealed to and targeted 
younger voters, and because social media is an 
important source of information for younger 
people, it was a key part of their strategy. Before 
polling day had arrived, a report by the Oxford 
Internet Institute revealed that Labour dominated 
the election conversation on Twitter, lending 
support to a view among digital strategists that 
Labour had indeed won the ‘social media election’ 
(if not, as it turned out, the actual election).
Online video has been singled out as a 
specific area in which Labour outperformed the 
other parties. I’ve used CrowdTangle – a tool that 
monitors the output of social media accounts – to 
see whether this view is supported by the data. 
I’ve used it to compare the output of the official 
Facebook accounts of 6 parties (Conservatives, 
Labour, Liberal Democrats, UKIP, SNP, and the 
Greens) during the 2015 and 2017 general election 
periods, looking in particular at the volume of 
video posts. I’ve focussed on Facebook, as it is by 
far the most widely-used social network in the 
United Kingdom (63% of the online population 
use Facebook each week, and 80% of 18-24s), 
and because there is a lack of studies based on 
Facebook data.
To start, I compared the number of posts 
made by each official party account in 2015 and 
2017. Somewhat surprisingly, the average number 
of posts per day from all parties except the Liberal 
Democrats was slightly lower in 2017 than in 2015 
(I use average number of posts per day rather than 
the raw figure because the 2015 election period 
was slightly longer than in 2017). But during both 
elections, Labour posted over twice as many times 
to Facebook as any of the other parties, posting an 
average of 12 times per day in 2017, compared to 3 
to 5 times per day for the rest (see Figure 1).
So, what did Labour do differently in 2017? 
One answer is that they posted more video. The 
Liberal Democrats and the SNP both posted 
slightly more videos per day in 2017. The Con-
servatives, UKIP and the Greens posted fewer. But 
Labour, who already made more use of video in 
2015 than any of the other parties, nearly trebled 
their number of video posts, from just over 3 per 
day in 2015 to over 9 per day in 2017. This means 
that around three-quarters of all posts from the 
official Labour account included a video of some 
kind (see Figure 2).
This matters, because for all parties in 2017 
videos were more likely to produce an interaction 
(defined as a like/dislike, a share, or a comment) 
than any other type of post (such as an image, a 
link, or a status update). This is likely to be linked, 
in part, to Facebook’s earlier decision to prioritise 
video content in people’s news feeds. Labour were 
therefore particularly successful at generating 
interactions during the election period, producing 
around 2.5 million in total, compared to 1 million 
for the Conservatives, and no more than 400 
thousand for any of the other parties. This is partly 
because they posted more often. But importantly, 
around 90% of all of Labour’s likes, shares, and 
comments came from video posts. This figure is 
much higher than the equivalent figure for the 
Liberal Democrats (around 70%), the Conserva-
tives, the SNP, and the Greens (between around 
50% and 55%) and UKIP (around 33%). 
Of course, the content of these videos is 
important, and more in-depth analysis will help 
build a richer understanding. Nonetheless, this 
data suggests that during the 2017 campaign 
Labour were indeed able to attract the attention 
of social media users through the use of engaging 
video content, which may have ultimately had 
some bearing on the eventual result.
Figure 1: Average number of Facebook posts 
per day (2015 and 2017)
Figure 2: Average number of Facebook video 
posts per day (2015 and 2017)
94
Like me, share me: the people’s social media 
campaign
Dr Darren Lilleker
Associate Professor of 
Political Communication 
at Bournemouth 
University.
Email: dlilleker@bournemouth.
ac.uk
Twitter: @DrDGL
2017 is perhaps the first social media election, in 
terms of the likelihood of political activities taking 
place on social media having an impact upon voter 
turnout. It would be wrong to claim the election was 
decided online, rather that the key youth demo-
graphic who turned out in greater numbers is likely 
to have been exposed to, and thus mobilised by, 
communication promoting Labour online. As in 
the run-up to the election of Obama in the US in 
2008 a left-leaning milieu had become highly active, 
independent media such as Another Angry Voice 
or The Canary became fervent supporters of Jeremy 
Corbyn. Momentum was created as a campaign 
organisation to promote him and his policies. Party 
involvement in online communication proved 
tentative prior to the election contest. However, as 
the party machine swung into action the activists 
began to promote its content. Social media may not 
have been dominated by Labour, but if you had any 
politically interested friends in your network there 
was a higher chance of seeing a Labour message. 
This is clear in the data displayed below.
The online environment is a complex one. 
A range of brands push their messages, many 
paying for the access to the communities of users 
of a platform. Political parties create free profiles; 
they are therefore not promoted automatically by 
the algorithms that deliver content to user news 
feeds. However if parties receive high numbers of 
shares this activates an alternative algorithm which 
promotes content based on popularity. Hence to 
be a successful a party needs a highly energised 
and active followership. Followers of parties need 
to be driven by intrinsic motivations, passion for 
the cause basically. Followers also need to feel 
that there will be rewards for promoting a party. 
Rewards can be provided by an election outcome. 
As polls tighten the drive to support the party 
users are passionate about increases and therefore 
activity likewise strengthens. But rewards are also 
provided by the user’s network. If a user shares 
content and their network likes it in large numbers 
this motivates them to share similar material. 
Research demonstrates that online rewards from 
within a network, from peers, is powerful and 
can actually contribute to increasing the passion 
of the individual for a cause. We might therefore 
hypothesise that a person accidentally exposed 
to a political message they agree with, and who 
then shares that message will, if they get positive 
feedback in the forms of likes and comments, share 
more similar material. There is therefore a virtuous 
circle at work here.
SoTrender provide data on Facebook and 
Twitter which allows the disaggregation of activ-
ities relating to a brand’s profile. Comparing the 
parties for number of followers, the percentage of 
those followers who engaged with the campaign 
and the overall interactivity for the last four 
weeks of the campaign May 12-June 8 we see 
the extraordinary advantage Labour had. Table 
1 shows the data for Facebook. These figures 
indicate how shareable the content of each party 
was. UKIP’s active support collapsed compared to 
2015, the other parties struggled, but Labour had 
the highest followership, the second highest but 
overall largest number of engaged users and so 
over double the interactions with their content as 
their closest rival.
The Twittersphere shows less dramatic differ-
ences but Labour had a much larger followership 
and while not the most mentioned they were far 
more retweeted and liked. Their nearest rivals for 
gaining the retweets and likes that afford greater 
reach were relatively minor players. The mentions 
figure includes trolling, in this respect it is likely 
the Conservatives at times had a fairly hostile 
reception on Twitter.
The only real effect that can be judged by this 
is the increase in followership over the course of 
the campaign. The hypothesis is here that having 
an engaged followership equates to greater reach 
which in turn generates increased interest and fol-
lowership.  Table 3 shows the percentage increase 
for each platform over the course of the four week 
campaign. Again the story is one of exponential 
gains by Labour, sound gains by the Conservatives 
and the minor parties lagging behind. 
These data reveal some interesting patterns. 
Interest in Labour increased by almost 20%, 
arguably this is evidence of the party benefiting 
from the high levels of activism among their sup-
porters. The interest may well have been stimulat-
ed by partisan, or at least pro-Corbyn, platforms 
such as Momentum and The Canary. However 
the party as a whole benefitted and the campaigns 
locally also turned to social media. Strong perfor-
mances by Momentum branches may have con-
tributed to surprise results: such as Labour taking 
second place in true-blue Poole with a 16.6% 
swing. Labour’s social media team supported this 
by creating far more videos, the most shareable 
and promoted form of content, so understand-
ing the dynamics of social media far better than 
their rivals. The data also shows the collapse in 
interest in UKIP, and the Liberal Democrats not 
regaining anything near their support levels prior 
to 2010. These are indications that social media 
dynamics have parallels with the outcomes at the 
ballot box. In this respect social media may have 
played a key role in Labour bypassing the largely 
hostile mainstream media, getting support for 
their platform and encouraging interest, building 
support for Corbyn and the party, and mobilising 
the youth vote that seems to have been crucial in 
ensuring the Conservative majority was lost. Had 
the campaign reached and persuaded a further 
2,227 to turnout in key marginal constituencies 
there is a likelihood Jeremy Corbyn would now be 
prime minister.
Party Followership Engaged users (%) Interactivity Index
Conservatives 633,477 34.23% 6,239,432
Green Party 305,577 47.32% 1,405,806
Labour 989,752 44.59% 15,875,607
Liberal Democrats 185,914 24.01% 839,772
Plaid Cymru 29,249 20.09% 110,462
Scottish Nationalists 287,883 19.14% 1,209,605
UKIP 596,471 6.56% 599,567
Party Followership Mentions Retweets Likes
Conservatives 269,859 84,297 25,381 209,633
Green Party 207,466 20,449 49,775 186,732
Labour 475,647 59,239 60,041 369,693
Liberal Democrats 191,070 52,065 39,246 135,364
Plaid Cymru 27,787 10,080 9,039 33,940
Scottish Nationalists 187,810 46,973 34,383 158,507
UKIP 166,246 32,151 15,223 66,875
Party Facebook – percentage 
followership increase
Twitter – percentage follow-
ership increase
Conservatives 10.00% 8.00%
Green Party 7.43% 6.00%
Labour 19.98% 19.00%
Liberal Democrats 6.53% 6.00%
Plaid Cymru 4.44% 4.00%
Scottish Nationalists 4.73% 2.00%
UKIP 2.24% 4.00%
Table 2: Twitter numbers and engagement on Twitter per party
Table 3: Followership gains on social media
Table 1: Follower numbers and engagement on Facebook per party
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It was Facebook wot almost won it.
After the 2015 General Election social media 
was decried as an echo chamber, endlessly recon-
firming the biases of voters and candidates.  
In 2017, social media gave us the largest clues 
to the political earthquake that was underway. The 
energised supporters of Jeremy Corbyn and the 
Labour Party consumed large amounts of Facebook 
content. The party was able to mobilise support 
via the large numbers of people subscribed to 
their Facebook feeds and organically sharing their 
content. The huge growth in likes, compared to 
other parties and leaders, should have been an indi-
cation that something extraordinary was happening.
The way the parties used Facebook was 
markedly different. 
There were some common characteristics. 
With little notice of the coming campaign, social 
media became a vital and reactive tool for all the 
major parties. They all used their Facebook feeds 
to promote their key messages, to provide expla-
nations of policy and transmit statements and 
speeches from their leaders.
The Conservatives feed displays a controlled 
attempt at messaging, at the start of the campaign 
there was rarely more than three posts a day. By the 
last weeks, post frequency had increased hitting a 
peak of seven posts on the 2nd of June. 
Positive messages, particularly about Brexit, 
were transmitted from Theresa May’s account. 
The main Conservatives page was used to house 
attack ads and other key messages. There was very 
little attempt to provide detailed explanation of 
policy and it was only following the pause in the 
wake of the Manchester bombing, that there was 
any attempt to create a positive tone. The party’s 
Facebook newsfeed provided a hub of content that 
supported targeted digital advertising delivered to 
swing voters in marginal seats.
The Labour party feed was much more active, 
from the start regularly repeating key messages 
and content. This appears predicated on an organic 
rather than paid advertising model. The assumption 
being that significant sharing by supporters would 
have spill over impacts with undecided voters.
The content of the Facebook feed was relent-
lessly positive; there were very few straightforward 
attack ads. Although an attack on Theresa May’s 
record on security and police numbers was one of 
the most shared social videos of the campaign.
The content tended to be of two types. 
Explainers of policy or polished campaign 
videos focusing on Jeremy Corbyn or celebrities 
endorsing the party. The key topics were the NHS 
and the impacts of austerity cuts on people’s lives.  
While there was much cynicism in the media 
of Corbyn’s rallies, they had significant impact on 
Facebook. They were widely watched and shared. 
Their presentation of Corbyn as a successful and 
dynamic figure meeting crowds of people provided 
a contrast to the perception of Theresa May as a 
remote, cold figure who wouldn’t interact with 
normal voters. A Facebook live video of a Corbyn 
rally in Birmingham, where he shared the stage 
with Clean Bandit and the actor Steve Coogan, 
attracted 2.3m views - an astonishingly high 
number for a political Facebook live video. While 
there was some local media reporting of the rally, it 
made little impact on the national press.
With the exception of the two terror attacks 
in Manchester and London, little news made it 
onto the Facebook feeds. There was no attempt to 
use Facebook, as the Conservatives did Twitter in 
2015, to break stories.
The response to the terror attacks was different. 
Following the shock of the bombing of Ariana 
Grande’s concert, the Facebook accounts went 
silent for several days. They’d only just begun to 
campaign again when the London Bridge attack 
took place. In its wake, the Conservatives, Labour 
and Liberal Democrats all used Facebook to 
highlight their policies on terrorism. Theresa May’s 
Downing Street speech of June 4th was posted 
on her Facebook page in full. Edited highlights 
of Jeremy Corbyn’s speech of the same day were 
also posted on his account. Both Labour and the 
Conservatives launched highly watched attack ads 
lambasting each other’s records on terrorism and 
national security.
The use of video to communicate political 
messages on Facebook was popularised during 
the 2015 election and it was a key tool for all the 
parties, with the exception of UKIP who barely 
attempted any significant engagement with their 
more than 500,000 followers.
This election also saw third parties 
engaging with political video. Most significantly, 
Momentum, who explicitly targeted the youth 
vote with satirical films and videos by credible 
political campaigners and journalists, such as The 
Guardian’s Owen Jones and the writer Paul Mason. 
Some of these went viral and attracted significant 
viewing, Tory Britain 2030 was watched more than 
7.5m times in the closing days of the election.
In conclusion, during the 2017 General Election 
campaign the major parties carried out aggressive 
campaigns on social media. They made extensive use 
of video to try and communicate directly with sup-
porters and floating voters. These had various levels 
of engagement but when they did connect with users 
high viewing numbers were recorded. 
But for the most part the campaigns tried 
to disconnect themselves from the news agenda, 
focussing on their talking points and key messages 
in an effort to disintermediate political journalism 
and the wider media. Given the settled view of the 
media establishment that the Conservatives were 
heading to victory, this policy seems to have been 
particularly successful for The Labour Party. 
The alternate and influential world of the political 
parties’ Facebook feeds
Matt Walsh
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Fig 1: Change in Facebook likes for parties and party leaders 
during election campaign
Fig 2: Most watched party social videos on Facebook
Fig 3: Still from Momentum campaign ad Tory Britain 2030
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Social media and the Corbyn breakthrough
The days when we all interacted with identical 
information from limited media outlets has 
largely gone thanks to the growth of media and 
in particular social media channels. However, a 
more Orwellian interpretation is that social media 
algorithms actually restrict choice as our prefer-
ences become increasing determined by previous 
behaviour patterns.  This is the difficulty facing 
political parties and candidates. Even if you can 
buy access to individuals and target messages (for 
example, free university fees targeting younger 
voters), you may be preaching to the converted 
and if not it is impossible to determine who paid 
attention, if they were impacted and for how 
long. There is also the question of regulation. 
Current laws are pretty laissez faire and parties 
are reluctant to reveal their online tactics leading 
to accusations of the proliferation of ‘dark ads’: 
targeted by constituency and consumer and 
online activity using algorithms. 
However, what became clear in 2017, is that 
even with the resources to run more targeted 
ads, what is hard to predict is reach and impact 
via retweets or shares. When the polls were at 
their closest in the last week of the campaign, for 
example, the Conservatives tweeted nearly twice 
as much as  Labour (382 to 220 tweets/retweets 
from June 5-8). However, tweet traction (likes and 
retweets) was considerably higher for Labour . 
They capitalised on their leader, Jeremy Corbyn, 
whose tweets regularly surpassed Theresa May’s 
in terms of likes and retweets. Corbyn also caught 
the public mood with the inspirational populist 
manifesto catch-phrase ‘for the many, not the few’ 
and both he and the party pushed policy sweet-
eners on education, health and pensions to reflect 
their slogan. Labour’s positive messages promoted 
incentives from their manifesto that could prove 
attractive for anyone earning under 80k. The 
Conservative’s policy of austerity meant that they 
had little to sell, and lots to take from their core 
voters (for example, ending the triple-lock on 
pensions, ending universal winter fuel payments, 
and an ‘elderly/dementia housing tax’ to pay for 
personal care). Consequently, the Conservatives 
focused on negative posts about Jeremy Corbyn 
and Diane Abbott (typically either gaffes on live 
media, or controversial policy positions such as 
Corbyn’s on shoot-to-kill given the context of the 
terrorist attacks that happened during the election 
campaign). While these were the most popular 
Conservative posts, they gained nowhere near the 
reach (likes, shares, retweets…) of Labour’s mix of 
promises and celebrity endorsements.  
Indeed, Corbyn and Labour connected to 
celebrity endorsements and core music events (for 
example, #OneLoveManchester) where the views, 
likes and shares were earned from the resulting 
high profile UK-wide audience reach far eclipsing 
anything the Conservatives could manage via more 
mundane visits (for example, May visiting Atherley 
Bowling Club) and businesses (for example, May 
meeting traders at Smithfield Market). In short, 
while the Conservatives tweeted more in the last 
week of the campaign, it enjoyed far less reach 
than Labour via likes and retweets. The tweets of 
the leaders are also revealing. In the final 4 days 
Corbyn tweeted 93 times compared to May’s 
14. Across the campaign Corbyn posted over 8k 
tweets, May less than 300. Not only was Corbyn 
more active than May, but brand Corbyn became a 
campaign asset that countered his highly negative 
image portrayay in many tabloids. A rupturing dis-
sonance occurred as Corbyn went from a low-base 
to being humanised and seen as a potential leader 
through TV debates and social media in contrast 
to the typical negative media portrayal. The exact 
opposite happened to May. Reluctance to debate 
on TV or social media (awkwardness and wooden 
performances) meant May went from a high-base 
to  low irrespective of the anti-Corbyn line dissem-
inated by the Tory press. 
At the end of the campaign Corbyn had over 
a million likes on Facebook compared to just over 
400k for May. Corbyn also had almost 1.2 million 
followers on Twitter, May had under 350k. In the 
final week of the campaign, Labour also posted 
three to five times more per day on Facebook than 
the Conservatives. This matters, because Facebook 
not only has a larger audience than Twitter, but 
online users engage with it more frequently and for 
longer periods per visit. Volume, and more positive 
content, arguably worked. A June 6th Corbyn 
event in Birmingham featuring Clean Bandit and 
Steve Coogan attracted 91k likes, 45k shares and 
2.3m views. This contrasts with a negative ivideo 
of Diane Abbot messing up an interview posted by 
the Conservatives on the same day registering 12k 
likes, 10k shares and 1m views. Even when it came 
to selling Labour Party policy, Labour’s ‘10 Reasons 
to Vote Labour’ post was viewed over 4m times by 
June 6th. Online, the public seemed more inter-
ested in an upbeat party with things to offer than a 
party with less to offer and more negative ads.       
Did the better online performance help 
Corbyn – Yes. The 18-30 demographic are most 
active online in terms of numbers and activities, 
and they actually turned out to vote in unprec-
edented numbers. Consequently, social media 
was more important in this election than any 
other. Young people used it more, used it more 
to spread the positive Corbyn narrative and also 
crucially turned out to vote. Had it not been for the 
multiplicity of anti-Tory parties and the first-past-
the-post electoral system, social media might have 
helped tipped the balance for Labour. 
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The UK digisphere and the 2017 election
On April 18th, a resolute Theresa May held a 
press conference outside Downing Street, calling 
for a general election to be held on the 8th of 
June. Outlining the reasons of her decision, she 
explained that “at this moment of enormous 
national significance, there should be unity here 
in Westminster. But instead, there is division: the 
country is coming together, but Westminster is not”. 
After the election result, however, the country 
emerges more divided than ever. Clearly, this was 
an election full of surprises and plot twists. How 
did it come to that?
First, although exact numbers of voter turnout 
were still unclear at the time of writing, it is likely 
that young voters under the age of 30 significantly 
shaped the election outcome. In its run-up, 1.5 
million young people registered to vote, giving 
the Labour party with its popular policies, such 
as the scrapping of tuition fees, an electoral boost. 
Second, the respective launches of the Labour and 
Conservative manifestos worked against the latter. 
While a clearly rattled Theresa May struggled to 
contain herself during a press conference half way 
through the campaign in which she claimed that 
‘nothing has changed’ – despite having u-turned 
on social care just hours before – the launch of the 
Labour party’s manifesto received unexpectedly 
favourable news coverage. Third, the election was 
overshadowed by two appalling terror attacks 
that laid bare the cuts to police officers Theresa 
May and the Conservatives had presided over for 
several years. Last, but certainly not least, Theresa 
May’s unwillingness to face her opponent in a TV 
debate, and her staged and somewhat awkward 
appearance on the BBC’s The One Show did little 
to portray her as a likeable political figure. To the 
contrary, according to research by Loughborough 
University, on the back of his well-received Labour 
manifesto, Jeremy Corbyn gained momentum in 
the third and fourth week of the campaign and 
became the most frequently reported political 
figure in the news.
A further important aspect of this general 
election was the rise of new, alternative media 
online. This election is a prime example of how 
online, alternative outlets are now extending their 
reach to the levels expected of mainstream media 
in the past. Unlike their counterparts in the press, 
these new online media came out in enthusiastic 
support of Corbyn. One example of this trend is 
Another Angry Voice, a blog started in 2010 by 
English tutor Thomas Clark. In the run-up to the 
election, his post, ‘How many of Jeremy Corbyn’s 
policies do you actually disagree with?’, became 
one of his most popular ones. As of June 8, his 
article garnered 4,300 reactions on Facebook and 
was shared 12,560 times. Analysis by digital market 
intelligence service SimilarWeb shows a huge 
increase in traffic to Clark’s site between April, 
when the blog attracted around 50,000 total visits, 
and May, when total page visits surged to 370,000. 
Similarly, analysis by the Buzzfeed News 
Social Barometer showed that three weeks before 
the election, an article by The Canary with the 
headline ‘A bystander took a behind the scenes 
photo of Theresa May that reduces her campaign 
to a sham’ had been shared 42,400 times on social 
media. The article shows Theresa May during one 
of her campaign rallies, supposedly surrounded 
by large crowds of people. However, the picture 
by the ‘bystander’, who had taken it from further 
afield, showed a much smaller crowd than the 
official pictures suggested. Other left-leaning sites 
such as Evolve Politics and Skwawbox, provided an 
antidote to the UK’s often Eurosceptic, pro-Tory 
mainstream media.
Indeed, when looking at the UK general 
election through the prism of the mainstream 
media, one could almost get the sense that they 
reported on a different event altogether. Lough-
borough University found The Sun and the Daily 
Express attacking Jeremy Corbyn and the Labour 
party in predictably harsh terms reminiscent of 
the red tops’ denunciation of the ‘loony left’ in the 
1980s. The Daily Mail was also hostile to Labour, 
and broadly positive towards Theresa May and 
the Conservatives, an editorial stance echoed by 
The Times. This pattern of pro-Tory coverage 
shifted as the campaign period ended, with Jeremy 
Corbyn gaining momentum in some parts of the 
media. However, the coverage of his party overall 
remained negative. On election day, the Daily 
Express called on its readers to ‘vote for May today’ 
and The Sun called on the electorate not to ‘chuck 
Britain in the Cor-bin’. By contrast, the alternative 
media mentioned above seemed to report on an 
election happening in a parallel universe. 
As we know, the pro-Corbyn media were 
vindicated. And as if this election wasn’t already 
surprising and unpredictable enough, the day after 
the result, even the usually Tory-backing press had 
their knives out against May. The Daily Mail’s front 
page read ‘Tories turn on Theresa’, and The Times 
noted that May ‘stares into the abyss’. 
Here at the Digital Media Research Centre at 
QUT, we are working on a project funded by the 
Australian Research Council (ARC) called ‘Jour-
nalism beyond the crisis’. I have just completed my 
first round of interviews in Sydney, and across the 
board, journalists agreed that legacy news media no 
longer hold the sole authority of being the ‘storytell-
ers of our time’. In an election riddled by surprises 
and plot twists, the power of alternative media in 
this election lends strong support to that view. 
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Recent elections around the world have raised 
serious questions about the potential effects that 
social media might have on voters. The UK 2017 
Election seems a vivid example of what happens 
when one political party completely neglects social 
media, while its opponent leverages its incredible 
momentum to activate young voters.
As seen during the EU referendum, social 
media is becoming a vital election campaign 
battleground. Young people increasingly turn 
to sites like Facebook, Instagram and Twitter as 
sources of information and entertainment with 
regard to upcoming elections. In particular, we note 
Instagram has become popular among young adults 
to express political views and show support for the 
causes they care about. After Theresa May’s election 
announcement , there was a deluge of Instagram 
posts about what this election might mean for 
British society. 
In addition, to encourage young people to vote, 
several musicians, actors, athletes and social media 
celebrities joined the political battle. In the months 
leading up to the election, the hashtag #Register-
ToVote caught on. It amassed over 29,870 public 
posts on Instagram showing overwhelming support 
for Labour, which we collected and analysed as part 
of our research at the Oxford Internet Institute.
Related hashtags frequently co-tagged hashtags 
also tried to galvanise youth into political action 
through memes and emotional appeals. For 
example, #VoteLabour (83,094 posts), #ForThe-
ManyNotTheFew (20,063 posts), #JC4PM (18,275 
posts), #ToriesOut (16,439 posts), #ForTheMany 
(9,738 posts), #FuckTheTories (7,499 posts), #Make-
JuneTheEndOfMay (5,515 posts), #YourVoteYour-
Voice (5,046 posts), #Grime4Corbyn (2,251 posts) 
and, perhaps most ironically, #StrongAndStable-
MyArse (1,457 posts). All showed strong support 
for Labour and were predominantly promoted by 
young people. 
Our findings suggest  Britain’s younger gen-
eration and their prolific use of social media had 
a massive effect on the election outcome. What is 
more surprising, perhaps, is the diversity of Insta-
grammers who decided to encourage young voters 
to register to vote while also showing support for 
Jeremy Corbyn. As shown in our exploratory study, 
the Internet is full of surprises and sometimes new 
advocates of democracy emerge from the most 
unexpected places. 
Some of the most influential Instagrammers 
who actively stepped into the election campaign 
were actresses Emilia Clarke from Game of 
Thrones and Kaya Scodelario from Pirates of 
the Caribbean, high street brands like TopShop 
and Lush, as well as musicians like Stormzy and 
Clean Bandit, who all got behind Corbyn. To put 
things into perspective, Emilia Clarke’s picture of 
her cute dog, in which she urged young people to 
make their voices heard, was liked by over 271,934 
people. By contrast, the median post in the studied 
sample only received 21 likes.
As a direct result of this the number of young 
people registering to vote in 2017 was the highest 
of any age group. While no official data on youth 
turnout exists at the time of writing, some exit polls 
suggest turnout among under-35s rose by 12 per-
centage points compared with 2015, to 56 percent. 
Other reports estimate that as many as 72 percent of 
eligible 18-24 year olds voted. This surge in young 
people registering, soon dubbed as the “youth-
quake”, partly constituted Labour’s 10-point advance 
in vote share. 
Throughout the election, Labour lagged in 
the polls but was winning on social media. Jeremy 
Corbyn’s remarkable online popularity allowed him 
to defy pundits and pollsters to bring Labour back 
on track. This is good news for parties with similar 
political philosophies around the world who are 
facing upcoming elections. Our data indicates that 
young voters are not only more visible on social 
media, but they are also more left-leaning and 
more likely to put their faith in political parties that 
support globalisation.
For a new generation of politicians, social 
media now offers a new path to power that was 
previously unimaginable. However, merely relying 
on tech-savvy younger people online is not enough 
to win an election. As social media becomes 
increasingly crowded, competitive, and saturated 
with clickbait articles and fake news, many political 
parties struggle to build meaningful relationships 
with citizens. Our research indicates there is a 
severe disconnect between motivated voters, who 
keenly generate content on social media, and 
political party strategies. 
Rather than relying on chance, social media 
momentum can be actively fostered through tech-
nological means at a large scale. Digital campaign-
ing agencies like Avantgarde Analytics offer artificial 
intelligence solutions to make this political dream 
a reality. Deep neural networks can be trained 
to recognise patterns in social media behaviour 
and actively reach out to voters with personalised 
messages. In this way, machine learning algorithms 
can be used to better engage young voters; to inform 
them about the diversity of political opinions and 
guide them towards political empowerment in an 
accessible and personalised manner. 
As the GE2017 campaign was entering the 
home stretch, Jeremy Corbyn could have used this 
form of algorithmic campaigning to reach out to 
the millions already expressing their support for 
him online and encourage them to vote. However,  
Labour still managed to cause a seismic shift. For 
many Conservatives the result was a huge surprise. 
Maybe next time, to avoid such a spectacular mis-
judgement, they should turn away from polls and 
look to social media to get a better sense of what is 
really going on.
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Theresa May’s first Facebook post on 18 May, 
three weeks before polling day, heralded her newly 
published manifesto: “We can build a stronger 
Britain.” Initial responses weren’t exclusively 
enthusiastic. The first ten included support for 
Labour, suggesting her policies were “stronger” 
for Tory bank accounts and spelt a return to “the 
dark ages”, a demand she apologize for the British 
Empire, posts calling her a “self-serving snake” 
and slamming her refusal to take part in a TV 
debate, and a link to a blog entitled ‘Theresa May 
isn’t strong, she’s cowardly, evasive and weak – and 
I’m a Tory!’ By contrast, the first ten responses to 
Jeremy Corbyn’s first Facebook post that day (in 
response to that manifesto) were broadly support-
ive, with just one ambivalent response – “until we 
see the detail we have no idea what the relative 
impact is.”
When on 15 May the Prime Minister 
appeared on Facebook Live only 14,000 users 
logged in. As the BBC noted the next day, the 
“female Conservative Prime Minister” celebrated 
by Tory Facebook groups tends to be Margaret 
Thatcher rather than Mrs May.
By polling day, Corbyn had 1.15 million 
Facebook likes and May 420,000. On Twitter 
Corbyn had topped 1.17 million followers, while 
May had reached 346K. Nine of the first 10 
responses to May’s manifesto tweet lambasted her 
hostility towards the disabled, elderly, unemployed, 
sick, homeless, children and foxes. Only three 
of Corbyn’s first ten responses attacked his first 
tweet of the day. (He’d posted a shot of that day’s 
i newspaper front page – “millions of pension-
ers lose winter fuel funding” – prompting one 
respondent to call him a “lying Trot”).
As the BBC reported on 10 May, Corbyn 
“dwarfs his political rivals” on social media. His 
Twitter lead didn’t reflect his support nationally, 
but may have symptomized that desire for change 
(particularly among younger voters) which led to 
a hung parliament. Yet Corbyn’s campaign success 
might be ascribed less to social media than to his 
increasingly confident TV performances and what 
The Independent described as May’s “spectacular 
series of mistakes”.
To equate social media reach with electoral 
potential is clearly misleading. After all, as 
Anstead noted, in 2015 “Labour seemed to have a 
significant dominance in the online space.” 2015 
had been hailed as Britain’s “first social media 
election”; but it remains unclear whether social 
media promote democratization or the disruption 
of democracy. 
Donald Trump’s exploitation of social media 
(“without the tweets I wouldn’t be here”) under-
pinned a divisive campaign, while the Brexit vote 
exposed discord propagated by social media. 
Fenton has supposed that social media inspire “a 
form of radical politics that favours gut reaction 
and quick fixes over long-term struggle.” But 
might social media ever overturn established elites 
to deliver power to the people? Was that what 
happened with Brexit and Trump – or were those 
phenomena merely the triumph of (as George 
Monbiot suggests) “dark money” and (as David 
Remnick and Jason Wilson have argued) strategies 
of “constant lies”, “clickbait scoops” and fake news? 
Britain’s political establishment have voiced 
concerns about a post-truth culture of fake news: 
what the Defence Secretary called a strategy of 
“weaponising misinformation” and the Chair of 
Parliament’s Culture, Media & Sport Committee 
dubbed a “threat to democracy.” The vogue for fake 
news and alt-right alt-reporting erupted in 2016 
to fill a vacuum created by American mainstream 
media’s refusal to address the Trump campaign 
with much more than contempt. But in Britain 
there’s been no such void for the crazed rants of 
fake news to fill. Instead our spread of extreme 
news narratives ranges from the reactionary Mail 
lamenting ‘Corbyn’s plan to bankrupt the UK’ 
(17 May) to the Momentum-sustaining Canary 
declaring that the Tory manifesto ‘officially told the 
UN to go fuck itself ’ (18 May). It seems telling that 
when the Sunday Sport’s parody of the Daily Mail’s 
campaign coverage went viral on social media – 
‘Teenage Corbyn squashed my sister’s baby rabbit 
with his pogo stick’ (14 May) – many readers 
mistook it for the genuine article.
Milan Kundera once warned against the 
laughter of a fanaticism “ready to hang” dissenters 
and a cynicism which “proclaims that everything 
has become meaningless.” The polarizing proper-
ties of social media tend to foster such extremes. 
Far from fostering conversations to synthesize 
shared societal aspirations, their destabilizing 
effects undermine those dialogical sense-making 
strategies which sustain possibilities of political 
consensus – as social media starkly fail to fulfil 
their social potential.
These platforms aren’t tools of political 
control so much as randomizing phenomena 
which open limitless opportunities for faux pas, 
spin political processes beyond party control, and 
– rather than toppling elites – merely add unprec-
edented degrees of unpredictability (or irrational-
ity) to peacetime democratic processes. They may 
as such have longer-term impacts upon political 
realignments… but only time (and tweets) will 
tell. The best lesson social media have taught us is 
to expect the unexpected. 
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Music and comedy duo, Casetteboy, produced another one of their infamous 
mashups - this time of Theresa May - during the campaign.
Captain Ska's protest song, 'Liar Liar GE2017', was released on 26th May and 
reached number 4 in the UK Singles Chart during the campaign.
The Nations
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Nasty, British and Short: an emotional election  
In her 20th April interview on Andrew Neil’s This 
Week, Gina Miller asserted “I’m interested in the 
facts; I’m not interested in any emotions”. This is 
very surprising from the self-appointed leader 
of the anti-Brexit movement - because if Brexit 
revealed anything, it is that British politics are 
increasingly dominated not by neutral facts but by 
raw emotion. The dominant issues of 2017 – Brexit, 
immigration, faith in leaders, and security – are 
fundamentally emotional. Like Scottish inde-
pendence and Brexit, the GE2017 was dominated 
by slippery issues of identity, sovereignty, and 
nostalgia, and subsequently the election was influ-
enced by raw feeling as much as cold calculation. 
As a consequence, this election was nasty, British, 
and short.
The campaign has been nasty. The General 
Election was called in a country still smarting from 
bitter arguments over Scotland, Brexit, Trump, Le 
Pen, and indyref2; the emotional legacies of which 
had not disappeared when Theresa May made her 
announcement. Alongside these lingering divides, 
the campaign brought into national focus political 
frustrations which have appeared since Cameron’s 
resignation and Corbyn’s election as party leader. 
The early days of campaigning seemed to offer 
voters two equally unappealing choices: between 
an unelected authoritarian imposing yet more 
austerity, or a man with dubious connections who 
had refused to publicly sing the national anthem. In 
this atmosphere of heightened emotions, economic 
and constitutional issues were overshadowed. 
Throughout the campaign both Labour and the 
Conservatives appealed to emotions by castigating 
and sometimes demonising their opponents as 
heartless scoundrels or a direct threat to national 
security. This was particularly visible in the televised 
debates and interviews, in which audience questions 
aimed at both May and Corbyn were rarely neutral 
but instead laden with frustration and fury. Subse-
quent media analyses and endorsements focused 
on the personalities of the two leaders and appealed 
to emotions through such language as “cold”, 
“robotic”, “the nasty party”, and tediously recycling 
the word “hope”. These emotive portrayals of May 
and Corbyn point not only to the nastiness of the 
election, but also to the return of the old system.
The campaign has been British. In 2010 the 
sudden emergence of UKIP, the SNP, and the 
Con-Dem coalition suggested a transformation 
from American-style two-party politics to a Europe-
an-style multiparty system. GE2017 ended that brief 
experiment. UKIP is nearly extinct and the SNP is 
in retreat, while the LibDems have failed to rally the 
remains of ‘Remain’. This restoration of two-party 
politics has exacerbated, and been exacerbated by, 
the growing hostility and contempt between two 
parties which are no longer jostling in the centre 
as they have from 1997 onwards, but which are 
separated by a broad gulf. Corbyn has taken Labour 
to the far left, and May rather clumsily attempted 
to fill the centrist vacuum by taking the Conserv-
atives slightly to the left. This strategy failed, but 
in its failure demonstrates how parties have taken 
a back seat while individual leaders have been 
pushed to the front. It is difficult to have emotional 
ties with an abstract entity such as a party, but very 
easy to form an emotional connection with a single 
individual. Online press stories on policy sugges-
tions or manifesto proposals received far fewer 
public comments than reports of a party leader’s or 
cabinet/shadow cabinet member’s latest car-crash 
interview. The return of binary politics and the 
power of emotion are interdependent - particularly 
in the context of such a brief election.
The campaign has been short. Not only was 
this campaign shortened due to terrorism, but the 
increasing emotionalisation and bipartisanship of 
politics points to political debate itself becoming 
increasingly brief. First seen in the Scottish ref-
erendum, social media and the digital realm are 
fast becoming the dominant forum for political 
debate and information. In an age of heightened 
emotions and in an online world of single-click 
symbols and profile picture-frames which instantly 
advertise the user’s voting intentions, social media 
users increasingly purge those online contacts who 
do not share their political views. The result is an 
electorate – especially the young – who gather 
and share information in politically homogeneous 
echo-chambers which have little or no contact with 
the opposing side. As a consequence, social media 
is becoming not a forum for civilised debate but 
a collection of digital soapboxes whose speakers 
merely hurl abuse and accusations at one another 
before unfriending and blocking. Debate, when it 
occurs, is becoming short and savage. If this trend 
continues, elections and referendums will become 
even more dominated by emotions, self-righteous-
ness, and intolerance of diverse opinions. This does 
not bode well for future elections.
However, this is not of immediate concern. 
After national votes (or votes on national-scale 
issues) in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017, political 
exhaustion is setting in. The emotional response of 
‘Bristol Brenda’ symbolises much of the electorate’s 
fatigue, and even Corbyn’s cage-rattling is unlikely 
to drown out the national sigh if another General 
Election is called. It is even more unlikely that the 
Conservatives, with Momentum unexpectedly 
snapping at their heels, will risk calling an election 
before 2022. Demands for Irish unification, a 
second Brexit vote, and indyref2 have clearly fizzled 
out, and so the need for national votes is temporar-
ily over. The Conservatives are almost guaranteed 
to remove Theresa May but the party will remain in 
office, quietly propped up by the DUP, for five years. 
The 2017 General Election was nasty, British, and 
short – but at least it was the last one for a while.
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Scotland in the 2017 UK General Election
It will be clear across this report that the 2017 UK 
General Election was called on a single issue. Just 
as Edward Heath went to the voters in 1974 to ask 
“who rules Britain”, 2017 election saw the Con-
servatives’ Theresa May demand the confidence 
of the electorate in negotiating the UK’s exit from 
the European Union. Neither request produced the 
desired response: Heath was removed from office 
and May’s anticipated increased majority crumbled 
to a minority administration. 
To some extent, such altered prospects are 
to be expected in the information vortex of an 
election contest. The tragedies that befall a func-
tioning state, along with the interests and tactics of 
opposing parties, buffer and derail even the most 
robust campaign messages, and therefore played 
havoc with the conspicuously-vacuous “strong and 
stable” slogan favoured by Conservative strategists. 
Scotland departed from the repetitiveness of 
the UK campaign, however, with the Scottish Con-
servative and Unionists opting for a more fruitful 
line on the internal composition and integrity of 
the UK. Attacks on the Scottish National Party 
(SNP) cited their alleged fixation on securing a 
further independence referendum, and conse-
quent neglect both of other issues central to this 
particular election and their responsibilities in 
running the devolved Scottish administration. 
However, the most cursory examination indicates 
that whoever was consumed by independence 
over the period of the campaign, it was not the 
SNP. However, in a way that benefited the unionist 
parties, the SNP and the drive for independence 
had already become conflated. To take just one 
day, on the 5th and into much of 6th of June, 
the Scottish Conservatives’ Twitter feed (n=21) 
included 16 tweets referring either to the SNP or 
their First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, along with 5 
tweets referring to the constitutional arrangement 
of Scotland (especially the “Barnett Formula”), 
leaving 10 tweets to other matters, including 
the terrorist attack at Westminster Bridge and a 
visit by UK Conservative leader Theresa May to 
Scotland. Across the other parties and platforms 
too, McAngus and his colleagues found that the 
SNP referred to independence the joint-least of the 
four main parties, accounting for 10 per cent of 
party communications; 5 per cent less than Labour 
and 12 per cent less than the Liberal Democrats. 
As elephants in the room go, independence 
therefore proved to be a most peculiar specimen: 
one that not only received its warranted attention, 
but excited argument as to who was responsible for 
its invitation. 
Yet, while it is true that the independence issue 
helped distinguish the political debate in Scotland, 
it is also arguable that Scotland became central 
to the UK-wide campaign. At a surface level, this 
was manifest in discussion of the influence that 
Scottish members may have in Westminster. But 
at a deeper level, this was apparent in a lexicon 
portending the destruction of the whole political 
settlement. Picking up on a trope developed for 
the 2015 campaign, the rhetoric of Conservative 
campaign groups and right-wing newspapers cast 
the SNP within a “coalition of chaos”, alongside 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats.
This campaign moved along the contours 
of the devolved arrangement, informed by the 
on-going dynamic between contested powers 
across the periphery and the centre. In ways easily 
resolvable by political communicators, this had 
policy implications that may not have been made 
clear. As Cushion has recently noted in relation 
to Scotland, Wales and, now-tellingly, Northern 
Ireland, news and the packaging of party manifes-
tos routinely ignored the devolved status of issues 
such as social care, disregarding the implications 
this may have for voter choice. In its symbolic 
status as well, however, the place of Scotland now 
reaches beyond the composition and balance of 
the House of Commons, and is symptomatic of a 
deeper constitutional uncertainty at a sub-national, 
national and now European level. 
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The General Election did little to solve Wales’ 
‘democratic deficit’
When interviewed on television following his 
narrow win on Ynys Môn, incumbent Labour MP 
Albert Owen attributed his victory over his Con-
servative challenger to two factors: “The people 
of Anglesey were concerned about health and 
education,” he said. Powers over both these issues 
have been devolved to the National Assembly of 
Wales since 1999, and so the people of Anglesey 
would have been better directing their concerns at 
the Labour government in Cardiff than the Con-
servative government in London.
Ignorance of what powers are devolved to 
the National Assembly of Wales continue to raise 
issues of accountability at both Westminster and 
Welsh General Elections. A survey by the BBC/
ICM in 2014 found that there was widespread 
confusion about what powers were devolved to the 
Welsh Assembly, with only 48% correctly identi-
fying that health was a devolved matter, and 42% 
wrongly believing they had control over policing.
The central problem is that while Wales now 
has many of the institutions of a modern na-
tion-state, it lacks a public sphere that would keep 
the public informed about them. The country 
has no English-language national news service, 
and depends largely on the BBC as well as two 
regional newspapers, the Western Mail in south 
of the country and the Daily Post in the north. 
The Western Mail has seen its circulation fall from 
above 55,000 in 1999 to 16,754 in 2016, while 
the Daily Post decided in 2016 to no longer send 
a reporter to the National Assembly to cover 
devolved matters.
In May 2013 the Presiding Officer of the 
Welsh Assembly spoke in stark terms of what 
she termed the “democratic deficit” in Wales. 
She identified a “financial pressures faced by our 
indigenous Welsh national and regional press” 
as the main culprit, which meant that the pop-
ulation relied on “Anglo-centric” broadcasters 
and news outlets that reported on England-only 
issues as though they applied to the whole of the 
UK. One would therefore presume that elections 
would be a means of dispelling people’s ignorance 
about these matters, due to the increased focus on 
Welsh politics. However, rather than clarifying the 
dividing lines between the different parliaments, 
both Westminster and Welsh General Elections 
tend to further muddy the waters.
The Labour Party’s rallying cry at last year’s 
Assembly Elections is that they were Wales’ shield 
against the Tory government in Westminster. Their 
own record after 17 years of government in Wales 
was barely mentioned. During this year’s West-
minster General Election, the reverse happened, 
as they sought to distance themselves from 
Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership by emphasising their 
autonomy from the UK Labour Party.
The Welsh Labour manifesto for the Westmin-
ster Election included plans for a relief road for the 
M4, improvements to the A55 and plans for metros 
for south and north east Wales. It also included a 
commitment to 30 hours of free childcare a week, a 
promise to build 20,000 affordable homes in Wales, 
and an increase the number of nurses, doctors, 
consultants and GPs caring for patients.
But the Welsh Labour MPs the public were being 
asked to vote for would have no role in implementing 
these policies - transport, education, housing and 
health are already devolved to Wales, and under the 
control of the Labour Welsh Government.
It is not clear what precisely can be done to 
ensure that the people of Wales are better informed 
about the distribution of powers between the 
Welsh Assembly and Westminster Parliament.
The growth of online alternatives has only 
hastened the Welsh print media’s slow decline since 
its golden age in the 19th century. Ownership and 
editorial decisions are being further centralised 
outside of Wales’ borders. The BBC could shoulder 
a greater burden in ensuring that news about 
Welsh politics reached a wider audience.
A 2010 report by Cushion et al into how 
much coverage of devolution was involved in 
the BBC’s UK output found that, excluding news 
about UK politics at Westminster, only 3.6% 
of BBC television, radio and online news was 
geographically relevant to Wales, compared with 
4.5% for Northern Ireland, 9.9% for Scotland and 
82% for England.
It could be argued that the Welsh Assembly 
itself needs to take a more proactive role in 
educating the public about its role, either by 
investing greater resources in providing its own 
online content, or by financing independent, 
not-for-profit media. The online Welsh-language 
news website, Golwg 360, which is subsidies by 
the Welsh government, offers a model for how this 
could be done.
The only certainty is that an increased focus 
on Welsh politics will not necessarily solve the 
‘democratic deficit’, if it is done through the prism 
of a media that itself has little understanding of or 
interest in devolution.
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Northern Ireland’s voters could be forgiven if their 
immediate reaction to Theresa May’s calling a snap 
election was one of complete exasperation. Barely 
a month had passed since snap elections to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly, and the 2017 General 
Election would be the seventh time in four years 
that they were asked to troop to the polls
The 2017 General Election result in Northern 
Ireland should be viewed in light of develop-
ments at the devolved level. Even by the prov-
ince’s standards, 2017 has been a seismic year in 
Northern Irish politics. It began with the collapse 
of the power-sharing government at Stormont; 
Sinn Féin Deputy First Minister (DFM) Martin 
McGuinness resigning in protest at the Demo-
cratic Unionist Party’s (DUP) mismanagement of 
a government-funded renewable energy initia-
tive, among other things. Sinn Féin’s refusal to 
nominate a DFM unless DUP leader and First 
Minister Arlene Foster stepped aside while a public 
inquiry was held into the scheme triggered fresh 
Assembly elections in March. Those elections saw 
a marked surge in the nationalist vote, depriving 
unionists of a majority at Stormont for the first 
time in the history of the Northern Irish state and 
bringing Sinn Féin to within 1,168 votes and one 
seat of the DUP’s mantle as the largest party. The 
abiding impression was therefore one of nationalist 
gains juxtaposed with unionist decline.
Following the Assembly election, the DUP 
and Sinn Féin entered negotiations to end the 
impasse at Stormont. While there were small 
signs of progress, talks were cut short by the 
General Election. The Westminster election 
could therefore not have come at a worse time 
as far as power-sharing in Northern Ireland was 
concerned. Any prospect of reconciliation was 
quickly extinguished as parties retreated to their 
respective corners for another divisive campaign. 
With the close-run Assembly contest still fresh in 
voters’ minds, the two main parties – the DUP and 
Sinn Féin – appealed to their communities for a 
mandate to strengthen their hand in post-election 
talks on the restoration of devolution.
Fuelled in part by the first-past-the-post 
electoral system, Westminster elections in 
Northern Ireland typically take the form of 
sectarian headcounts. 2017 was no exception. To 
avoid splitting the unionist vote the DUP opted 
not to field a candidate in Fermanagh and South 
Tyrone. Likewise, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 
did not stand in North Belfast, gifting the DUP 
a clear run against Sinn Féin. These informal 
constituency-level pacts were not replicated by the 
nationalist parties.
The election proved nothing short of a 
triumph for the DUP – securing ten of the eighteen 
seats available and increasing its share of the vote 
by 10.3 percent. This represented a high-water 
mark for the party at Westminster and would, 
ultimately, grant it ‘kingmaker’ status at national 
level (see below). Its eight-seat haul from the 2015 
General Election was defended with relative ease, 
including in East Belfast where the incumbent was 
under pressure from a strong Alliance challenge. 
As well as gains in South Antrim and South Belfast 
– at the expense of the UUP and Social Democratic 
and Labour Party (SDLP) respectively – the party 
took a substantial chunk out of the Independent 
Lady Sylvia Hermon’s vote in North Down. 11 seats 
might well be achievable for the DUP in the not-
too-distant future. 
DUP joy was matched by UUP angst. 
Following Mike Nesbitt’s resignation in the wake 
of a poor showing in March’s Assembly contest, the 
party entered the election under new leadership. It 
would prove a chastening debut for Robin Swann 
as his party lost both its seats, South Antrim and 
Fermanagh and South Tyrone. The UUP’s overall 
vote share slumped to 10.3 percent – a 5.7 percent 
decline on 2015. Coming off the back of a dismal 
Assembly election, this result leaves the once 
dominant Ulster Unionists facing serious questions 
as to how they fashion a way forward and arrest 
their interminable decline. 
A similar picture – of a moderate party 
suffering electoral wipe-out at the hands of a more 
hard-line ethno-national rival – was observable on 
the nationalist side. Sinn Féin – with new northern 
leader Michelle O’Neill at the helm – posted its 
best ever Westminster result, winning seven seats. 
The most significant Sinn Féin gains came in South 
Down and Foyle, both at the expense of the SDLP. 
These seats were long established SDLP citadels: 
South Down had been represented by an SDLP MP 
since 1987; Foyle since 1983. Coupled with losing 
South Belfast to the DUP, these losses would leave 
the SDLP facing a similar existential crisis to that 
of the UUP. 
Whatever of the results – and questions of the 
future viability of the UUP and SDLP – the 2017 
election in Northern Ireland will be remembered 
for the bearing it would have on the formation of 
a national government. The Conservative Party’s 
failure to secure an overall majority at Westminster 
saw them invite the DUP to prop up a minority 
government. What this Conservative-DUP ar-
rangement means for the future of devolution in 
Northern Ireland, and relations between the DUP 
and Sinn Féin remains to be seen. No longer an 
exceptional ‘place apart’, often consigned to the 
margins of UK politics, all eyes are suddenly on 
Northern Ireland.
GE2017 in Northern Ireland: total eclipse of the 
moderates
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Previous research into ‘dual screening,’ when 
individuals switch between broadcast media and 
social media and provide commentary during 
media events, has suggested that this ‘viewertariat’ 
is typically a small but vocal minority (Anstead 
& O’Loughlin, 2011; Vaccari et al, 2015) . My aim 
here is to add to the limited empirical data on these 
practices by exploring the preliminary results of a 
study of how Northern Irish tweeters responded 
to the BBC Northern Ireland Leaders’ debate 
on 6th June. While it is beyond the scope of this 
article to fully explore the context in which this 
televised debate took place, the continued impasse 
over efforts to restore the Stormont Assembly and 
disagreements over how to respond to Brexit had 
resulted in a negative campaign characterised by 
SDLP and Sinn Fein demands for a border poll 
and DUP rallying calls for unionists to come out in 
support of the Union. It should also be noted that 
there was much criticism of DUP leader Arlene 
Foster for declining an invite to participate (Sir 
Jeffrey Donaldson would represent the party), with 
Sinn Fein’s Michelle O’Neill also a late withdrawal 
due to illness (to be replaced by John O’Dowd). 
The BBC debate would also provide an opportu-
nity for Colum Eastwood (SDLP), Naomi Long 
(Alliance) and Robin Swann (Ulster Unionists) to 
make a last pitch to the Northern Irish electorate 
before polling day.
I used Discovertext to collect and analyse 
1,842 tweets tagged with the official hashtag 
(#bbcnidebate) between 3pm and the end of 
the one hour live debate at 9pm. Twitter activity 
tended to spike just after key moments in the 
debate (see Figure 1). For example, between 8.27 
and 8.30pm Donaldson would be ridiculed by 
tweeters for waving a photograph of Sinn Fein’s 
Máirtín Ó Muilleoir meeting Ulster Defence 
Association leader Jackie McDonald at O’Dowd 
when challenged about loyalist endorsement of 
DUP candidates in the election. The DUP rep-
resentative would also be the main talking point 
during the spike in hashtagged tweets between 8.33 
and 8.39pm, when there would be bemusement 
about how he knew about a forthcoming Belfast 
Telegraph story on Shankill bomber Sean Kelly 
canvassing for Sinn Fein.
The response of tweeters to Donaldson’s 
contribution to the debate came at the expense 
of other talking points such as Brexit and the 
scandals that had resulted in the collapse of the 
Stormont Executive (see Figure 2). There were 
also efforts made by each of the parties to flood 
Twitter with quotes from their respective candi-
dates and provide evidence to corroborate their 
attacks on each other. For example, the DUP 
official account tweeted a link to a story about 
Kelly’s link to dissident republican terrorists 
immediately after Donaldson’s claim about him 
canvassing for Sinn Fein. However, as per my 
previous study, the republican party appeared to be 
the most strategic in terms of their use of Twitter 
during the debate. One of the most shared tweets 
in the corpus (retweeted 17 times) was attribut-
ed to An Phoblacht, its official newspaper.Titled 
‘SDLP credibility test’, it featured a picture of MPs 
Mark Durkan, Alasdair McDonnell, and Margaret 
Ritchie along with the caption ‘Couldn’t lead the 
SDLP’ and the hastag #Retired2Westminster. Nev-
ertheless, it was notable that the tweets produced 
by each of the official parties represented at the 
debate tended only to be shared by accounts main-
tained by party activists and supporters. However, 
further work is needed in order to explore this 
preliminary finding about the ways in which these 
tweets were shared during the debate.   
Northern Ireland tweeters appeared to 
respond favourably to the performances of Naomi 
Long and Colum Eastwood. The former would be 
praised for ‘talking the most sense’ and recognising 
the complex causes of political violence (particu-
larly in comparison to Donaldson and O’Dowd). 
They were also angry at Donaldson’s lack of respect 
for the Alliance party leader and for shushing her 
during the debate.  The SDLP leader would also 
receive praise for his withering attack on O’Dowd, 
in which he claimed Sinn Fein had no influence in 
the EU Parliament due to its decision to sit with 
the communist parties of Bohemia and Moravia. 
Although O’Dowd received few messages of 
support via the hashtag, a few tweeters did express 
anger at host Noel Thompson’s ‘biased’ and ‘unfair’ 
questions to the Sinn Fein representative. 
Further work is needed in order to understand 
the dynamics of these information flows and what 
impact, if any, they have on digital ‘refuseniks’ and 
‘watchers’ who don’t contribute to such hashtags. 
However, these preliminary results do suggest 
that social media metrics (e.g. retweets) may offer 
greater insight into the relative popularity of each 
party rather than the views expressed by ‘unaffili-
ated’ citizens.Figure 1: #bbcnidebate tweets during 
Northern Ireland Leaders’ Debate, 8-9pm.
Twitter, dual screening and the BBC Northern 
Ireland Leaders’ debate
Figure 1: #bbcnidebate tweets during Northern Ireland 
Leaders’ Debate, 8-9pm.
Figure 2: Most frequently occurring words in 
#BBCnidebate
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Brexit was central to this election, but not in the 
way we might have expected. The momentous 
implications of Brexit, both for the UK and for the 
EU, were for the most part sidelined by a campaign 
dominated by domestic concerns and May’s public 
relations implosion. Labour glossed over the con-
tradictions of their Brexit strategy and resolutely 
campaigned for social justice. The May-centric 
campaign, with its ‘strong and stable’ mantra, 
never went much beyond superficial sound bites. 
Nevertheless this was the Brexit election. It was 
rooted in the triumphalism of the Leave campaign’s 
victory of June 23rd 2016, which we were told was 
a foundational political moment. Brexitland was a 
new Kingdom, in which the people had taken back 
control of their country from the Westminster 
and Brussels elites, and their representatives were 
compelled to restore sovereignty and greatness 
in their name. Born-again Brexiteer Theresa 
May perfectly symbolized the new order, having 
renounced her ‘Remain’ tendencies, she fully 
embraced the Brexit cause. Brussels may be out to 
get ‘us’, interfering in our election and proposing to 
extort billions for daring to leave, but it will be no 
match for this ‘bloody difficult woman’. 
With a 20 point lead in the poll, May’s decision 
to call an election made sense. She concluded that 
the people wanted Brexitland and they want her to 
be its leader. Once ordained, her authority would 
be absolute and she could enter into battle with 
the EU as the people’s champion. The point of the 
election was to crush dissenters in parliament who 
continued to resist the will of the people. “The 
country is coming together but Westminster is not” 
she told the nation. While in hindsight this appears 
hubristic, May’s agency should not be overstat-
ed. She is the inevitable product of a right wing 
Eurosceptic coup within an archaic ‘winner takes 
all’ parliamentary system. She has surrounded 
herself by hard line Brexiteers, many of whom have 
nurtured the fantasy of revived greatness outside 
of the EU for thirty years. Most importantly they 
believed the referendum and the election would 
transform populist Euroscepticism into the moral 
community of Brexitland, and who better to do 
this than the vicar’s daughter? 
The Brexit vision we were told was rooted 
in notions of authenticity, its core base were the 
‘citizens of somewhere’, at the heart of the nation in 
ways that elites no longer understood or appreci-
ated. These social identities were mobilised by the 
Eurosceptic ideology of British exceptionalism, 
superiority and sovereignty. From this view, to 
spell out what Brexit meant, its complexities and 
impossibilities, is to undermine the vision of Brexit 
in all its ‘back to the future’ simplicity. In this 
sense, Brexit is what we are not what we become. It 
opposes all those who bring change - to the EU, to 
experts, to metropolitan elites, and to immigrants.  
Any future it projects must be rooted in the past. 
According to Boris, the Brexit negotiations may 
get a bit ‘hairy’ but we’ll be ‘perfectly OK’ even if 
there’s no deal. The vision is ‘post-Brexit’ global 
Britain as Empire 2.0, economically secure in a 
revival of the Commonwealth and Anglosphere. In 
Brexitland the future is never a problem as we are 
always returning to greatness.
Farage complained following the election 
result that this is what you get when you put a 
Remainer in charge of Brexit but the collapse of 
UKIP demonstrated, with many voters turning to 
Labour, that the problem was more fundamen-
tal. When it became clear that the ‘Empress had 
no clothes’ it also demonstrated the vacuousness 
underlying the Eurosceptic power grab. Its biggest 
challenge has come from young people, who do 
not want to live in the past and face chronically 
insecure futures. In the referendum and election 
they have voted for a society that is open, diverse 
and fair. They reflect the reality of what the UK 
has been becoming for some time a more urban, 
educated and cosmopolitan society but also one 
that is more unequal and socially unjust. They are 
experiencing intergenerational injustice as their 
debts mount, their pay does not increase and they 
struggle to buy a home. Corbyn’s appeal to the 
reality of social injustice is the perfect antithesis 
to Brexitland fantasies. Nevertheless, while the 
election may represent the end of Brexitland, Brexit 
continues and, as the economy slows, is more 
threatening than ever. 
Brexit without Brexitland
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At the heart of Theresa May’s logic for calling the 
snap General Election was the argument that she 
needed a stronger mandate as she entered into 
negotiations with the European Union on the 
process of withdrawal. Having formally begun 
the process of Article 50 discussions at the end of 
March, May now needed to be able to demonstrate 
the commitment of the UK to pursuing this to its 
conclusion on the terms laid out by the Conserv-
ative Government in its White Paper, so that she 
could get the ‘best deal’ for the country. Moreover, 
Brexit became one of the issues that May used 
to contrast herself with Jeremy Corbyn, who she 
tried to present as lacking in leadership or having a 
coherent policy on the matter.
Quite aside from the merits of this line 
of argument as a campaign strategy, the more 
pertinent point is one of whether it holds true 
for the Article 50 negotiations. The EU insti-
tutions and leaders of EU member states were 
pointedly quiet during the general election 
campaign, limiting any comment to their pursuit 
of agreement among themselves on negotiating 
documents on citizens’ rights and the financial 
settlement, and reminding the UK that the clock 
continues to count down to the March 2019 
deadline. As in the EU referendum, there was a 
general understanding that there is nothing to be 
gained by trying to participate in the hermetical-
ly-sealed bubble of British politics.
Even if there were something that could be 
achieved, it would be dwarfed by the structural issue 
of how Article 50 works. It is a mechanism for the 
EU to manage the departure of a member state, 
rather than one for a departing member state to 
craft a new relationship: think of it as a schedule for 
the EU to work out what it will offer, rather than a 
menu from which the UK might pick and mix.
This is evident in a number of ways. During 
April 2017, the EU confirmed that it would 
approach Article 50 in a phased manner, working 
to resolve outstanding liabilities before discussing 
frameworks for a new package to be negotiated 
post-exit. Despite bluster from various parties, this 
means dealing with finances at the beginning, as 
well as forcing the UK to accept a role for the EU’s 
Court of Justice in overseeing the new package. In 
addition, the ever-increasing level of detailed po-
sitioning coming from the EU side contrasts with 
the vagueness of all the main parties’ manifestos on 
the subject.
In crude terms, the size of the new govern-
ment’s mandate – and even the shape of its policy 
preferences – is going to have very little impact on 
the substantive negotiations that were due to begin 
on 19 June, beyond the basic choice between being 
members of the single market or not. This is not 
because the EU does not care about the UK, but 
because it also has to care about the interests of the 
remaining 27 members, each of which has its own 
political imperatives and mandate. As the election 
of Emmanuel Macron in France in May demon-
strated, even a ‘big’ member state has little effect on 
how Brexit will run, let alone one that is heading 
for the door.
If the election is to have an impact then it 
will be in two areas. Firstly, the uncertainty over 
May’s position immediately after the vote has 
raised questions about whether 19 June will see 
talks occur, as both sides might feel more certainty 
on the composition and longevity of the British 
Government is needed. This means less time to 
reach an agreement within the two-year timeframe 
of Article 50, which in turn strengthens the EU’s 
hand, as the only party with a clear strategy.
Secondly, the British Government’s room for 
manoeuvre in detailed negotiations is likely to 
become constrained: the Tory leadership now has 
to balance hard and soft Brexiteers with the DUP, 
any one of which could deprive a government 
majority. Assuming this balances out, even if policy 
does not move, then UK negotiators are going 
to be less flexible, as they manage their domestic 
audience. This is going to make an already-difficult 
process even more so.
Why the General Election will make little 
difference to the Article 50 negotiations
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Brexit is the spectre at the feast. It was the making 
of Theresa May as Prime Minister in the first place; 
it was cited as the reason we had a snap general 
election; and it was the driving force behind May’s 
personalised campaign. It looms large as the 
biggest legal transition the country has faced in 
generations, and it could well be etched into the 
political epitaphs of the ‘victors’ now sat nervously 
at the cabinet table. 
But it remained a shadowy presence in 
the campaigns. An inability, or unwillingness, 
to engage with the details of Brexit meant that 
politicians had very little to say of substance. May 
urged us to believe she will make a ‘success of 
Brexit’ while Corbyn has spoken enigmatically of 
a ‘jobs-first’ Brexit. The manifestos gave the matter 
very little attention. The Conservative manifesto 
made numerous Brexit mentions, but devoted 
only two pages (out of 83 pages of text) to actually 
discussing it. The Labour manifesto didn’t give it 
much more space – 4 out of 95 pages of text. Both 
were supremely vague on their objectives; the 
Conservatives wished to ‘pursue a deep an special 
partnership’ with the EU, while Labour wanted 
the ‘benefits of the Single Market and the Customs 
Union.’ Corbyn has repeatedly spoken ‘tariff-free 
access’ which does not really mean anything.  The 
magnitude and complexity of Brexit – and its 
sheer unknowableness – makes it a difficult, if not 
impossible topic to debate without descending 
into empty rhetoric, and makes it a difficult sell 
in the great marketing project of an election. And 
so while the word ‘Brexit’ was swung around like 
an oratorical weapon, even the basic objectives of 
Brexit were not discussed, debated, or scrutinised. 
The White Papers on Leaving the EU, and on the 
Great Repeal Bill had provided very little concrete 
detail, beyond ominous suggestions that govern-
ment would be awarded substantial delegated 
powers to ‘correct the statute book’. The papers 
were barely mentioned during the campaigns. 
In the ‘Leaders Special’ of Question Time, David 
Dimbleby asked May what a ‘bad deal’ would be; 
she responded that a bad deal would be one that 
‘punished’ the UK, or was the ‘worst possible deal 
at the highest possible price’. She might as well have 
said that a nasty deal would be a bad deal. There 
was a desperate dearth of detail in the campaigns 
on the biggest, most complex political issue facing 
the UK. 
On the rights of EU nationals in the UK, a 
pressing issue stemming from the leave vote, the 
Conservatives proposed to ‘secure’ their entitle-
ments, and the Labour Party pledged to ‘immedi-
ately guarantee’ them. Again this tells us very little. 
This issue on its own is incredibly complicated; 
the EU Rights Project has shown that it is hard 
enough to discern, and then assert, EU nationals’ 
rights as it is in light of recent changes, let alone 
during and after Brexit. What measures would 
be taken to distinguish those who live in Britain 
from newcomers? What rights will be retained? 
What about the rights of children? What about 
when those children turn eighteen? What about 
EU nationals not yet born – will the right to reside 
be heritable for future generations? What of third 
country national spouses? How will other family 
members be defined? What about temporary 
returns to states of origin? 
These questions demand a modicum of legal 
literacy, and there was little enough in evidence 
during the campaigns. However, in contrast to 
May’s emphatic presentation of herself as negoti-
ator-in-chief, during the course of the campaign 
Corbyn moved from emphasising his role in 
‘reaching out to colleagues across Europe’, to place 
greater emphasis upon the legal credentials of his 
Shadow Secretary of State for exiting the European 
Union, Keir Starmer. It is possible, that maybe, just 
maybe, after a period of disfavour, experts might 
be creeping back into fashion…. 
The election result achieved the seemingly im-
possible, in that it has complicated things further. 
The minority government cannot steam-roller 
Brexit plans through Parliament, and will have to 
work harder to get cross-party agreement. This 
may mean there will be more meaningful debate 
and scrutiny. But we do not have the luxury 
of time; the two-year Brexit clock is ticking. 
According to Article 50(3) the deadline could 
be extended, but that requires the unanimous 
agreement of the other 27 Member States, so we 
should probably start meta-negotiations for an 
extension now. And the DUP – armed with its 
own wish list - has been unpredictably catapulted 
into a potentially pivotal role, which begs serious 
questions about what might be bartered for Brexit. 
As the deadline bears down on us we need to 
get beyond evasions and platitudes, and into the 
legal, economic, social, political and environmental 
specifics. And yes – like it or not, we are going to 
need experts. 
Totem, taboo and trigger word: the dominance 
and obscurity of Brexit in the campaigns
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The Conservatives and Brexit: the election and after
The main narratives emerging about the 2017 
general election are that it was a ‘Brexit election’ 
and that the Conservative campaign was disas-
trous. But the two are not closely intertwined. 
Brexit was the dominant issue in the Con-
servative campaign yet we learned little about 
their position and rival parties only made limited 
headway in probing it. Still, Brexit did not deliver 
the votes the Conservatives expected. They gained 
some ground in constituencies that registered a 
large Leave vote in 2016, but the greater than an-
ticipated numbers of 2015 UKIP voters switching 
to Labour helped unseat some Conservatives 
and deny them gains in the Midlands and North. 
Labour significantly increased its vote share in 
areas with large Remain votes.
As in 1997 and 2001, a Conservative campaign 
built around the EU issue did not bring great 
reward – but back then, Conservative divisions had 
been a key reason. David Cameron lowered the 
salience of the EU issue at the 2010 election and his 
referendum pledge kept a lid on dissent in 2015. 
In the referendum, 186 Conservative MPs voted 
Remain and 141 voted Leave (3 did not disclose 
their vote). 
Yet Brexit, and internal divisions on it, was not 
the cause of the Conservatives’ campaign calamity. 
There was no major Conservative dissent on Brexit 
during the campaign. Hard Brexiteers were rela-
tively quiescent, buoyed by Theresa May’s embrace 
of parts of their agenda. Nine Remain Conserva-
tive MPs had voted against the European Union 
(Notification of Withdrawal) Bill and seven others 
deliberately abstained. They did not dissent from 
the party line during the campaign, but a softer 
position on Brexit could not save Ben Howlett 
(Bath) and Tania Mathias (Twickenham) in heavily 
Remain constituencies.
Of the Conservative candidates standing in 
England and Wales, online searches reveal that 248 
(43%) had voted Leave and 233 (41%) Remain. 
Among those who were not MPs in 2015-17, 109 
voted Leave and 57 Remain. But most candidates 
rehashed the central party message rather than 
highlighting their own vote. There was no readily 
accessible public statement of how 91 candidates 
(16%) had voted. Many of these had not cam-
paigned actively in the referendum (or the election 
itself). Some refused to disclose their vote and/
or removed online evidence of it. Remainers may 
have been particularly reluctant to reveal their vote 
now that Brexit was party policy, but candidates 
from both camps may also have been wary of 
disclosing their position if it was contrary to the 
referendum result in their constituency. 
The 2017 Conservative parliamentary party 
consists of 169 MPs who voted Remain, 138 who 
voted Leave and 10 (6 from Scotland) whose 
referendum vote was undisclosed. But many 
of the former were ‘reluctant Remainers’ and 
have accepted the Leave vote with few qualms. 
The trend since 1979 of each cohort being more 
Eurosceptic than the last continues. Considering 
seat losses and gains plus retirements and replace-
ments since the referendum, there is a net loss 
of 18 Remain-voting MPs and 2 Leave MPs. Neil 
Carmichael, chair of the Conservative Group for 
Europe, lost his seat as did persistent Eurosceptic 
rebels David Nuttall and Stewart Jackson.
The EU issue wrecked the premierships 
of Margaret Thatcher, John Major and David 
Cameron. Theresa May now faces her own perfect 
storm on Brexit:
(i) a minority government with a wounded 
prime minister at its head, propped up by the 
Democratic Unionist Party which has its own 
Brexit demands. 
(ii) the EU issue will dominate the new Parlia-
ment as negotiations with the EU get underway and 
the government tries to get the ‘Great Repeal Bill’ 
and other Brexit-related legislation through parlia-
ment without having a majority in either House.
(iii) a group of some 60 hard Brexiteers 
associated with the European Research Group 
who will insist upon leaving the single market 
and the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Justice, oppose a ‘divorce bill’ and lengthy transi-
tion period, and who would not hesitate (indeed, 
might relish) to walk away from negotiations 
without a deal. Among their ranks are a core of 
Eurosceptic rebels who have mastered the art 
of using parliamentary procedures to make life 
difficult for the government.
(iv) a smaller group of Remain MPs who will 
be emboldened by what they interpret as voters’ 
rejection of hard Brexit and will not shy away from 
rebellion and will seek to forge cross-party alliances 
to extract concessions from the government. Twelve 
new Scottish Conservative MPs will seek greater 
recognition of Scotland’s distinctive interests.
Theresa May hoped that by strengthening her 
personal authority and increasing her parliamen-
tary majority, a general election would give her a 
mandate for Brexit and afford her more room for 
manoeuvre. Instead it has made the most difficult 
single challenge facing any post-war government 
even more formidable.
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The 2017 UK election: reflections from Norway
When discussing the 2017 UK election and 
its possible implications, it is useful to refer to 
Norway’s experiences and to draw some parallels 
between the UK and Norway. Norway has had two 
popular referenda on EU membership, one in 1972 
and the other in 1994. Both produced small ‘no’ 
majorities. The interesting point about the 1994 
referendum is that it was arranged after Norway 
had entered into the EEA agreement with the EU. 
Thus, in the 1994 referendum, the Norwegian 
population was not simply voting for or against EU 
membership, it was voting on the type of relation-
ship that Norway should have with the EU. The un-
derlying options were: free trade agreement (revert 
back to pre-EEA status); the EEA Agreement; and 
EU membership. All subsequent elections have 
produced parliaments with a significant majority 
of MPs that support EU membership. Voters who 
voted no to membership in the 1994 referendum 
have thus voted in favour of parties that have 
officially endorsed EU membership. They knew 
that their voter choice would not affect the EU 
membership issue. 
There are clear parallels to the UK situation. 
In the referendum, the underlying options were at 
least three: some form of trade agreement with the 
EU; inclusion in the EU’s single market (similar to 
the EEA Agreement); and continued EU mem-
bership. It was quite clear what would happen if 
voters voted Remain, but not if they voted Leave. 
Voters were not given the option to decide whether 
they should authorize the government to go for a 
soft Brexit or for a hard Brexit. PM Theresa May 
entered the 2017 election with a resolve to opt for 
a hard Brexit. Additionally she made all kinds of 
assurances of continued EU access, but did not 
spell out how that would come about when the 
UK would no longer be part of the EU’s customs 
union or single market. In the election it became 
clear that voters supported parties that sought a 
more binding association with the EU. UK voters, 
as Norwegian voters, rejected EU membership, but 
wanted to retain a close relationship with the rest 
of Europe.
Another parallel between the UK and 
Norway pertains to the problem of finding 
a proper democratic procedure to settle the 
deeply divisive EU membership issue. PM 
May’s behavior during the election campaign 
is symptomatic of these problems: she stressed 
that the election should be about Brexit but did 
not engage with the key underlying question, 
namely: which UK in which Europe? This 
fundamental issue cannot be addressed without 
paying sufficient heed to historical bonds and 
obligations. That would bring out the affinities 
between people on the British Isles and those in 
the rest of Europe, and such a discussion would 
need to include their voices and views, as well. In 
many ways, the UK election gives credence to the 
strength of Laura Cram’s notion of ‘banal Euro-
peanism’, or the sense of attachment that people 
develop through their daily engagements and in-
teractions. Strong forces sought to replace this by 
a narrow, exclusive nationalism that sits uneasily 
with Britain’s history and global outlook.
In Norway, the equivalent question: ‘which 
Norway in which Europe’ has never been properly 
discussed. Formal status as EU non-member 
retains the impression of sovereign control. In 
reality there is a significant gap between the 
illusion of sovereign control and the reality of 
self-imposed hegemonic submission (including 
taxation without representation). 
Many analysts believe that the UK election 
result will compel the government to opt for a 
‘soft’ Brexit. There is renewed talk of the so-called 
Norway model. Note that each EFTA country can 
bar the UK from entering the EEA after Brexit. It 
is not likely but UK admission requires their active 
consent. Some in Norway think that a UK that 
seeks a binding EU relationship could spell the end 
of the EEA Agreement. Others are concerned that 
UK EEA membership will politicize and render 
Norway’s EU relationship more difficult to manage. 
Norway’s EU relationship is based on a complex 
domestic compromise between a popular majority 
that does not want EU membership and a business 
sector anxious to have secure access to the EU 
market. This situation of close association without 
formal membership survives through removing 
the deeply divisive EU membership issue from the 
political agenda and preventing it from interfering 
with the rapid and dynamic EU adaptation. UK 
EEA membership is likely to politicize and render 
the status of non-EU member more apparent; 
hence reduce certainty. 
Norway’s experience brings up democratic 
procedural questions of relevance to the UK: How 
long does a popular referendum result ‘bind’ a gov-
ernment to a specific course of action? Can – and 
should - an election result override the popular ref-
erendum result? If so, under what circumstances? 
These are not only practical questions but require 
theoretical-normative reflection.
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The German print media covered the general 
elections of June 2017 very extensively. It is fair 
to say that German newspapers and magazines 
tend to be more outward looking than their 
British counterparts, and that British (and other 
elections across Europe) always receive a lot of 
attention. This time, a plethora of issues and events 
were picked up by the press and discussed along 
partisan lines. The key themes were: the future role 
of the state in Britain’s economy; Islamist terrorism 
and the different reactions to the recent attacks 
in Britain; and Brexit. Each theme will be briefly 
discussed in the following three paragraphs. 
The future of the British market economy
Partisan affinities are clearly reflected in the 
coverage and the reporting. For instance, the 
left-wing newspaper Tageszeitung (TAZ) published 
a piece about Labour MP Kate Hoey’s campaign in 
Vauxhall, focusing on her Eurosceptic views. What 
comes through in this article is a sense of political 
disillusionment many working-class voters in 
Vauxhall express after years of austerity. The TAZ 
also notes that Prime Minister Theresa May has 
“added some Labour policies to her 
programme. She wants to make the Tories more 
palatable to the traditional Labour voters, for 
whom party leader Jeremy Corbyn is too far on the 
Left: more state intervention instead of uncon-
trolled market economy, limiting manager salaries 
with the help of shareholders, more participation 
for workers, an upper limit for energy prices. At a 
first glance, this sounds good. But is there a reason 
why we should trust a Prime Minister who, over 
many months, asserted that there wouldn’t be early 
elections, only to hold them suddenly and out of 
base motives?”
A different perspective on Britain’s economy 
is taken by the conservative Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung (FAZ). Here, predictably, Labour 
leader Jeremy Corbyn’s manifesto is criticized for 
being too leftwing and regressive in its call for the 
re-nationlisation of some key industries, such as 
Royal Mail and the railways. Labour’s manifesto 
is described as a farewell note to the market 
economy. The FAZ’s focus however, lies on the 
terrorist attacks in Manchester and London, and 
how these have affected the election campaign. 
The British response to Islamist terrorism 
The FAZ praises Theresa May’s strong words and 
willingness to confront Islamist extremists. Her 
speech of 4 June, in which she introduced a four-
point plan to combat extremism, and in which she 
proposes stricter laws and more online surveil-
lance, is well received by the FAZ. By contrast, the 
centre-left Süddeutsche Zeitung is more sympathet-
ic towards Jeremy Corbyn’s statement that “the war 
on terror has failed” and that Britain’s involvement 
in some of the wars in the Middle East, such as in 
Libya, might have contributed to the radicalisation 
of home-grown Islamist terrorists. In the article it 
is also argued that national security has become 
the dominant theme of the campaign. But although 
the Süddeutsche Zeitung remains critical of Theresa 
May, the newspaper was by no means convinced 
that Corbyn will win the elections:
“Is is, however, unlikely that the Tories will 
lose the election. For this to happen, Corbyn’s pop-
ularity isn’t big enough, and in addition [shadow 
Home Secretary] Diane Abbot speaks too much 
nonsense. It is rather possible that the victory will 
be far less clear than expected, and perhaps even so 
narrow that little will change in the current balance 
of power. In this case, one could ask themselves 
why citizens were asked to vote again.”
The absence of Brexit
The implications of the UK elections on Britain’s 
Brexit negotiations is of major interest to Germany. 
Different newspapers from across the political 
spectrum have highlighted that Brexit – the 
trigger of the snap election – was largely absent 
from the campaign. An article published by the 
liberal, centrist newspaper Tagesspiegel, entitled 
“Brexit-election campaign in Great Britain: beating 
around the bush” argues that despite Theresa May’s 
discourse of a ‘strong and stable’ Conservative 
Government, British voters are far from united 
in their views on Brexit and in their preferences 
for Britain’s future relationship with the EU.  The 
article also highlights the Labour Party’s internal 
divisions over Brexit and Jeremy Corbyn’s ambiva-
lence towards the EU. 
The ‘Chaos-Queen’ from Downing Street
As expected, the election results have triggered 
speculation about Theresa May’s future as Prime 
Minister and the challenges she might face in 
building coalitions. The Süddeutsche Zeitung calls 
Theresa May ‘the chaos-queen from Downing 
Street’ who “has managed to further increase the 
uncertainty in her country”. The FAZ also high-
lights the pressure May will be facing from the 
left and the right when negotiating Brexit. It will 
be impossible to please everybody, the newspaper 
explains. Overall, the German press portrays May 
as a lonely and beleaguered leader who might not 
stay in power for much longer. 
Partisan and plentiful: the 2017 UK election in 
the German press
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“Will the British manage to surprise us again?”, 
quipped L’Express magazine a week before election 
day, once the campaign had turned out to be much 
more gripping than initially expected. Tracking 
French media coverage of the UK General Election 
campaign had been somewhat dispiriting at first 
due to the paucity and lack of substance of the 
coverage. Because of the Brexit negotiations, the 
stakes were high for France as well as the rest of the 
EU, and thus the French media were eager to frame 
the UK ballot as D-Day for Brexit. But as the topic 
of Brexit in fact ranked very low in the election 
campaign itself, this angle could not get much 
traction. As in the UK, the tipping point came 
with the publication of the YouGov/Times poll on 
26 May which showed a significant narrowing of 
the gap between Labour and the Conservatives. 
Something unexpected was beginning to take 
place. The spectacular rise of Labour combined 
with the shock of the two terror attacks rekindled 
French media interest. Despite initial concerns 
that French media coverage consisted mainly of 
rehashed UK articles and news agencies’ dispatch-
es, and that this failed to provide a specific French 
perspective, the analysis did eventually yield some 
interesting results.
If there was an initial lack of attention for 
the UK election campaign in the French media, 
with coverage almost nonexistent until two weeks 
before election day, this was largely a reflection of 
the fact that the UK General Election was sand-
wiched between the French presidential election 
(whose final ballot took place on 7 May) and the 
subsequent legislative election. In the national 
and international media, all eyes were set on 
the high drama of Emmanuel Macron’s contest 
against Marine Le Pen. The victory of ‘iconoclastic’ 
Macron and the collapse of the two main parties 
of the left and right made the UK contest between 
the two traditional mainstream parties look very 
dull in comparison, especially as a conservative 
victory seemed a foregone conclusion. The duel 
between Theresa May and Jeremy Corbyn, in many 
ways yesterday’s politicians, hardly came across as 
a clash of the titans. This seemed to confirm the 
perception in France that, with Brexit, the UK had 
started shrinking into itself and may soon become 
an irrelevance. 
Therefore, as in the UK, the surprise results 
were framed by the French media with some irony 
in terms of a risky political gamble – the second 
in two years – which had tragically backfired: 
May had played and lost, her poker strike turning 
against herself. There were references to a similar 
failed political gamble by Jacques Chirac twenty 
years earlier. Describing a spectacular own goal, 
Le Point mused on “the art of shooting oneself in 
the foot”. French coverage of May’s humiliating 
defeat also carried some degree of schadenfreude 
as her aggressive stance in discussions with the EU 
and her attempts to instrumentalise Brexit for her 
own political gain had generated strong resent-
ment. This accounts for the narrative of punished 
arrogance when May found herself caught in her 
own trap. France’s best-selling newspaper Ouest 
France even awarded May the “Palme d’Or for 
political suicide”.
Another dominant narrative was that of the 
victory of hope over fear, epitomised by the figure 
of the underdog (almost) beating the favourite on 
the finishing line. Corbyn, hopeless in the face of 
the Tory juggernaut and subjected to a constant 
stream of shocking attacks by the tabloid press, 
suddenly stands as a model for the French left, as 
once Blair did. The French papers were unanimous 
in hailing Labour’s defeat as a great success. 
“Jeremy Corbyn: singing in defeat”, headlined 
Libération. Even though French commentators and 
politicians are not sure what to make of Corbyn, 
whom they compare in turn to Benoît Hamon 
and Jean-Luc Mélanchon, since the fate of the 
Parti Socialiste seemed to parallel that of Labour, 
the latter’s unexpected reversal of fortune inspires 
hope in French left-wing parties. Hamon was 
quick to congratulate Corbyn in a tweet on 9 June 
and Alexis Corbière, Mélanchon’s spokesperson, 
claimed on FranceTVInfo that Corbyn’s success 
owed much to the France Insoumise model. 
In sum, the unfolding of the UK election 
campaign confirmed the narrative of the unpre-
dictable character of British politics, a perception 
which had been boosted by the shock of the Brexit 
vote. Thus Libération ran an article mocking the 
Conservatives’ penchant for risky gambles which 
have left its European partners stunned. In the 
context of the upcoming Brexit negotiations, 
the French media relayed the EU’s eagerness to 
get some clarity. While the Conservatives’ poor 
showing has generated hope that May’s hard Brexit 
option no longer is the only one on the table, 
French papers have been bemoaning the continued 
uncertainty about the negotiations, since the 
result has plunged Brexit “into a thick fog” in lieu 
of the clear horizon which the snap election was 
supposed to deliver. Meanwhile, the Brexit clock 
which was set in motion with the triggering of 
article 50 on March 29 continues to tick and the 
EU now faces the impossible task of negotiating 
with a Prime Minister sitting on an “ejector seat”. 
The UK 2017 General Election thus provides 
another illustration of the ability of the UK to take 
its French neighbour by surprise, leaving it once 
again dazed and confused and wondering what will 
come next.
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Similarly, to the UK’s perceived ‘special relation-
ship’ with the U.S., policy-makers in Poland warm 
to the idea of enjoying a ‘special relationship’ with 
the UK. This historically unique, yet not always 
politically cosy, relationship has oftentimes been 
a barometer of Anglo-European relations, in 
which Poland has vested interests in. The recent 
‘Brexit election’ in the UK has a strong bearing 
on European affairs, since the political fallout 
resulting from the 2016 Brexit referendum is to be 
determined thereafter. In theory, the result of the 
June election will shape multilateral (pre-Brexit) 
and bilateral (post-Brexit) British-Polish relations. 
In practice, these relations depend on Theresa 
May’s ability to remain in power and, consequently, 
in her ability to implement a compelling Brexit 
negotiations strategy. Unfortunately, the result of 
the UK election is seen in Poland as weakening 
May’s position over the shape of a ‘Brexit deal’, and 
as putting a further shadow on the legitimacy of 
her approach to European affairs. 
The announcement of the snap UK election 
was mirrored in Polish media with reports on two 
central issues: the rights of the Polish diaspora in 
the UK and trade relations between the UK and 
Poland. Despite the emerging voices from within 
the UK Conservative Party, including that of the 
Polish-born MP, Daniel Kawczynski, suggesting 
that when pressed on “free movement within the 
EU and the loss of sovereignty”, among European 
partners, “these fell, and continue to fall, on deaf 
ears”. Yet, following the Brexit referendum, the 
UK Government initiated the development of 
a ‘strategic bilateral relationship’ with Poland 
as a potential supporter of the British position 
during the Brexit negotiations. During the recent 
election campaign, relations between Poland and 
Britain were of limited importance to any political 
party, but the rights of the Polish diaspora in the 
UK have frequently been commented upon as 
the status of Europeans living in the UK is most 
certainly to become a political negotiating card 
in the forthcoming Brexit negotiations. This 
election also revealed that the ‘Polish vote’ in the 
UK is not yet strong enough to make a direct 
impact on political issues, but the recent political 
events have mobilized the UK Poles to engage in 
political debates about the direction their adapted 
homeland is heading to. 
Apart from uncertainties surrounding the 
rights of Europeans in the UK, Poles including, 
Warsaw is concerned about the trade relations 
with the UK as its second biggest export market. 
Since the Brexit referendum, the Polish conserv-
ative government was gearing towards attracting 
jobs and financial capital from London to Warsaw. 
The competition over jobs, capital investment and 
talent became official government policy with a 
view to attract ‘middle and back offices rather than 
their corporate headquarters’ to Warsaw, where 
companies, after all, enjoy full Common Market 
access. In months to follow the UK election, UK 
markets will be observing growing inflation rates, 
but also the outflow of financial capital from 
the UK to Poland and other Common Market 
destinations. The type of the Brexit deal negoti-
ated between May’s government and the EU will 
likely be detrimental to these transnational market 
movements. Polish businesses, however, remain 
optimistic about the UK markets; for example, the 
Polish Airlines LOT has recently increased capacity 
to fly to London. 
The ‘Brexit election’ campaign itself also 
echoed widely in Poland, and news media reported 
on Theresa May proving to be a less charismat-
ic and weaker campaigning leader, losing her 
authority, and openly speculating that she will 
not survive the Brexit negotiations as the Prime 
Minister. Contrary to that, commentators in 
Poland praised Jeremy Corbyn for his ability to 
connect with the UK voters and, in particular, for 
his skills to mobilise youth voters, traditionally 
labelled as a ‘disenchanted’ electorate. Gazeta 
Wyborcza, a leading Polish daily, kicked off its 
reaction to the UK election with a headline stating 
“Catastrophe for Theresa May: Tories lose their 
majority. Corbyn calls for her resignation”. This 
is one of many examples of media reporting on 
the UK elections in Poland through the prism of 
balances of power and issues surrounding nego-
tiation with the EU. The political gamble taken 
by Theresa May by announcing snap election 
backfired, bringing however hope for more 
inclusive politics in the UK, and publically demon-
strating a greater appetite for a ‘softer Brexit’. In his 
congratulatory letter to Theresa May, the Polish 
politician and the President of the European 
Council, Donald Tusk, paid less attention to 
personal curtsies, and more to the issues surround-
ing European affairs. For now, this letter captures 
nicely the mood of the Polish-British relations. 
This, I am sure Theresa May would agree, might 
change soon too.  
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The Italian media have often been accused - both 
by scholars and politicians – to have a too narrow 
domestic perspective. Despite some exceptions, 
most of the Italian newspaper headlines still 
concern the domestic politics. Foreign politics 
news becomes central only when they concern 
‘media events’: the results of the presidential 
elections in France, the election of the President of 
the United States, or the election outcomes in the 
UK. In the last years, however, another phenom-
enon has emerged: we refer to the assimilation 
and overlay process. Shortly, both the media 
and the politicians tend to create an overlapping 
between domestic political trends and the overseas 
politics. It happened during the recent French 
presidential elections (with the development of a 
storytelling about an ‘Italian macronism’) and it 
resumed during the short political campaign for 
the GE2017. 
The view from Italy
During the GE2017 campaign we have observed 
three specific trends in the Italian scenario:
• the development of an assimilation and re-se-
mantization process of UK politics operated 
by the Italian journalists and politicians;
• the development of a projection of the British 
outcomes on the Italian affairs, often adopting 
a stadium supporter’s perspective (they strive 
for one or another for striking the possible 
national equivalents);
• the re-framing of the UK political news in the 
framework of Italian domestic politics.
For the first time in many years, some Italian 
news media tried to explain how the UK electoral 
system works; the Agenzia Italia (one of the most 
important Italian news agency) also produced a 
short video for Twitter. 
Many other newspapers produced briefs 
about UK electoral system, comparing it with 
the German one, which chimed with an ongoing 
debate in Italy around electoral reform. Here, the 
German method (to be precise, an Italian compli-
cated version of that) got an agreement (broken 
after few days) among the four major parties while 
the Left parties proposed a proportional system 
or the re-instatement of the 1994 electoral law 
which is basically based upon the ‘first-past-the-
post’ method. Evidently, Britain did not invent the 
concept of ‘coalition of chaos’!
The main topics of UK GE2017 (in the Italian 
scenario)
The UK General Election has been observed by 
Italy across three main topics: a) the question 
of Brexit and the consequences of the Tories’ 
(expected) victory for the relationship between 
UK and EU; b) the influence of terrorism over the 
election’s outcomes; c) the predicted defeat and 
disappearance of Labour. This third point has 
also produced a sub-point, concerning Labour’s 
campaign, based upon social issues and egalitar-
ian perspective and the ‘emotional’ rhetoric used 
by Jeremy Corbyn. This issue was discussed by 
a small percentage of journalists and by social 
movements of the radical left before the election, 
becoming a trending topic for the Italian media 
system on 9 June.
The first topic concerned the ‘sure bet’ of 
Theresa May and the type of Brexit she would 
pursue. But the Conservatives have fallen short of 
an absolute majority of seats and this has produced 
astonished comments by journalists and politi-
cians. The second topic represented a typical ‘soft’ 
argument, but most commentators interpreted 
it as another advantage for the Tories because of 
Theresa May’s shock allegations about a possible 
suspension of civil rights.
The Corbyn effect
The third topic has produced a vibrant discussion 
in the Italian social media sphere, divided into 
supporters and opponents of Jeremy Corbyn. Also, 
the socially mediated politicians have shown the 
emergence of partisan politics, as highlighted by the 
networks of affiliation and/or partisan divides. This 
is the tweet of an Italian MP (Democratic Party) on 
9 June 2017: “With a different candidate, perhaps 
the Labour, after the slip of May, could win. What a 
pity: losing good is nice, but not enough”
Similar statements have been used by many 
leading political figures of the same party, probably 
to recover their wrong predictions over Jeremy 
Corbyn. On the other hand, even Matteo Renzi, 
interviewed by The Guardian in 2015, defined the 
election of Corbyn as leader of the Labour as the 
evidence that the party “delight in losing”.
The debate about the real proportion of 
Labour’s success constituted one of the main topic of 
discussions among Italian journalists and politi-
cians. Jeremy Corbyn has brought the Labour Party 
to 40% of the votes, the largest result since 2001, 
with a percentage increase that has only a precedent 
in the Attlee result in 1945. This matter of fact has 
been used by the Italian media and political sphere 
as a further pretext for debating Italian politics. 
Once again, assimilation, internal projection and 
re-framing as distinctive elements of the Italian 
debate on the 2017 UK General Election.
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When Theresa May announced the election, in 
April, the result seemed to be a foregone con-
clusion, for the Conservatives were 15-20 points 
head of Labour in most opinion polls, and May’s 
own popularity and leadership credibility vastly 
exceed that of Labour’s Jeremy Corbyn. A landslide 
Conservative victory – and a Labour meltdown – 
seemed to be a formality.
Hence the shock of the final result, in which 
the Conservatives’ loss of seats deprived them of a 
parliamentary majority, while Labour made signif-
icant advances, even winning former Conservative 
strongholds such as Canterbury and Kensington. 
While elections are shaped by various factors, there 
is no doubt that leadership played a major part in 
the 2017 result – but not in the way that had been 
widely assumed at the outset.
Theresa May had begun the campaign by 
promising to provide the ‘strong and stable’ 
leadership which Britain required, both to 
tackle domestic problems, and to adopt a tough 
stance vis-à-vis other EU leaders when negoti-
ating Brexit. She contrasted this self-image with 
Jeremy Corbyn, who she depicted as ideologically 
extreme, a throw-back to the 1970s, and lacking 
the diplomatic skills and experience required to 
negotiate a ‘good’ Brexit. If voters failed to return a 
Conservative government, May warned, the result 
would probably be a ‘coalition of chaos’, as Labour 
desperately tried to form a government with 
the Scottish National Party and remnants of the 
Liberal Democrats. 
Framing the election campaign in this manner, 
the Conservatives placed relatively little emphasis 
on detailed policy pledges; the main thrust was on 
May’s apparent leadership qualities and ability to 
pursue Brexit. Indeed, the Conservatives’ campaign 
bus featured May’s name in large letters on the side, 
while the Party’s name appeared in small letters. 
However, her strategy to pursue a presiden-
tial-style campaign calamitously back-fired, because 
in some of her television interviews – the ones 
which she actually turned-up for – she sounded 
‘wooden’ or nervous, and was inclined to answer 
questions with slogans (repeating the ‘strong and 
stable’ mantra), or verbally attacking Corbyn. 
Of course, the most damaging episode was 
the so-called ‘dementia tax’, whereby some citizens 
who required social care in later life would have the 
costs recouped from the sale of their homes after 
they died. Not only did the policy prove deeply 
unpopular, May’s hasty U-turn when faced with 
ensuing controversy, fatally damaged her claims to 
be a ‘strong and stable’ leader. Some commentators 
believe that it was the ‘dementia tax’ which ulti-
mately ‘lost’ the Conservatives the election. 
May also suffered, it seems, as a consequence 
of the awful Manchester and London terrorist 
attacks. Not only did she link these atrocities to the 
need for stronger national security which could 
only be provided ‘strong and stable’ leadership, she 
also pointed reiterated Conservative allegations 
that Jeremy Corbyn had been a ‘terrorist-sympa-
thiser’, due to his meetings, many years ago, with 
people associated with the IRA. However, May 
was immediately faced with criticism – including 
from some Conservatives – that she had been 
Home Secretary prior to becoming Prime Minister, 
and so had been the senior Minister responsi-
ble for cuts in policing, and the apparent failure 
to strengthen national security. This further 
weakened May’s authority and credibility during 
the election campaign.
Yet the Conservatives’ failure to win was not 
just because of May’s woeful campaign. It was 
also due, in part, to the surprisingly successful 
campaign by Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn. He 
confounded his many critics – not least in the 
Labour Party – with a calm, assured, election 
campaign, in which he promoted a package of 
left-wing, but nonetheless widely popular policies. 
Crucially, these had been ‘costed’, to reassure voters 
that a Labour government would not be economi-
cally profligate or reckless. 
Corbyn’s calm public demeanour, affability, 
the courteous, measured and generally unflustered 
manner in which he answered questions, and his 
reluctance to engage in personalised attacks on his 
Conservative opponents, greatly impressed many 
television viewers and those who saw Corbyn via 
social media. This did much to counter the vicious 
attacks on him by pro-Conservative newspapers. 
Indeed, some of these press attacks might inad-
vertently have boosted Corbyn’s popularity, partly 
because the ‘calm’ Corbyn who viewers saw and 
heard on TV bore little relation to the ‘extremist’ 
Corbyn they read about in pro-Conservative 
papers, and partly because the sheer vitriol of the 
press attacks on Corbyn’s character offended a 
British sense of ‘fair play’.        
In these respects, therefore, the 2017 general 
election was a dramatic tale of two leadership 
campaigns. The Conservatives’ Theresa May 
had a disastrous, error-strewn, campaign which 
destroyed her ‘strong and stable’ persona, and 
led to a catastrophic loss of support. By contrast, 
Labour’s Jeremy Corbyn astonished many people 
with his positive campaign, popular and ‘costed’ 
policies, and refusal to engage in personal attacks 
against his political opponents. As May’s populari-
ty plummeted, Corbyn’s soared.  
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During an election campaign political actors vie 
for attention and a distinctively managed form of 
visibility. In the age of digital media, the public 
image of the political leader is caught between 
ever-more tightly controlled staging of photo 
opportunities and the counter imaging practices 
of those hoping to reveal an unguarded moment, 
or who might create a fantasy mash-up version 
if such a moment does not exist. Controlling the 
‘optics’ of the election is about hoping to influence 
value judgements, especially in relation to leader-
ship qualities. 
The 2017 general election campaign has been 
‘highly presidentialised’, with the smaller parties 
and other usually prominent politicians side-
lined in an election narrative centred on a choice 
between ‘him or her’. In calling a snap election 
Theresa May immediately occupied an advanta-
geous position: with the authority of the Downing 
Street stage as her backdrop, she aimed to project 
herself as the embodiment of strong leadership. 
This was her message and she was going to stick to 
it. But May’s inflexible style soon led to a one-di-
mensional public image, as if she was a prisoner 
who could not escape the confines of a podium 
with placards held aloft behind her. When she 
did manage to escape she floundered and looked 
awkward in off-script moments. An early attempt 
at projecting ordinariness by eating a cone of chips 
was photoshopped to take that intended message 
to a wonderfully absurd level (Figure 1). 
Contrast this with Labour offering not just a 
three-dimensional leader, but a 360 degree video 
of Jeremy Corbyn’s public addresses on their 
Facebook page. In launching their use of 360 
degree filming technology at major events, Corbyn 
stated ‘This is accessible, participatory politics for 
the 21st century’ and claimed that the immersive 
video enabled Facebook users to experience the 
event ‘as if they were there’. While such faith in 
the visual technology might be over-stated in that 
claim, the initiative skilfully aligned openness and 
visibility with honesty and accessibility. In terms 
of participatory visual politics, the memes and 
videos often produced by Momentum activists, 
in addition to interested supporters, captured the 
DIY aesthetic of ‘outsider’ Corbyn in an attractive 
and humorous way. 
As the campaign progressed, the Labour leader 
attracted huge crowds at rallies, with Channel 4’s 
Michael Crick tweeting that Corbyn had probably 
addressed bigger meetings than any leader since 
Churchill (Figure 2). For viewers of such media 
reports, seeing large numbers of ordinary citizens 
mobilised in this way worked as visual evidence of 
his popularity. We might question whether these 
images merely represented the party faithful in 
safe Labour seats but this would be to miss their 
wider significance. The accumulative power of 
such visuals achieved something remarkable, 
cutting through the negativity of right-wing tabloid 
scenarios due to their effective harnessing of an 
authentic mood of positivity.    
It would be simplistic to suggest that the 
sensational shift in the polls during the campaign, 
and specifically in the perceptions of the two 
leaders, can be explained away by reading the 
media images alone. But as Justin Lewis has 
argued, broadcast impartiality rules opened up the 
space for a more balanced approach to Corbyn, 
and so both an increased and fair-minded visibil-
ity worked in his favour, not enough to win the 
election but enough to reduce the Conservative 
majority in a dramatic political shock. 
Outside No 10 on the morning of 9 June, the 
BBC’s political editor Laura Kuenssberg directly 
commented on the bad ‘optics’ of Theresa May 
staying holed up inside, that this would ‘not look 
good’. On one level this could be the frustration of 
a reporter who is waiting for the drama to unfold, 
but on another level it acknowledges the impor-
tance of been seen by and in the public. To take it a 
step further, we can think of the public as brought 
into being through attentive and participatory 
spectatorship; we want to see our leaders and see 
them interact with others like us and to feel a sense 
of recognition. Jeremy Corbyn got this, Theresa 
May did not. 
Seeing Jeremy Corbyn and not seeing Theresa 
May: the promise of civic spectatorship
Figure 1: (Created by JimmerUK and originally shared on 
b3ta.com before gong viral on various social media) 
http://www.b3ta.com/users/profile.php?id=34212
Figure 2: Michael Crick on Twitter, 6 June
https://twitter.com/MichaelLCrick/status/872158950896144385
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The social media posts of Labour supporters 
following the 2017 General Election were as 
celebratory as triumphant. The party under Jeremy 
Corbyn’s leadership, targeted by sections of the 
right-wing press with the ferocity usually reserved 
for the EU, had achieved an unexpected triumph: 
he had lost the general election with a similar 
number of seats that had led to Gordon Brown’s 
resignation in 2010. 
The seeming paradox of the delight in defeat 
of Labour supporters illustrates more than an 
element of surprise in exceeding expectations. The 
emotion, passion and enthusiasm of those cheering 
on Labour’s performance exceeded mere delight 
at a defeat less heavy than anticipated and was 
largely unaffected by the Conservatives’ success 
in securing a minority government with the DUP. 
They reflected that far from being a sole means to 
material end, support for Corbyn and Labour was 
an affective investment , part of the ‘fanization’ of 
British politics.
To many Labour and particularly Corbyn 
supporters the election result was celebrated as a 
personal vindication. A victory, albeit symbolic, 
that felt and was personal; articulating and 
reflecting a sense of self more than mere partici-
pation in the democratic process. The capacity of 
Corbyn to attract a highly committed fan following 
that secured two victories in Labour leadership 
elections has, of course, not been in doubt. But 
the nature of Labour’s ‘hollow defeat’ highlights a 
number of important consequences of the faniza-
tion of politics. Consequences which translate to 
vectors of political change that allow us to under-
stand the 2017 General Election not as a reversal of 
the trends shaping the past two tumultuous years – 
including David Cameron’s 2015 General Election 
victory, the Brexit vote, and Donald Trump’s shock 
victory in the US 2016 presidential election – a 
substantive shift to the Right, the influence of 
the tabloid press in political agenda setting and 
the rapid disintegration of factuality in political 
discourse described as post-truth politics  but on a 
deeper level as their continuation and articulation 
through a different electoral platform.
Fan cultures have long been understood as 
interpretative communities, gravitating towards 
collective readings and meanings, often construct-
ed in opposition to the canon of reception. The fan 
cultures surrounding Corbyn with its relentless 
critique of most “mainstream media” are a case 
in point. Like the active enthusiasts in other fan 
cultures, these fans are highly visible through user 
generated online texts and other forms of online 
and offline activism. Importantly their ‘fanon’ is 
maintained through uncompromising strategies 
of textual selection: disregard of large swathes 
of texts, information, and facts, which in their 
eyes are simply part of the neo-liberal conspiracy 
against him.
As such, their political fandom bears notable 
similarities to Brexit supporters who happily dis-
counted expert opinions warning against leaving 
the EU. Indeed, on the topic of Europe many 
Labour and Corbyn supporters demonstrated the 
greatest capacity of selection bias, or as psycholo-
gists call it, cognitive dissonance. Most Labour 
supporters and voter view the European Union 
favourably, aspects of the Labour manifesto 
such as the commitment to ending freedom of 
movement  a policy so rightwing that it was un-
imaginable in all but extremist parties’ manifestos 
two years ago – were rationalised as inevitable or 
simply ignored in the construction of their fan 
object (Corbyn/Labour).
Corbyn’s relative success thus illustrates the 
limitations of notions such as “post-truth” politics. 
The affective bond between fan and fan object is 
maintained through the semiotic appropriation of 
the fan object in popular culture: what Rodman 
(1996) describes as myths – indeterminable realms 
beyond a singular notion of truth. It is thus that 
in their affectively fuelled Corbyn and Labour 
fandom, supporters (like fans of other movements) 
create meaning which, for instance, celebrates the 
highest vote share for Labour since 2001 rather 
than the less favourable interpretations; that an 
actual defeat appears as a sort of victory.
How such myths are selected, and the affective 
bond to the fan object they maintain, explains the 
wider success of Corbyn’s Labour. Among its most 
visible enthusiasts fandom operates through the 
highly  personalised bond between fan and object 
in which the latter is constructed as a self-articu-
lation and reflection. The perspective of the fan is 
one that first and foremost asks “what does it mean 
to me”. Leaders and manifestos are read and ap-
propriated through the prism of self. Much as Vote 
Leave and Trump’s 2016campaign  succeeded in 
offering visions not of general values but personal 
interest and entitlement, Corbyn’s Labour achieved 
unexpected success by beating the Conservatives 
at their own game. While May proposed policies 
that implied substantive costs to almost all of 
the electorate through her social care reforms, in 
Corbyn fandom traditional progressive concerns 
of solidarity and equality – such as the rights of 
millions of migrants to and from the EU– were 
abandoned and replaced by the concern with self 
in anti-elitist discourses. As the accounts of former 
UKIP voters explaining their support for Corbyn 
highlight, he convinced voters that he would stand 
up for them; if not so much for others – a campaign 
“for the many [read: us], not the few [read: them]”, 
but certainly not “for all”. As much as political 
enthusiasm and fandom has thus fuelled Corbyn’s 
leadership, it also highlights its greatest weakness: 
the promise of affectively rewarding political en-
gagement that in its focus on the self is condemned 
to the defence of relative privilege. 
Corbyn and his fans: post-truth, myth and 
Labour’s hollow defeat
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Fandom emerged as a kind of small-scale 
curiosity in the 2015 election campaign – Mili-
fandom offered an unexpected tale for the media, 
with Ed Miliband representing an unlikely object 
for fan art, memes, and intellectual crushes. 
But by 2017 fandom had surely taken up a very 
different presence in electoral discourse. Rather 
than politics interacting with popular culture 
in more traditional ways, via celebrity endorse-
ments, or representations of ‘the political’, the 
energies of fandom that usually belonged to neo-
liberal consumption had instead migrated into an 
emergent left-populism.    
No longer a mildly comedic story, aspects 
of fandom had become seriously integrated into 
ways of seeking to transform society – successfully 
‘activated’ by the likes of Momentum. The political 
analyst Jonathan Dean has been foremost in docu-
menting this, astutely arguing: 
what distinguishes politicised fandom 
is… the direction of… affective flow. By this 
I mean that within ordinary fandoms, the 
affective ‘charge’ runs primarily between 
fan, fan object and fellow fans. As fandoms 
become politicised, however, fans’ affective 
investments become more ‘outwardly’ oriented 
in the sense of being constituted by a desire to 
change wider society.
At the same time, however, languages of fandom 
were being used very differently by opponents 
of ‘Corbyn-mania’ (Blairites as much as Tories), 
aiming to delegitimise and pathologise Jeremy 
Corbyn’s supporters. This was something of a 
‘retro’ move, as it’s been widely argued that media 
fandom – once the target of ‘get a life!’ admon-
ishments – is now part and parcel of mainstream 
culture. Indeed, books such as 2017’s Superfandom 
discuss how fan attachment can be serviced and 
monetised by an ever-vigilant culture industry. 
But centre-right political discourse was busy 
turning the clock back and ignoring the Web 
2.0 normalisation of fan activities; because here, 
fandom stood for the irrational/hysterical, and 
for an alleged detachment from (political) reality. 
Those supporting Jeremy Corbyn were rapidly 
badged as ‘Corbynistas’, dismissed as “delusional 
cultists” (in the recent and critically apologetic 
words of Owen Jones), and positioned as improper 
participants in the political sphere. Such an attempt 
at delegitimisation, based on deep-rooted binaries 
of emotion versus reason, was sharply encapsulated 
in a New Statesman article which accused Corbyn 
supporters of being “socialism fans”; something 
that was evidently felt to be far worse than them 
actually being socialists. “Socialism fans”, hazarded 
Daniel Allington,   
…joined the [Labour] party not because 
they agreed with its goals and wanted to help it 
achieve them, but because they identified with 
the culture of Leftism and sought an active 
form of cultural participation — much as 
theatre buffs might join an amateur dramatics 
club, or history enthusiasts might join a 
medieval re-enactment society. …They view 
[the Labour Party]… as an opportunity to 
engage in demonstrations, protests, marches, 
and rallies — as well as thrilling social media 
battles against insufficiently radical Labour 
MPs.
The accusation is that this amounts to pol-
itics-as-lifestyle, restricted to social media 
consumption and engagement rather than 
‘genuine’ political participation in campaigning, 
door-knocking, and so on. Socialists should be out 
there fighting the good fight, but “socialism fans” 
are allegedly narcissistic and individualized rather 
than politically committed and collectivised. 
All such pathologisations of an emotional 
Corbyn ‘cult’ – of fan-like ‘protest’ rather than 
supposedly mature parliamentary politics – failed 
to predict or perceive the nationalisation of fandom 
which crystallised in the wake of Labour’s 2017 
manifesto launch. Fannish energy and affect that 
were usually channelled through commercial (in-
tellectual) properties became centred on a political 
movement that precisely articulated “social media 
battles” with door-knocking and the likes of my-
nearestmarginal.com, as well as utilising possibili-
ties such as Facebook Live to train new canvassers.
There is an overly legible story of ‘hope’ versus 
‘fear’ on show here, but this reduces the complex 
affective relationships of fan practice to a weirdly 
polarised binary, with commentary becoming 
(meta-)divisive. Taking seriously today’s politi-
cised participatory culture – along with its chants 
of “Oh, Jeremy Corbyn” – means taking seriously 
the “stans”. As Zoe Williams says: “I had to Google 
what a stan was: it is a wild enthusiast, an off-the-
charts believer, a person who will bore the pub 
down. Corbyn has these, and no other British poli-
tician does”. Such passionate “stans” (or productive, 
transformational and socially-engaged fans, in 
old money) do not only stand for ‘hope’, and nor 
do they narcissistically ‘mirror’ their self-identity 
through Jeremy Corbyn. Instead, they represent a 
subset of the electorate that views itself as a part 
of multiple online communities, collectives and 
groupings that can influence others, act in concert, 
and convey affective contagions, or moods, that 
are irreducible to easy media narratives of singular 
emotion. Popular culture, and its normative Web 
2.0 neoliberal consumerism, has at least partly 
created the conditions of possibility for an anti-ne-
oliberal populism that traverses and appreciates the 
mediated figure of Jeremy Corbyn without being 
enclosed in a ‘cult of personality’.             
It’s the stans wot (nearly) won it
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With the election still a month away, Sky News 
asked where all the celebrities who ‘clogged up’ 
the campaign trail in 2015 were this time around. 
It’s true that Labour’s 2015 campaign had a strong 
celebrity presence from start to finish, from the 
PEB with Martin Freeman uploaded to YouTube 
on day one (followed by broadcasts by Jo Brand 
and Steve Coogan), to the surprise endorsement 
from Russell Brand in the final week. But while 
celebrities have attracted fewer national headlines 
and less airtime in 2017, a closer look at social 
media and local news coverage shows no celebrity 
exodus from Labour. 
Long-time supporters such as Steve Coogan 
and Eddie Izzard continued to support Labour 
candidates on the campaign trail despite not 
backing Corbyn for leader, with Wes Streeting 
being singled out for support by Sir Ian McKellen. 
It could have been 2015 again on Izzard’s constit-
uency tour, as the comedian repeated his efforts 
to pre-empt cynicism about celebrity endorsers 
by telling activists he had not been ‘wheeled out’ 
by the party, and that he intends ‘to run in the 
next election’. 
Even if Corbyn didn’t ‘go to’ Russell Brand 
as his predecessor was criticised for doing, Brand 
again used YouTube (and the Huffington Post) 
to reframe his often-misinterpreted comments 
about voting and lend support to Corbyn’s Labour. 
Maxine Peake’s PEB was similar to previous 
celebrity broadcasts with its framing of the election 
as a moral choice and emphasis on public services, 
but unlike in 2015 there was no mysterious 
absence of Labour’s leader. Similarly while Labour 
again called on a familiar face from Coronation 
Street to speak at a rally, Julie Hesmondhalgh 
directed far more enthusiasm toward the leader 
she believes ‘gives a toss’. Peake was also seen on 
Labour’s social media door-knocking with Corbyn, 
one of several shorter videos shared online with 
public figures from Kate Nash to Michael Rosen 
sharing their motivations for voting Labour. 
While Peake’s broadcast did not attract 
as much media attention or as many views as 
Freeman’s in 2015, it also did not attract the 
controversy. Labour’s celebrity supporters were 
previously dismissed as wealthy alleged tax evaders 
(Martin Freeman), drug abusers and philander-
ers (Steve Coogan), and all of the above (Russell 
Brand). When asked which celebrity endorsement 
he would most like to receive, Corbyn responded ‘I 
just want endorsement from the public – the many, 
not the few’. This use of Labour’s campaign slogan 
demonstrates the tension Labour, and Corbyn’s 
Labour in particular, faces. While consistently 
being the party to attract the most celebrity 
support, the wealth and fame of these supporters is 
at odds with their claims to represent the interests 
and share the concerns of ‘the many’. 
It therefore makes sense that Jeremy ‘The 
Outsider’ Corbyn found most support from those 
outside the mainstream in their own fields, par-
ticularly young rappers and grime artists. Akala 
faced a defensive Andrew Neil on This Week to 
discuss media treatment of Corbyn and May, with 
Stormzy having told The Guardian last year that 
Corbyn ‘gets what the ethnic minorities are going 
through and the homeless and the working class’. 
Corbyn himself was more likely to be seen on 
YouTube and Snapchat, answering questions from 
JME and discussing grime and grassroots football 
with Poet and Vuj. 
Corbyn also used football analogies to 
describe the state of the campaign in an interview 
for NME, where editor Mike Williams sought to 
authenticate the Labour leader for their audience 
by judging ‘whether he’s legit and for real’. These 
interviews combined discussion of music and 
football with opportunities for young people, 
and Akala, JME and Rag‘n’Bone Man all said 
they would be voting for the first time because of  
Corbyn. The links between grime and Corbyn were 
explored at a panel debate and rave organised by 
the Grime4Corbyn campaign group, set up in the 
hope that pro-Corbyn grime artists could influence 
young fans.  
Ultimately however, nobody was better able to 
attract a crowd during this campaign than Jeremy 
Corbyn himself. In front of 20,000 people at Wirral 
Live festival at Prenton Park, Corbyn received a 
response most warm up acts would dream of when 
he came on before The Libertines to again combine 
an appeal to football and music fans. But Corbyn 
also attracted and addressed impressive crowds 
throughout the campaign as the headline act, 
attracting nearly 6000 for a rally in Birmingham as 
the campaign came to a close. 
This campaign has demonstrated Corbyn’s 
impressive ability to attract celebrity supporters, 
particularly voices not usually heard in election 
campaigns, and to attract crowds of his own. 
Whether this assisted Corbyn in leading Labour 
to unexpected gains remains to be seen, but it 
certainly served to accentuate the differences 
between him and his opponent. 
Celebrities4Corbyn: continuity and change in 
Labour’s use of celebrities
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The othering and objectification of Diane Abbott MP 
Since 8th June, the news media has been awash 
with stories celebrating the increased diversity of 
Parliament, which now has 51 Black and Asian 
MPs. Meanwhile, the number of women MPs 
rose to 208, demonstrating progress towards race 
equality in British politics is considerably slower 
than gender equality. 
However, the tendency to separate ‘race’ from 
‘gender’ in discussions of equality, masks intersection-
al experiences and hidden inequalities. Therefore, the 
reported ‘success’ of women in British politics, masks 
the distinct forms of raced and gendered discrimina-
tion directed towards Black women.
Patricia Hill Collins argues that Black women 
are routinely objectified as ‘the other’, and a cursory 
examination of mainstream discourse during the 
General Election reveal that both remain persistent 
features of Black women’s experiences in public life. 
Despite her British identity, stories about Diane 
Abbott construct her as ‘the other’ through constant 
reference to the cultural heritage of her parents. On 
28th May writing for the Independent, in a scathing 
attack, Matthew Norman wrote: “No Padding-
ton-reared child of Jamaican immigrants gets to 
study law at Cambridge by being a dummy.” While 
on 9th June, in a front-page the Sun story by Jon 
Lockett: Labour’s First Lady, under the sub-heading, 
“Who is Diane Abbott? What’s her background?” 
The first sentence reads: “Born in London to 
Jamaican immigrants”. 
As Wetherall and Potter argue in Mapping the 
Language of Racism; racialised discourse need not 
be explicitly racist to be discriminatory, marginal-
ising or oppressive. The term ‘immigrants’ marks 
a location of difference that has negative connota-
tions due to repeated negative media coverage that 
constructs migrants as social problems. Therefore, 
repeated reference to ‘Jamaican immigrant’ serves 
as a process of othering and marker of difference 
— even though this information has no relevance 
to the stories. 
While scrutiny and critique in the news media 
are endemic to the nature of politics, people of 
colour are subjected to “intense, disproportionate 
and unfair surveillance” in the political arena, as 
John Fiske argues in White Watch. Diane Abbott 
is constantly singled out and pilloried across the 
news and social media. On 6th June, she was forced 
to pull out of a planned BBC Radio 4 interview on 
Women’s Hour after a serious long-term illness was 
diagnosed (revealed after the election to be type 2 
diabetes). This was announced by Women’s Hour on 
Twitter at 8.42am. Shortly afterwards a picture of Ms 
Abbott speaking on her phone in the ticket hall of 
Oxford Circus was tweeted which read “not seeming 
very unwell”. At 11.42am ex Tory MP and Evening 
Standard editor George Osborne tweeted a cartoon 
of Ms Abbott with the caption “Anti-terror meeting? 
I’m far too ill to attend that.” Tweets from support-
ers highlighted the double standards at play, as at 
12.15pm one tweet read: “Tories criticising Diane 
Abbott for doing what Theresa May did: pulling out 
of Woman’s Hour. Isn’t that called hypocrisy?”
Bell hooks argues that Black women are fre-
quently objectified through controlling images. The 
sexual objectification of Black women is rooted in 
slavery but persists in contemporary representation 
of Black women in public life. In January 2015, The 
Telegraph serialised an unauthorised biography 
of Jeremy Corbyn, which alleges that he and Ms 
Abbott had an intimate relationship in the 1970s. 
The Sun’s 8th June headline ‘Labour’s First Lady’, is 
clearly a reference to the book’s claims and plays on 
historical conceptions of Black women as concu-
bines. Such controlling images serve to maintain 
and reinforce patriarchal sexual ideologies about 
Black women.
As van Dijk argues, elite social actors play a 
major role in the reproduction of racism in society 
through racist discourse, not least because of their 
influential status. However, this is always accom-
panied by a denial of prejudice, which serves to 
normalise racial ideologies and present them as 
rational and justified. It is therefore no surprise, 
that on 6th June, writing for the Telegraph, Zoe 
Strimpel’s headline read: “It’s not racist to point out 
that Diane Abbott is a bungling disappointment”. 
In White Watch, John Fiske draws on Foucault’s 
conceptualisation of the ‘regime of truth’, defined as 
knowledge and truth, not as a reflection of objective 
reality but of the discursive power of elites. 
On 8th June, Operation Black Vote (OBV) 
published an “urgent statement in support of Diane 
Abbott MP”, signed by academic, legal and political 
figures, including Lord Herman Ousely. Part of the 
statement read:
“Black leadership in the UK is under constant 
scrutiny and examination. This… does not generally 
apply, to white mainstream politicians… afforded 
the luxury of white privilege, that allows for such 
mistakes to be considered human…we note the 
current hysteria of sections of the British media 
which has a disturbing tendency to apply a wholly 
different standard of critical news values when 
reporting on senior black political figures, and in 
particular, black women.” 
The statement is an apt critique of White 
privilege and how it manifests in political news 
reporting. From a Black feminist standpoint, 
othering and objectification typify how Ms Abbott 
has been represented across the mainstream media. 
Historical associations with hypersexuality serve 
to dehumanise Black women and undermine their 
authority and legitimacy as politicians. 
So while there is occasion to celebrate the 
increase in Black and Asian MPs — especially the 
landslide victory of Ms Abbott herself, we should 
be mindful that increased diversity does not mean 
increased equality — we still have a long way to go 
to achieve both.
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“Theresa May for Britain”: a personal brand in 
search of personality
It had looked so straightforward for the Conserv-
atives. They picked a campaign theme – ‘strong 
and stable’ leadership in an uncertain world;  a 
tried-and-tested strategy for incumbents against 
the ‘time for a change’ challenge of opponents. 
Theresa May seemed a perfect fit. She had calmed 
the nation in the tumultuous aftermath of the 
Brexit referendum; she had united her fractured 
party while Labour fell apart.  By the first quarter 
of 2017, she was high in the opinion polls, more 
popular than her own party, consistently had 
20-plus points leads over Jeremy Corbyn on 
approval ratings, and was deemed to have the best 
policies for Brexit. At the outset then, a leader-fo-
cussed Tory campaign seemed the no-brainer 
option. What could possibly go wrong?
As it turned out, practically everything. With 
hindsight, the fatal error was to throw all the 
campaign eggs into the Brand May basket. Early 
in the piece, reporters noted that the Tories were 
waging an extraordinarily presidential campaign; 
then again, don’t they always say that? This time, 
they were right. Scour the official Conservative 
website, its YouTube channel or Facebook and it 
was all about Theresa. Examine the mainstream 
media coverage and you find May dominated 
to the exclusion of everyone in Cabinet, barring 
walk-on roles for Amber Rudd and Boris Johnson. 
Her battle bus gave the first clue – “Theresa 
May: for Britain” was its slogan. This was indeed 
the most presidential party campaign in living 
memory, more even than those from the masters 
of personality politics, Tony Blair and David 
Cameron. May was the Conservative brand. 
“The Conservative Party is no more. Now it’s just 
Theresa May’s Team” the Telegraph’s sketch writer, 
Michael Deacon, put it.
Tory strategists must have been aware of the 
risks of such a personalized campaign. Apart from 
the considerable strain on the talent and energy of 
one person, it carried additional dangers, particu-
lar to May. First, her capacity to carry a campaign 
was unknown. She had scarcely been tested in any 
national contest, having had no leading profile 
in previous elections, or the Brexit referendum 
and having won the party leadership by default. 
Moreover, while she was a solid media performer, 
she had not demonstrated any of the televisual ease 
of Cameron, Blair or Boris. 
More importantly, it was not clear that she had 
the magic brand ingredient of emotional connec-
tion. She might be the personification of “keep calm 
and carry on”, but her high approval ratings did 
not translate into likeability. After her One Show 
appearance, a YouGov focus group of undecided 
voters found her “pushy” and “patronizing”, with a 
frustrating tendency to speak in soundbites.  When 
asked to describe her “animal personality”, respond-
ents likened her to a reptile; like a snake she was 
beautiful but also cold and deadly.  
May’s reserved, aloof personality is a common 
thread of media portraits. We have plenty of 
information about the vicar’s daughter, her 
Oxbridge education and political career, but it is a 
struggle to get a handle on her personality. I don’t 
know who she really is; that was one of my first 
thoughts when I started to consider the May brand. 
Matthew Parris came to the same conclusion in his 
profile for Newsnight.  After interviewing some 
of her friends and colleagues, he was still none 
the wiser. There is enough about her style and 
her willingness to take political risks to suggest a 
genuinely fascinating personality. But in public, 
certainly in this campaign, she wasn’t for sharing. 
Her buttoned-up, safety-first performance con-
trasted sharply with Corbyn’s energizing rallies or 
the engaging ebullience of Ruth Davidson, leading 
the Scottish Conservative campaign. May was, said 
the Daily Mail’s Quentin Letts a “glum bucket”. As 
the poll leads diminished, media commentators 
decided that she was simply a poor campaigner, 
isolated from real people, and robotically repeating 
campaign slogans. She became the “Maybot”. 
Ultimately, the entire strong-and-stable 
strategy was undermined by the manifesto 
blunders, especially, the ‘dementia tax’. Forced to 
backtrack on a key manifesto pledge, May became 
the ‘Queen of U-turns’; first the budget, then the 
decision to call an election when she’d promised 
not to, and then the dementia tax. “Weak and 
wobbly” was the Spectator’s headline over a cartoon 
showing a distraught May desperately clinging 
to her modesty as her armour plating crumbles 
around her. 
By the end, Brand May was in tatters. A brand 
devoid of personal charm was now ambiguous 
politically. Who is this Theresa May who says one 
thing and does another; votes Remain then follows 
hard Brexit; promises no election and then gives us 
one; promises compassionate inclusion then takes 
school lunches and threatens the inheritance of the 
elderly; promises a strong stable government, then 
U-turns under the first sign of pressure? This was 
the Brand May campaign, but if anything, we are 
less sure about Theresa.
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The presidential-style prominence given to 
Theresa May as a symbol of strength and stability 
contrasts sharply with images of her as a schemer, 
dissembler and flaky public performer. Whatever 
one’s feelings about May as a weak politician, the 
powerful emotions she attracts illustrates more 
widely the emotional framing of women poli-
ticians in news media and the gendered nature 
of contemporary politics. Although women’s 
influence on politics is growing globally and this 
election saw a record number of women elected, 
political culture remains a masculinised sphere 
where numerically men continue to dominate 
both as political journalists and as politicians. 
What’s more, the image and tone of male lead-
ership remains defined as the default position 
against which women are often judged as lacking. 
If women perform assertively they are liable 
to be judged as cold and aggressive, but if they 
express emotion they are perceived as a potential 
liability, weak and even emotionally unstable. 
As racist social media and bullying coverage of 
Diane Abbott show, the structures of intersection-
ality and ‘race’ also play a significant role in this 
process. May’s own mocking attacks on Abbott 
indicate the pernicious way that such structural 
unconscious bias works, even between women.
The perception of May as cold and distant was 
reinforced through her poor performance on the 
stump and toe-curling television interviews that 
truly reflected the poverty of her policies and poor 
skills as a communicator. Nonetheless, as our own 
analysis of the news coverage of Clinton, Sturgeon, 
and Abbott show, the extreme response to her 
as a political figure also reflects wider patterns 
of news reporting of women politicians indicat-
ing that they attract love and loathing in equal 
measure. On the one hand, as May’s unflattering 
sobriquet ‘Maybot’ implies, she is represented as an 
unfeeling, unnatural, machine-like creature whose 
responses to interviews are so robotic that they 
would fail the Turing test. Whilst ‘Maybot’ presents 
a cartoonish image of the walking dead or a horror 
film Mummy, the alternative representation of May 
which remained popular with some Tory-lean-
ing commentators up until the campaign’s final 
stages was that of another kind of Mummy: the 
containing, wise mother  - or ‘Mother Theresa’ 
in the parlance of Daily Mail columnist Richard 
Littlejohn.  As with Germany’s Angela Merkel, who 
is referred to as ‘Mutti’, some Tory MPs have gone 
so far as to refer to May as ‘Mummy’. The Oedipal 
connotations of the latter recall passionate feelings 
some of the Tory old guard felt about May’s role 
model Margaret Thatcher, who even referred 
to herself as ‘Mummy’ in her 2001 Plymouth 
‘Mummy Returns Speech’. May’s performance as 
the Iron Lady re-born may have initially worked 
to reassure some, but for others, her femininity 
also evoked the return of the repressed – and not 
in a good way. When one Tory MP tweeted ‘Here 
comes Mummy’, journalist Sarah Ditum said it 
reminded her of a creepy episode of Doctor Who.  
Here, the fantasy dimensions of the response to 
May tap less into a Freudian model of Oedipal 
desire but instead hint at pre-oedipal anxieties 
about the maternal body – fears that continue to 
be expressed culturally when it comes to women 
holding positions of political power who are seen 
as usual and even a bit strange. Such concerns are 
often dealt with defensively – splitting women into 
good and bad – by idealising and denigrating them 
as objects of love or loathing as in the example of 
May or other politicians such as Clinton, Sturgeon 
and Abbott (Yates, 2015). Such attention often 
focuses on the body and, as we have discussed 
elsewhere in relation to the press coverage of 
Clinton’s aging body, the reporting of May has 
also been framed in this way - as in ‘Legsgate’, her 
‘Prime Ministerial style’, her ‘lowcut tops’  and even 
her womb when the issue of her child-free status 
resurfaced in the election. 
As a political leader, the representation of 
May’s relationship to feminism and her own 
femininity is complex. She follows Thatcher in 
aligning herself both to the memory of her actual 
father and to the values of the symbolic father (i.e. 
God, Patriarchy and possibly Geoffrey Boycott). 
Defining herself as the Vicar’s daughter with strong 
Church of England values; her mother is rarely 
mentioned as an object of identification. This 
omission and the emphasis on paternal inheritance 
reflects perhaps – albeit symbolically – her voting 
record on women’s issues such as more restrictive 
abortion laws, child tax credit cuts, and the attack 
on public sector jobs and social care. In this respect 
she follows Thatcher in failing to support other 
women through her social policy decisions. Her 
attempts to embody the ‘strong and stable leader-
ship’ mantra is thus contingent upon the disavowal 
of those parts of herself aligned with feminism 
and social justice, and reinforces older notions of 
femininity as the cultural and political other. These 
same cultural processes that reinforce the dualities 
of femininity continue to shape the press coverage 
of women and the framing of their performance on 
the political stage.
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Politics, charisma, and the celebrity spectre of 
Nigel Farage
“Guess who my favourite politician is…”, my 
dentist said, as I lay, gaping and vulnerable, 
etherised upon his table. 
I didn’t get the chance to reply. 
“Vladimir Putin!”, he exclaimed. “Gets stuff 
done. Has real charisma. I’d vote for him”.
For all sorts of reasons, I’ve found myself 
reflecting on this frankly terrifying moment 
quite a bit since I had a molar filled at the turn of 
the month. One reason is that, with the benefit 
of hindsight, this was the time when the wheels 
first really began to wobble on the Theresa May 
bandwagon and the saddle was starting to be fitted 
on Jeremy Corbyn’s horse. 
Yet, for all the “Let’s make June the end of 
May” rhetoric on my Facebook timeline, anyone 
predicting a hung parliament a week before the 
election would have been laughed out of town: a 
sentiment that held, universally, right up to the 
election itself. On the eve of the vote, for example, 
Nigel Farage predicted a 65-seat Tory majority his 
LBC radio show and a “relatively comfortable win 
for Mrs May”.  
Yet, as we now know, things didn’t work out 
the way that everyone had expected. And one 
of the reasons for the amazing surge in different 
directions for May and Corbyn brings us back 
to my dentist: the notion that exuding charisma 
is central to being seen as a strong leader and a 
successful politician. 
Theories of celebrity, particularly work 
that explains how politicians are increasingly 
utilizing methods from the entertainment indus-
tries to boost their brands, have long canonized 
the German sociologist Max Weber’s notion of 
charismatic authority: a proposal that power and 
legitimacy derive from the charisma of a strong 
leader. And one of the most remarkable aspects of 
this election was the challenge to this formulation.
Corbyn’s remarkable late rise to prominence 
saw him overcome an image of incompetence 
that had plagued him since his first election to the 
Labour leadership in September 2015: an image 
fostered by opponents in the Parliamentary Labour 
Party and gleefully reproduced in the mainstream 
media. But in overcoming this hegemonic percep-
tion, Corbyn did not formulate a traditional image 
of a strong man. Rather, as the sociologist Katy 
Fox-Hodess argued in a perceptive Facebook post, 
Corbyn “built tremendous support without the kind 
of tough macho affect…associated with ‘old’ Labour 
and the old left in general. Quite to the contrary, 
Corbyn is kind, thoughtful and earnest and always 
seems genuinely bemused by the adulation he’s 
received – which he always deflects to instead 
emphasize the collective efforts of the grassroots”. As 
such, while there’s little doubt that by election day 
Corbyn had become a cult figure, especially among 
younger voters, his political power and legitimacy is, 
at least in part, derived from his refusal to nurture a 
brand of celebrity based on individualism: a process 
that Jo Littler has suggested we consider as Corbyn 
being an “anti-celebrity”. 
Corbyn’s success in doing this was undoubt-
edly boosted by Theresa May’s advisors’ strategy of 
foregrounding her as a “strong and stable leader”: 
something that became increasingly ridiculous 
as she bumbled from one disaster to the next. 
Meanwhile, it was also buttressed by the UKIP 
leader, Paul Nuttall, who, while managing to rid his 
party of the vast majority of its votes, managed to 
throw into question the truism that in order to be 
popular leaders should exude authenticity. Nuttall 
certainly tried to act like an ‘ordinary bloke’, but 
it didn’t seem to help. Along with rank incom-
petence, as it was becoming clear that the UKIP 
vote was being squeezed by the Conservatives 
and Labour, Nuttall’s rhetoric become increas-
ingly extreme, pressing for the return of capital 
punishment and for the total ban of the burqa, 
in a “desperate attempt to stay relevant”. This was 
unreconstructed masculinity eating itself.
Even more damning, perhaps, by the evening 
of the election it was clear that the mainstream 
media was simply ignoring Nuttall: something 
that his predecessor would have never let happen. 
In the six hours of channel surfing for which I 
managed to stay awake, Nuttall did not appear a 
single time. The next day, after Nuttall resigned, 
Farage suggested that his successor did not have 
“time to establish himself with the voters, who 
still don’t quite know who he is”. An alternative 
reading would suggest that the voters knew him 
all too well. 
Farage went on to say in numerous interviews 
that he feared that Brexit was now in trouble and 
that he “would have no option but involve myself 
again in full-time campaigning”, though when 
pressed he said that this did not necessarily mean 
as leader of UKIP. This makes a lot of sense. In my 
report on Farage after last year’s EU referendum, I 
suggested that due to UKIP’s raison d’être disap-
pearing with Brexit, Farage might find himself 
personally vulnerable. But, of course, I underesti-
mated him. Farage understood better than I that 
his success as a celebrity transcended party politics, 
and spent next few months cultivating influence 
through radio shows, and celebrity bromances with 
international strongmen. 
Despite UKIP’s demise, Farage will continue 
to pervade our cultural consciousness. He proves 
that, despite Corbyn’s best efforts, performanc-
es of traditional masculinity are far from dead: 
something that will, at least, cheer my dentist.
133
Prof Kay Richardson
Professor of 
Communication and 
Media at the University 
of Liverpool.
Email: Kay100@liverpool.ac.uk
Twitter: @kay090555 
Mainstream broadcast comedy and satire
This was not a good election for national main-
stream broadcast comedy, compromised by the 
snap character of the campaign, the terrorist 
attacks in Manchester and London, and reliance 
on a narrow and familiar (and not necessarily 
political) range of comic ideas as well as the re-
quirements of non-partisanship. The main outlets 
were the regular topical comedy shows – on TV, 
this included Have I Got News for You (BBC 1) 
The Last Leg (Channel 4) and The Fake News Show 
(Channel 4). BBC Radio 4 contributed via The 
News Quiz and The Vote Now Show. The sketch 
show format was represented by Election Spy, a 
modified and shortened version of Channel 4’s 
behind-the-campaigning- scenes  Power Monkeys/
Ballot Monkeys of 2015 and 2016, transferring 
to BBC 2. On the panel shows, election themed 
comedy had to take its place alongside other 
subjects, and the affairs of President Trump often 
took precedence in the earlier weeks.
Topical comedy was not suspended in 
response to the Manchester bombing and the 
attacks in London, but there were acknowledge-
ments of the atrocities within the comedy shows, to 
recognise the problem of tone in public discourse 
at such a difficult time. One experienced performer 
thematised the necessity of comedy as part of a 
defiant national response to the aims of terrorists:
ED BALLS (GUEST HOST): So it’s obviously been 
a horrible, terrible week.
IAN HISLOP (REGULAR TEAM CAPTAIN): Yes, 
but we’re still, I think, allowed to laugh.
Is that, is that 0K (addressing the studio audience 
directly)?
AUDIENCE “YES”.
IAN HISLOP: Well, I don’t want to overstate it, but 
going out, enjoying yourself, having a good time, 
all the things terrorism hates. We can still do it. 
Even here.
AUDIENCE: APPLAUSE
Meanwhile, the regular presenters of The Last Leg 
(Adam Hills, Josh Widdecombe, Alex Brooker) 
on May 26th spent about five minutes in pre-
dominantly earnest discussion of terrorism and 
responses to it, honouring the spirit of Manchester 
in particular, before reverting back to the expected 
comic mode (transitioning via a trope on Man-
chester’s ‘sense of humour’).
In these ways, authorised public comedy was 
positioned as taking place within a serious frame. 
Inside that frame, the comedy itself took familiar 
forms. Electioneering is, if nothing else, a matter of 
theatre and display. The performances of candi-
dates and other spokespeople during elections 
can be regarded as always potentially comic, to 
the extent that the humour is in the eyes and ears 
of the beholders. Many listeners and viewers, 
unprompted, will have responded with laughter to 
Diane Abbott’s on-air stumbling when asked about 
the cost of additional policing as anticipated in 
the Labour Party manifesto. In the TV and radio 
shows, the country’s paid wits and entertainers 
took it upon themselves to perform conscious 
humorous work on these moments. Both parties 
offered up instances apt for such rekeying – Jeremy 
Corbyn on radio, failing to recall figures related to 
Labour’s child care policy, Teresa May at a press 
conference, insisting that she had not reversed 
a manifesto commitment on social care. Karen 
Bradley on Good Morning Britain, refusing to 
answer a question from Piers Morgan about Tory 
cuts to police numbers. 
It is questionable whether comedy focused on 
the (lack of) performance skills is of any directly 
political relevance, rather than just being another 
dimension of contemporary celebrity culture. 
Have I Got News For You on June 2nd, recycled, to 
audience laughter, a backstage video recording of 
Corbyn stumbling over the figures in his Woman’s 
Hour (BBC Radio 4) appearance. Ian Hislop 
attempts to retrieve this for politics by finding 
the underlying memory failure unsatisfactory in 
a prospective leader: “There were two things to 
remember. How many children and how much it 
cost. It was poor”.  Hislop’s judgement nevertheless 
remains at the level of the political persona, not 
political substance. May’s difficulties spoke to both 
persona (how ‘stable’ is May?) and to substance 
(what, really, is the Conservative party’s position 
on social care for the elderly?). In none of these 
cases were comedy audiences assumed to have 
their own political commitments of either right 
wing or left wing orientation. Audiences in these 
cases were treated as consumers of electioneering 
conduct, asked to find funny (and thus to judge) 
on the basis of offences against presumed con-
sensual ‘citizenly’ values such as skills, expertise, 
consistency, informativeness, integrity, rather than 
on anything that might evoke divisions of wealth, 
ethnicity, gender, religious faith etc., within British 
society.  Space for the latter is not impossible in 
mainstream topical comedy broadcasting, but 
such discourse was largely side-lined during the 
campaign by the focus on performance, persona 
and process.  
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Sound bites: the music of Election 2017
For most accounts of the campaign, the words 
or the images are what seem to matter. But this 
is to ignore the sounds, often the most vivid and 
immediate form of communication. 
A key musical moment in this election wasn’t 
directly linked to a party campaign. A self-pro-
duced remix of a 2010 track, Captain Ska’s ‘Liar 
Liar’ aimed its titular accusation at Theresa May, 
whose speeches it sampled. It became the subject 
of protests and complaints of media bias over 
its lack of airplay. Driven by social media up the 
charts and blocked from being heard on chart 
shows by broadcasting balance regulations, it 
prompted a dilemma for broadcasters. Compliance 
with Ofcom’s Broadcasting Code and the Com-
munications Act 2003 rubs up against this trend, 
which has moved from purely musical concerns 
to political comment. Starting with the Facebook 
campaign that pushed Rage Against the Machine 
to Christmas Number One and then the use of  
‘Ding Dong the Witch is Dead’ from the Wizard of 
Oz to mark Margaret Thatcher’s death, it has now 
arrived in electoral politics.
While a mixture of meme culture and political 
pop hit the charts, the music in traditional party 
communications continued the shift away from the 
apogee that was New Labour’s ‘Things Can Only 
Get Better’. Campaign songs in centrally produced 
Party Election Broadcasts were relegated in favour 
of bland background music, where music featured 
at all.  The instrumentation and tone varied slightly 
– from the Conservative’s pastoral string arrange-
ments to convey safety and tradition, through 
the SNP’s last broadcast using acoustic guitar and 
folk fiddle, to Labour’s first film eschewing music 
entirely.  Almost all the parties seemed to shy away 
from music as an emblematic centrepiece and 
towards a non-descript musical aesthetic, light 
on hooks and more reminiscent of mobile phone 
advertisements than rousing anthems.
Only the Greens put a song at the heart of 
a national broadcast – ‘Shout’ by Tears for Fears 
– and even that was a fairly anonymous cover 
version. Another exception to the tendency 
towards background music was Conservative 
candidate Greg Knight’s co-written jingle at the 
end of his lo-fi video for his local campaign. 
Online mirth and comparisons to Alan Partridge 
nevertheless didn’t stop the drummer in the Parlia-
mentary band MP4 from holding his seat.
 But the star power of popular music still 
featured, with musicians’ endorsements and 
interventions prominent, and overwhelmingly pro 
Labour, or at least anti Conservative. The Grime 
4 Corbyn movement, certainly, chimed with his 
strategic emphasis on the youth vote. Unlike Red 
Wedge in 1987, this wasn’t officially aligned with 
the party. It also, by celebrating Corbyn, echoed 
the tenor of a campaign focused on the leader and 
his distinct ‘grassroots’ brand. 
The broader spectrum of popular music also 
got on board, with Corbyn on the cover of both 
NME and Kerrang and Lily Allen’s music featuring 
in a last minute video online. Pink Floyd’s David 
Gilmour backed Labour on Twitter, with a home 
video of a song putting new lyrics to the tune 
of Billy Bragg’s ‘Between the Wars’. Again, its 
homemade nature echoed the greater salience 
of social media campaigning and the associated 
aesthetic convergence of campaign music with 
user-generated content.
This was played out in the deployment of 
gigs as political platforms, with Corbyn’s appear-
ance before The Libertines in Tranmere and the 
adoption of ‘Seven Nation Army’ as a kind of 
football chant featuring his name. The slightly ad 
hoc feel to some of these musical moments also 
related to politicians’ impromptu use of music 
to authenticate themselves on the trail. Corbyn 
(again) sang hesitantly along to a busker, Iain 
Duncan Smith rapped Eminem lyrics on ITV’s 
Good Morning Britain and the SNP’s Mhairi Black 
delivered a pub rendition of ‘Caledonia’, this last 
case also highlighting the growing prevalence of 
mobile phone footage in political coverage.
The manifestos varied in their promises about 
music.  UKIP mentioned unequal access to music 
education and PE to serve its broader tilt against 
how different faiths interact in schools while the 
Tories addressed the creative industries at large. 
But only Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
contained specific music related promises – Labour 
to introduce measures to protect grassroots venues 
and the Liberal Democrats to review available 
funding and planning rules to the same end.
Ultimately, perhaps the most significant 
musical event of the campaign period – Ariana 
Grande’s Manchester concert – had little to do with 
the election itself, but emerged from events that 
nevertheless came to frame much of the debate. 
It’s hard to know in the bigger mix of factors 
exactly how much of a role musical concerns 
played in the result. But as an election centred on 
leadership proved unpredictable, it is clear that 
music was present throughout the campaign in an 
electoral environment increasingly characterised 
by the coming together, especially online, of party 
and publicly produced content.
Dr Adam Behr
Lecturer in Contemporary 
and Pop Music at the 
Newcastle University.
Email: adam.behr@newcastle.
ac.uk
Twitter: @AdamBehrLive
Pictures by:
Back cover image: Picture by Jane Barlow/PA Wire/PA Images
Front cover image 1: Picture by Ben Stevens/PA Wire/PA Images
Image 2: Picture by Rick Findler/PA Wire/PA Images
Image 3: Picture by Stefan Rousseau/PA Wire/PA Images
Image 4: Picture by Owen Humphreys/PA Wire/PA Images
Image 5: Picture by Isabel Infantes/EMPICS Entertainment
Image 6: Picture by Dominic Lipinski/PA Wire/PA Images
Image 7:  Picture by: Stefan Rousseau/PA Wire/PA Images
Image 8:  Screenshot from “When JME Met Jeremy Corbyn”, by i-D: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A-rxp_QwjmQ
I n  m e m o r y  o f 
Jo Cox MP
22 June 1974 – 16 June 2016
